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Abstract 
The act of “speaking security” has grave implications for political debate. By evoking a 
threat, political resources are mobilized in a way that lifts the issue at hand “beyond” 
politics and calls for an immediate response by adopting extraordinary measures that may 
result in the restriction of civil liberties. This approach was developed by the so-called 
Copenhagen School. The efforts of subsequent researchers to develop the several 
concepts left under-theorized in the original framework remain incomplete. 
The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, to develop a model for analyzing 
securitization processes in a more comprehensive manner, accounting for the bureaucratic 
policy-making procedures that undergird securitizing moves, for the reiterative 
deliberations between securitizing actors and audiences in the construction of threats, for 
the multiplicity of audiences involved in the process, and the influence wielded by 
functional actors on the success of securitization. To this effect, this thesis expounds on 
the theoretical aspects of securitization and media studies, the judicial precedents 
regarding immigration policy in the US, and adopts John Kingdon’s three streams model 
of policy-making.  
Second, this thesis presents a novel definition of the functional actor. Functional 
actors are entities that (1) affect decisions in a field of security in general and the success 
of a securitizing move in particular, (2) cannot independently produce security meanings, 
(3) stand to gain or lose, in material, ideational, social, or other terms, as a result, and (4) 
can, in their particular function, operate as a secondary securitizing actor or as a 
secondary audience but is not the direct target of a securitizing move. Specifically, this 
thesis argues that the media and the judiciary should be treated as functional actors in the 
securitization process. 
The latter point is tested by applying an enhanced model of securitization to the 
presidency of Donald Trump whose signature policy has been immigration. This thesis 
analyzes four categories of immigration policy through which the Trump administration 
has sought to securitize immigration. Each category is presented through the Kingdon 
model, followed by an overview of securitizing and desecuritizing moves, of media 
frames, and of judicial proceedings. The results confirm the utility of treating the media 
and the judiciary as functional actors. However, it also reveals a shortcoming of the 
Kingdon model because its presumption of temporal linearity is found to be unjustified. 
 
Keywords: securitization, desecuritization, functional actor, audience, security, 
immigration, United States, Donald Trump, media, the judiciary. 
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Introduction 
Relevance 
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has attracted considerable 
global scrutiny. Much of it has stemmed from concern with Mr. Trump’s character, 
temperament, and the policies which he has proposed or adopted. His presidential 
campaign and his time in office have been tinged with a host of controversies. Much of 
this has owed to his statements and hardline stance on immigration. This antipathy has 
also been echoed in other policy areas, for example in the administration’s protectionist 
decision to institute steel and aluminum tariffs under the guise of “national security 
interests” (Chung and Westbrook 2018). While political commentary on the Trump 
administration abounds, relatively little academic research has hitherto been published on 
his presidency. This is understandable, of course, given that he is currently hardly a year 
and a half into his four-year term. In any case, academic research is necessary to better 
understand the dynamics of American domestic and foreign politics under the new 
administration since, owing to the country’s preeminent position in the international 
system, there obviously are implications on international relations. This thesis, therefore, 
is both timely and topical. 
 The specific topic of immigration is also germane to investigate for multiple 
reasons. First, immigration consistently ranks among the top issues for the American 
electorate (Pew Research Center 2016, Newport 2016). Second, immigration is the core 
issue for populist radical-right parties (PRRP) and their specific electorates (Mudde 2016, 
Rydgren 2017). Mr. Trump, although nominally a Republican president, nevertheless fits 
the populist paradigm well (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Immigration is thus not only a 
suitable policy issue to investigate but an essential one, both in terms of the general 
electorate and in terms of the priorities of the new administration. Third, and more 
broadly, immigration in Western countries generally involves a debate over things like 
assimilation, affirmative action, discrimination, welfare policy, etc. Minorities who are 
favorably impacted by more liberal or more inclusive policies lean toward the parties that 
are on the left side of the political spectrum, a correlation that also applies to the US 
electorate (Pew Research Center 2015). Therefore, the status and treatment of 
immigrants, both illegal and otherwise, has serious implications on the electoral balance 
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between the leftward Democrats and the rightward Republicans. Finally, immigration-
related policy debates are very often framed in ways that make securitization theory (ST) 
a befitting model for analysis. 
 Securitization is a process in which something is argued to be existentially 
threatened by something else and that the remedy to the threat is the adoption of 
emergency measures. Securitization theory (ST) investigates how threats are constructed 
between entities who articulate the threat and the entities that need to be persuaded into 
accepting the threat. ST is a constructivist approach to international relations (IR) because 
it treats security as socially constructed by speech acts uttered in intersubjective 
communication. Our perception of security (or the lack thereof) is largely mediated by 
the way we speak or what we choose to speak about. Buzan and Hansen (2009: 212) 
suggest, the ST framework has seldom been applied to the United States specifically. 
They state that this is due to “the extent to which the concept of security is explicitly 
addressed” in the US and in Europe. It is no wonder that constructivist theoretical 
paradigms such as ST find little traction in American academia because it has historically 
been heavily dominated by positivism.1  
Furthermore, given that the Trump administration is the rare example of a populist 
right-wing government, one to whom immigration is the paramount issue, the ST 
framework has newfound utility for the US as a case study. There has hitherto been 
relatively little to research through ST, the voluminous research on the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks excepted (e.g. Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, d’Appollonia and Reich 2010). Thus, this 
thesis also fills a thematic gap at a propitious moment in time. 
 Côté (2016: 544–45) has highlighted a common concern regarding case studies that 
this thesis is bearing in mind. Using empirical studies as basis for theory development 
may include indirect selection bias through the reliance on secondary sources. However, 
the different representations of the same issues in the media, for example, are a key 
component of the empirical analysis, which alleviates (but does not completely eliminate) 
this concern. As such, this thesis also makes extensive use of original sources, such as 
policy documents published on government websites. In addition, since the US is 
comparable to other liberal-democratic systems in the most important respects, the 
                                                 
1 For a discussion on the differences between security studies in Europe and in the US, see Wæver (2004). 
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conclusions regarding the influence of the media and the judiciary that this thesis draws 
are a priori applicable to other Western settings as well. 
 
Research question 
The original framework of securitization has been widely criticized for being under-
theorized (McDonald 2008, Léonard and Kaunert 2011). While some key concepts have 
been considerably refined, no common framework for analysis has been developed. For 
example, there is still open debate over how to precisely judge when securitization has 
occurred or not. 
 These theoretical concerns are at the heart of this thesis. First, the thesis seeks to 
enhance the ST model by developing and then applying a model of ST that incorporates 
more precise definitions of the key concepts — in all their multiplicity —, elaborates on 
the dynamics between the entities involved, and utilizes important insights from fields 
such as law, media studies, and cognitive psychology. This thesis offers a modest step in 
that very direction. This task necessitates a considerable amount of theoretical elaboration 
and synthesis. 
 Second, this thesis uses the Trump administration case study to refine the concept 
of the functional actor — originally understood as any entity that affects the dynamics of 
a sector by influencing decisions in the field of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 36) — and 
seeks to clarify how functional actors impact the securitization process. In particular, this 
thesis argues that ST gains in explanatory potential by treating the media and the judiciary 
as functional actors. 
 The double task of the developing the ST framework in general and creating a more 
nuanced definition of the functional actor in particular necessitates an overview of 
existing literature on the relevant aspects of the theory. In the case of the functional actor, 
research is almost entirely non-existent. However, the revised conception does draw on, 
in part, the theoretical contributions of previous researches (see Chapter 1 Section 6). 
 The enhanced model of ST requires the researcher to conduct an extensive survey 
of government and media sources, as well as public opinion polls, to explain the ST 
process as accurately as possible.  
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Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter delves into the 
theoretical framework of ST, including an overview and discussion of the several key 
concepts. It also presents Kingdon’s three streams model as a way of structuring the 
securitization process by introducing elements bureaucratic politics into the mix. The 
theoretical chapter ends with an overview of important judicial rulings regarding the 
immigration policy of the US. These are relevant to understanding the influence the 
judiciary has had on the Trump administration’s immigration policy. It also speaks to 
questions regarding the legality and morality of those policies. 
 The second chapter will present the methodology used in the empirical part. The 
Kingdon model is used to delineate between different audiences in the process and to 
illuminate the dynamics between the securitizing actor and those audiences. The chapter 
also lists other units of analysis and describes the data gathering methods that have been 
used.  
The third chapter applies the enhanced theoretical model of ST to the Trump 
administration’s attempts at securitizing immigration. The chapter then discusses the 
implications of the case study and offers ideas for future research. 
 
Overview of the theoretical framework and sources 
The use of ST is appropriate because it provides insights into the dynamics of how policy 
issues are elevated into security issues. Patterns of securitization affect the kinds of 
policies that are adopted. Successful (or unsuccessful) securitization of immigration has 
significant ramifications for certain populations. Policies that may be described as 
“extraordinary” or even “extreme” — insofar as they start infringing on the basic human 
rights of those populations — become possible to adopt in cases of successful 
securitization. 
 The salience of this topic is accentuated by the fact that Mr. Trump’s election had 
an immediate demonstrable effect on immigration, as evidenced by the number of illegal 
border crossings plummeting and by the number of arrests and deportations surging in 
the administration’s first months alone (Dinan 2017a, Sacchetti 2017). Thereafter, the 
immigration-policy debate has remained on the front burner. These effects serve as a 
14 
 
stepping stone to problematizing the audience, since the American electorate is widely 
considered to be extremely divided, tendentious, and oppositional (Shifflett 2016, Jones 
2016). The original theory of the Copenhagen School (CS) assumes an idealized 
democratic society to be the audience of a securitizing move. The CS oversimplifies this 
crucial element in the securitization process since it treats the response of audience as a 
nominal measurement — either the audience agrees or not. However, the audience may 
respond by attempting to desecuritize the issue instead and try to keep it in the political 
arena. While we presume that a democratic society will involve a tug-of-war between 
ideas and policies, we expect majority assent to be the prerequisite to the same being 
enacted institutionally.  
This seemingly simple dynamic has now been complicated. Mr. Trump has 
consistently argued that illegal immigration is the bane of American society but counter-
discourses hold immigration and immigrants in higher esteem (Sharma 2017). He has 
managed to enacted few extraordinary measures yet his political opposition and the media 
claim those measures are extreme by default, since, for example, they have broken up 
families and dispensed with the civil liberties of immigrants, illegal or otherwise (King 
2017). Complicating the picture further are functional actors who influence the success 
of securitizing moves. 
 Following the lead of Léonard and Kaunert (2011), this thesis will utilize John 
Kingdon’s three streams model (originally developed in 1984) which divides the policy-
making process into three distinct stages. The model enables the analyst to divide the 
process of securitization into different stages and to analyze the process in greater detail. 
Another utility for ST, as emphasized by Léonard and Kaunert (2011: 64), is that it aides 
in operationalizing the securitizing actor and the audience more precisely, as well as 
enabling the conceptualization of the audience as an amalgam of different audiences, 
thereby resolving the overly simplistic original conception of the CS. To this model, I 
will add the enhanced concept of the functional actor.  
The concept has neither found discussion in Léonard and Kaunert’s (2011) adoption 
of the model, nor has such an entity been included in the original model. This is due to 
the inclusion of various entities, inside and outside governments, “visible” or “relatively 
hidden” (Kingdon 2013: 68), that operate, in the ST paradigm, somewhere between a 
securitizing actor, a functional actor, and an audience. Kingdon accounts for these 
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entities in their myriad actual functions but he does not abstract their common qualities, 
which otherwise would enable to unite those entities under a single label such as the 
functional actor. The closest concept in Kingdon’s model appears to be the agenda agent 
who is an entity involved in creating or blocking policy agenda items (e.g. interest groups) 
(Kingdon 2013: 51). However, Kingdon hardly mentions the concept and offers no 
theoretical considerations either. In any case, the enhanced definition of the functional 
actor includes the potential to influence on the policy-making process directly. 
 The empirical analysis section will present the policies that the Trump 
administration has sought to adopt — categorized into four different policy areas — and 
then discuss the responses by the judiciary (such as placing an injunction on a particular 
executive order) and by the media (such as arguing for and against the legality behind a 
policy). 
Data will be gathered from US government websites and from various news sites 
that are generally understood to be in opposite political camps (such as the left-leaning 
Washington Post and the right-leaning Washington Examiner). Among the data is a 
selection of the Trump administration’s securitizing speech acts, the Democrats’ 
desecuritizing speech acts, as well as the arguments the courts have made in allowing or 
forbidding the proposed policies of the Trump administration. 
 The analysis will be illuminated by opinion polls, taken to indicate the sentiments 
among the American populace. These polls pertain to general attitudes regarding broad 
social and political topics and to specific attitudes regarding particular policies. The polls 
often delineate between the political persuasions of the respondents, which is necessary 
in identifying the several audiences involved in the securitization process. Polls also 
elucidate the context in which certain attitudes are held and potentially reveal the impact 
that real-life events have on the formation thereof. Second-generation securitization 
scholars argue that context should be a full-fledged unit of analysis and the author of this 
thesis concurs. 
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1 Theoretical Framework 
Securitization is a process in which a securitizing actor depicts a referent object as 
existentially threatened by a threat to mobilize support for emergency measures that go 
“beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan et al. 1998: 5)2. This approach was 
developed by constructivist scholars now referred to collectively as the CS, associated 
mostly with the researchers Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde and their 
seminal work, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998).  
The essence of this approach is that security and securitization are, in the final 
analysis, social constructs realized by speech acts uttered in intersubjective interaction. 
This approach runs counter to mainstream IR scholarship which mostly purports to 
analyze the objective presence of threats and the subjective perceptions thereof. 
Analytically, it is important to note that “speaking security” is essentially about evoking 
insecurity, since potential insecurity is the prerequisite to securitization. 
 For the CS, the adoption of extraordinary measures (e.g. suspending civil rights, 
limiting economic freedoms, war, etc.) as a response to accepted threats (i.e. realized 
threat images) is paramount but methodologically the focus is almost solely on discourse, 
including aspects such as the authority of the speaker, rooted in John Austin’s speech act 
theory. Second-generation securitization scholars (e.g. Balzac, Bigo) hold that this is like 
studying the tip of the iceberg (Berling 2011: 389) and instead highlight sociopolitical 
factors such as institutionalization and bureaucratic practices as additional objects of 
analysis. This extends the original boundaries of the securitization to account for a wider 
“configuration of circumstances, the congruence of which facilitates its realization” 
(Balzacq 2011: 18). Appropriately, then, the first generation is referred to as the 
“philosophical” approach while the second generation is referred to as the “sociological” 
approach. 
Security is better understood as a spectral measure (i.e. a ratio measurement) that 
ranges from the non-politicized (i.e. not for the state to deal with and not up for public 
debate) through the politicized (i.e. part of public policy and policy-making) to 
                                                 
2 For a more meticulous, albeit laborious definition, see Balzacq (2011: 3) who attempts to account for all 
contingencies simultaneously. 
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securitization (i.e. an existential threat that is no longer debated but dealt with haste). 
However, there is no clear dividing line between the categories. This means that 
assessments thereof are necessarily externalized — inductively, the analyst assumes that 
their empirical observations evidence a particular state of affairs. If there is vigorous 
public debate between political factions on, for example, how many immigrants should 
be allowed into the country, then the matter is politicized. If, for example, the civil 
liberties of 120,000 Japanese Americans have been suspended through orders to relocate 
into internment camps under suspicion of potential treachery — with negligible public 
resistance —, then the matter has been securitized. The discursive and institutional 
practices that constitute securitization would, then, range from the entirely ordinary to the 
entirely extraordinary. 
 It is not in the purview of this thesis to answer the question that is inherent to a 
spectral measure: how much to yield a result3. Instead, this thesis serves to highlight the 
blurred line between the politicized and the securitized, especially with respect to 
different audiences. It is perfectly possible that critical mass can be determined only 
retroactively, based on an assessment of the whole securitization process, from the 
securitizing act to the adopted policies. If the state of affairs was changed and it involved 
some degree of audience assent, then we can deduce that enough support for the 
securitizing claim was garnered. One crucial shortcoming of the CS is that their 
securitization model does not include a way to measure the success or failure of 
securitizing moves.4 
In terms of levels of analysis, the focus is on the interaction between individuals 
(i.e. the securitizing actor, usually) and subunits (i.e. the audience and the functional 
actors), while the resulting implications are located at the unit level (i.e. states). The scope 
of security studies has expanded over time beyond the traditional military and political 
sectors. Buzan et al. (1998: 7–8) suggest that sectoral analysis in security analysis aids in 
                                                 
3 O’Reilly (2008: 67) attempted to conceptualize “critical mass” as a factor of volume (i.e. the amount of 
people convinced of a threat, “usually the majority of the target group”) and caliber (i.e. that the people 
convinced are actually the relevant audience). O’Reilly states that the usual target audiences in the US 
context are Congress and the general populace. 
4 Salter (2008) has developed a spectral measure to assess the success or failure of a securitizing move. 
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determining the referent objects or their characteristics. This speaks to one of the key 
contributions that ST made: a conceptualization of how state security is actually made up 
of disparate elements, not of simply military-political security, broadly understood. 
However, even though ST enables to analyze securitization processes on the individual 
and subunit level, the CS’s focus is fundamentally a traditional statist one. Sectors 
pertinent to this paper are the economic sector (i.e. national economies and the global 
market), the political sector (i.e. the sovereignty and ideology of the state), and the 
societal sector (i.e. collective national identity). The Trump administration has made 
appeals to all three.  
The aforementioned elements constitute internal incongruities that limit the 
explanatory potential of ST. Neal (2009) points at two other shortcomings. First, the ST 
paradigm may not be applicable to all venues. IR scholarship has generally been 
acknowledged to be Eurocentric but ST specifically, paradoxically, may not actually be 
applicable to processes on the supranational level of the European Union, given that the 
public dimension in EU policy-making is “minimal” (Neal 2009: 336). Second, the causal 
relationship between a securitizing act and a policy outcome is hard to discern. Indeed, 
Neal (Ibid.: 352) states that security cannot be comfortably understood through “a single 
overarching logic,” and while ST has admirably problematized the construction of 
security threats, “practices of government have become too complex, too plural and too 
diverse to maintain the plausibility of a sovereign centred, nominalist understanding of 
security.” But even if the “practices of both security and risk are becoming increasingly 
plural and heterogeneous” (Ibid.), it does not really prevent ST from being a useful model 
to apply to understanding these processes. While Neal’s argument is one in favor of a 
more comprehensive framework, his key argument regarding a policy outcome is 
fundamentally a call to abandon the focus on exceptional measures, especially in light of 
his references to Bigo (2002) and Huysmans (2006). But both of these researches already 
draw attention to security as a kind of practice in their discussions of the “security 
continuum” and a “governmentality of unease,” respectively5. The work of second-
                                                 
5 Both of these concepts treat security as a field in the Bourdieuan sense. The security continuum is “an 
institutionalized mode of policy-making that allows the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, 
drugs traffic and money-laundering to the area of migration” (Huysmans 2006: 72). Bigo’s governmentality 
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generation securitization scholars shows that the shift Neal is calling for has already taken 
place. Furthermore, the application of Kingdon’s three streams model to the securitization 
process enables to map out how a securitizing act is made into policy. Critiques of ST are 
aplenty, such as McSweeney’s (1996) argument that giving an ontological preexistence 
to the securitizing actor and audience runs afoul of to constructivist and processual 
perspectives of identity, but they are not fundamental to this particular thesis. 
The context of the US, fortunately, overcomes these concerns anyway in that the 
actors in the process are easily distinguishable, as is the process from a securitizing move 
to a policy outcome, save for the particular actors involved in backroom negotiations and 
any other manifestations of bureaucratic politics that attend any piece of legislation. The 
fact that the Trump administration, so far, has only succeeded in enacting executive orders 
(EOs), bypassing Congress, minimizes Neal’s concern over the ST paradigm not 
explaining how securitizing moves are institutionalized. 
 
1.1 Core concepts 
The concepts presented here retain their conventional meanings as espoused by the CS 
and subsequent researchers. Austin and Brossard (2017: 10), among a myriad other 
scholars, have noted that the CS gave an impression that the main units of analysis — the 
referent object, the subject, and the audience — are “homogeneous entities.” Theoretical 
elaboration on these concepts, as well as my original contribution to the definition of the 
functional actor, appear in subsequent sections. 
A securitizing move is an attempt to persuade the audience to acquiesce to a referent 
object being threatened existentially and to offer a potential way out. Securitization 
                                                 
of unease is about the ramifications of creating “a continuum of threats and general unease” that accompany 
the creation of “a risky and dangerous society” (2002: 63). Neal (2009: 353) is interested in how the links 
between different policy areas — asylum, border control, etc. — become institutionalized and how this is 
manifested in the “complex technologies, knowledges and techniques” of governance. However, as Côté 
(2016: 549) has pointed out, treating security as a field in the way the Paris School does, constructs a passive 
and limited conception of the audience by excluding the audiences outside the field of (in)security. The 
production of security practices and meanings is done by a select few security professionals that impose 
the same on a larger group but this runs counter to the extensive empirical work on audiences in ST. 
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cannot be imposed but has to be argued for, which is important because security action is 
“usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36). 
The reverse of a securitizing move is the desecuritizing move, which is given next to no 
attention in the CS except for being considered the “optimal long-range opinion” in that 
it shifts an issue back “into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere” 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 4, 31).  
A referent object is something that is seen as existentially threatened and that has a 
legitimate claim to survival. Different sectors involve different referent objects: economic 
security can be about the maintenance of the welfare state while environmental security 
can be about the maintenance of the local biosphere.6  
A securitizing actor is someone (or a group) who commits the securitizing move. 
These actors are often public officials who can lobby for securitization more easily 
because “they hold influential positions in the security field based on their political 
capital, and have a privileged access to mass media” (Balzacq 2011: 26). This paper treats 
the Trump administration (principally the president but also other members of his cabinet) 
as the securitizing actors and the political opposition (principally the key figures in the 
Democratic Party) as the desecuritizing actors, insofar as their role in this thesis is limited 
to the debate over immigration and attempts to counter the policies of the new 
administration. 
A functional actor is a person or a group that affects the dynamics of a sector by 
influencing decisions in the field of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 36). 
The empowering audience are people that need to be persuaded of a threat for 
securitization to be successful. An audience can offer formal and moral support, 
depending on whether it is an institution or the public, respectively. 
Context describes the general perceptions of threats that precondition audience 
behavior. It is important to note that rhetorical urgency does not always constitute a real 
threat. Just because somebody states something does not necessarily make it so — the 
constructivist position is that discursive statements could potentially make it so. 
According to Balzacq (2011: 12), the CS has overemphasized institutional threats (i.e. 
products of communicative relations between agents) and neglected “brute” threats (i.e. 
                                                 
6 For a more comprehensive overview of sectors, see Buzan et al. (1998: 8). 
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actual threats not contingent on “language mediations”). Indeed, “language does not 
construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it” (Ibid.). However, we are familiar 
with the axiom that perception is reality — or, at the very least, that perception could 
become reality. For successful securitization, the words of the securitizing actor need to 
resonate within the context, making securitization contingent “upon a perceptive 
environment” (Ibid.: 13) which is to a greater or lesser degree shaped by discourse. As 
discussions in subsequent sections demonstrate, the media plays a key role in creating the 
context in which the reiterative interactions between the securitizing actor and the 
audience take place.  
 
1.2 Speech act 
The total speech act is a performative utterance (i.e. it is intended to do something, like 
changing the state of affairs), consisting of three acts (presented here in a simplified 
form): (1) locutionary (i.e. what is said), (2) illocutionary (i.e. what is meant), and (3) 
perlocutionary (i.e. what happens on part of the audience).  
Illocution and perlocution are often confused because the speaker’s intent, partly, 
in issuing a speech act is to bring about the perlocutionary effect. Linguistics considers 
the success of a speech act to depend on felicity conditions, defined by Balzacq (2011: 
11) as the “necessary and sufficient rules that must prevail for linguistic acts to produce 
their effects.” Transposed to ST, it makes sense to assume such conditions under the more 
general notion of context.7 In the case of securitization, while institutional practices may 
suggest securitization, they might not always necessarily be contingent on discourse. 
There is a fundamental logical problem at the heart of CS’s conception of ST. The 
CS claims that security is both a self-referential practice and an intersubjective process 
simultaneously but they effectively attempt to reduce security to a speech act. The CS’s 
                                                 
7 It is worth mentioning that this linguistic logic, strongly represented in the original framework of the CS, 
is developed further in Buzan et al. (1998: 32–33) who list three conditions for a successful speech act: (1) 
internal, linguistic-grammatical (i.e. the speech act is executed according to accepted and conventional rules 
that apply to such acts), (2) external, contextual, and social (i.e. the persons have to have the authority and 
the circumstances need to be appropriate for the act to be invoked), and (3) the specific features of the 
alleged threat that either “facilitate or impede” securitization. 
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focus on illocution makes the self-referentiality of the securitizing move a definitional 
feature of the whole ST paradigm. This problem is highlighted by Balzacq (2011: 20): 
either security is self-referential (which forsakes perlocution) or it has the potential to 
produce a perlocutionary effect (which forsakes self-referentiality). Stritzel echoes this 
point (2007: 358), saying that “too much weight is put on the semantic side of the speech 
act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and sequentiality.” 
The inclusion of the audience as a proper unit of analysis in the securitization process — 
which the CS does not do — necessarily makes security intersubjective. If securitization 
is merely an illocutionary speech act, then language is given power to “create social 
reality” without input originating from “social interaction or authorization” (Côté 2016: 
542). 
 The CS fails to treat audience and context “as proper units of analysis,” making “it 
difficult to address the practically important question of what the proportionate weight of 
audience and contextual factors are in securitization theory” (Balzacq 2011: 20). The 
inclusion of these two concepts shifts securitization more toward a sociological practice, 
as opposed to the universal pragmatics of the CS.  
 Speaking security also pertains to not speaking it. Buzan and Hansen (2009: 215) 
deftly point out the “security as silence” problem, which occurs when the “potential 
subject of (in)security has no, or limited, possibility of speaking its security problems.” 
This poses a problem for the CS’s conception of ST because by making securitization 
hinge almost exclusively on the explicit verbal speech act, the failure to identify security 
utterances leaves a potential security problem outside the purview of the analysis. It also 
illustrates another way by which issues can become depoliticized. 
 Speech acts are also linguistic insofar as they construct narratives: speech acts must 
“follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes an 
existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33). Mr. 
Trump’s rhetoric has highlighted the performative nature of language, especially through 
a particular narrative: by saying, he has changed the political reality regarding 
immigration. A piece on Vox implied as much: “Trump likes to say that no one was talking 
about immigration before he entered the race. That isn’t true. But the way he talked about 
it resonated much more deeply than anything his rivals could muster.” (Lind and Yglesias 
2016) Immigration is a galvanizing issue for Americans and talking about it in a certain 
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way certainly polarized the electorate. This thesis will show that Mr. Trump’s securitized 
narrative regarding immigrants has also been explicitly employed by the judiciary to 
prevent the adoption of the same policies that that narrative is calling for. 
 Eroukhmanoff (2018) employs John Searle’s indirect speech act theory to include 
indirect securitization in the equation. While direct securitization is overt in labeling 
something a threat, indirect securitization is characterized by “a covert security grammar 
where securitising actors avoid labelling the issue a threat, for fear of saying something 
gauche and be subsequently chastised” (Eroukhmanoff 2018: 6). However, her approach 
suffers from the fact that it invites the analyst to read illocutionary motivations8 into the 
speeches of elites which is ultimately a subjective endeavor. Nevertheless, I consider this 
approach relevant to the Trump administration case study because one reason why the 
courts initially rejected the administration’s travel ban was the intention behind the ban, 
as inferred from statements Mr. Trump had made in the past. 
 
1.3 Desecuritization 
Desecuritization is about shifting a securitized issue back into the political domain. The 
concept is taken at face value by the CS and, as a result, left under-theorized. According 
to Austin and Brossard (2017: 6), Wæver drew on Jacques Derrida to define 
desecuritization as failed securitization when an audience rejects an initial securitizing 
move. However, desecuritization could also be a “deliberate ‘positive’ normative-
political move to reject the ‘exceptional’ realm of security politics” (Ibid.).  
Hansen (2012) developed a typology for modes of desecuritization: change through 
stabilization, replacement, rearticulation, and silencing. The first two are neutral and refer 
to the ways issues lose their intensity (e.g. in relation to the post-Cold War environment) 
or are replaced by more urgent issues, respectively. The latter two carry normative 
implications. Silencing emphasizes the power relations that underlie securitization, 
specifically pointing at the marginalization of women since they are less likely to have 
the authority from which to speak security. Rearticulation seeks to speak of issues 
                                                 
8 Or, to use Searle’s terms, to discover different illocutions with “a different propositional content” (Searle 
1979: 30 via Eroukhmanoff 2018: 14). 
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differently (e.g. instead of talking of migrants as a potential security threat, one can 
instead talk of human rights and hospitality) to move away from the “ethico-politically” 
negative status of security as such (Austin and Brossard 2017: 6–7). 
 An interesting manifestation of desecuritization, which is the focus of Austin and 
Brossard (2017), is that securitization and desecuritization can be enacted in conjunction, 
which challenges the temporally linear logic of the original ST. For example, by depicting 
radical Muslims as a separate entity from moderate Muslims — i.e. by splitting the threat 
image —, one aspect is being securitized against while the other is being desecuritized. 
However, I would refrain from using this particular kind of desecuritization as the 
template for all desecuritizations, but only inasmuch the original securitizing move 
contains within it the ingredients from which to construct desecuritization (i.e. what 
aspects or appeals of the securitizing move to argue against to reverse the process). This 
is more suitable to the case study of this thesis. 
 
1.4 Kingdon’s three streams model 
This thesis employs a policy-making model first developed by John Kingdon in 1984 and 
as integrated into the ST framework by Léonard and Kaunert (2011). Léonard and 
Kaunert (Ibid.) adopt the model9 as a means by which to reconceptualize the audience in 
ST and their effort produces a serviceable — and hitherto the most comprehensive — 
framework for analyzing the securitization process. Kingdon’s model remains a popular 
one in policy analysis but it was neither original — as it was based on the so-called 
garbage can model that Cohen, March, and Olsen presented in 1972 — nor the last of its 
kind (Rawat and Morris 2016). 
 Kingdon’s model divides any policy-making process into three streams (i.e. stages). 
These represent the steps from acknowledging a policy problem to implementing a policy 
solution. Crucially, in the context of ST, the model enables the differentiation of 
audiences, as well as their “specific composition and role” and “impact” (Léonard and 
Kaunert 2011: 74). 
                                                 
9 Léonard and Kaunert are not the first securitization scholars to attempt to integrate Kingdon’s model into 
ST. See, for example, Eriksson (1999) and Dunn Cavelty (2008). 
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 The first of the three streams is the problem stream. In this stream, an actor tries to 
construct a policy problem based on external events and/or various indicators. Kingdon 
(2013: 109–10) presciently acknowledges that certain conditions (i.e. a particular state of 
affairs) only become political problems when decision-makers perceive them as such. As 
Léonard and Kaunert (2011: 66) state, “Securitizing an issue (or a condition) is just a 
specific way of transforming it into a policy problem — a specific type of policy problem, 
namely a ‘security problem.’” In this stream, the audience is mostly comprised of other 
decision-makers who are involved in the policy-making process. It is the decision-makers 
themselves that first need to be convinced of a problem (in ST, of an existential threat) 
before proceeding to convince others. 
 The second stream is the policy stream. In this stream, a policy is formed and 
alternatives to it are generated. Policies that meet the requisite criteria for passage — 
“technical feasibility, value acceptability within the policy community, tolerable cost, 
anticipated public acquiescence, and a reasonable chance for receptivity among elected 
decision makers” (Kingdon 2013: 131) — are ones that survive. In this stream, the 
audience is comprised of specialists and technocrats who are involved in the policy-
making process. This audience is more responsive to rational, evidence-based arguments 
which is not necessarily the case for the public at large or even for decision-makers 
(Léonard and Kaunert 2011: 67).  
The third stream is the politics stream. In this stream, policy proposals are adopted 
or dismissed. The adoption of policies is contingent on factors such as public opinion, 
partisan distributions in Congress, pressure group campaigns, election results, and 
changes in administration (Kingdon 2013: 145). The obvious link with ST here is the 
notion of context. Support for passing a policy is garnered through bargaining with 
decision-makers to build coalitions. In this stream, the audience is comprised of 
unconvinced decision-makers and the general public. Since this stream involves the latter, 
it effectively conceptualizes the “politics of consent” (Léonard and Kaunert 2011: 66). 
Kingdon argues (2013: 166) that when these three streams are coupled, a policy 
window is briefly formed which presents an opportunity to take action on a given 
initiative. Policy windows are essential to adopting policies and they can only be opened 
by changes to the problem stream (e.g. a terrorist attack) or to the politics stream (e.g. 
because of a change in public opinion) but not in the policy stream of alternatives. When 
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a window for one subject opens, it becomes more likely for a window to open for a similar 
subject, a phenomenon called a “spillover”10 (Kingdon 2013: 190). As Léonard and 
Kaunert (2011: 69) note, this relates to the notion of security continuums, discussed 
previously. 
 The people that push the policies through are policy entrepreneurs, “advocates who 
are willing to invest their resources /…/ to promote a position in return for anticipated 
future gain” (Kingdon 2013: 179). In terms of ST, policy entrepreneurs are securitizing 
actors, just in the narrower context of bureaucratic politics. Policy entrepreneurs can be 
Senators, lobbyists, academics, civil servants, etc. What describes them is their expertise, 
their ability to speak for others, and their “authoritative decision-making position” 
(Kingdon 2013: 180). 
The benefit of Kingdon’s model is that by delineating different audiences, it enables 
us to consider their different logics of persuasion. It also emphasizes that the several 
audiences “are all interlinked as they are part of the same policy-making process” 
(Léonard and Kaunert 2011: 74) The model also enables us to include that policy-making 
process under the larger securitization framework. The model allows us to answer 
questions such as which audiences need to be persuaded at a particular stage and with 
what arguments. 
The model has been adopted to the realm of IR before (e.g. Durant and Diehl 1989, 
Neumann 2006). However, as outlined by Rawat and Morris (2016: 621–24), the model 
features some shortcomings, e.g. quantitative applications of the model not finding 
support for the predictions the model makes, a vague conception of the policy 
entrepreneur, and the absence of a spatial dimension to the policy stream. The model is 
also inapplicable to non-democratic contexts. However, these common criticisms of the 
model do not inhibit its application in this case study, given the focus on the audiences 
and context. 
 
                                                 
10 Originally used by Ernst Haas. 
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1.5 Audience 
Several second-generation ST scholars (e.g. Balzacq 2005, McDonald 2008, Vuori 2008, 
Léonard and Kaunert 2011, Côté 2016) have tackled the concept of the audience in the 
original ST. In fact, critiquing and developing this concept has been one of the pet 
preoccupations and main contributions of these scholars. Given that Buzan et al. (1998) 
gave the concept relatively short shrift and little theoretical attention, this was to be 
expected. As was discussed in Chapter 1 Section 2, the overemphasis of the illocutionary 
aspect of the speech act in the CS makes the securitizing move self-referential, thereby 
negating the role of the audience (Balzacq 2005: 179). 
 The subject of much research has been on who the audience are and how exactly do 
they relate to the securitizing actor. It is clear that audiences vary across different 
securitizations but they do not necessarily possess “a universal task or trait” (Côté 2016: 
547). In addition, a specific answer to the question of who the audience are “risks 
decontextualizing the audience and assigning it an essential characteristic” which would 
limit subsequent analysis (Ibid.). 
The audience are the people that a securitizing move aims to persuade and who 
participate in the production of security meanings (i.e. what is considered to be a 
legitimate threat). Second-generation ST scholars emphasized that the audience is 
actually a multiplicity of audiences and that context determines both the relationship 
between the securitizing actor and the audience and also preconditions audience response 
(as well as the type of support they offer, either formal or moral). The existence of 
multiple audiences and contexts reinforces the appropriateness of Kingdon’s three 
streams model. 
 Salter’s (2008) “dramaturgical analysis” of the Canadian Air Transport Security 
Authority proposes the existence of four types of audiences and speech contexts: popular, 
elite, technocratic, and scientific. Salter draws attention to the settings in which 
securitization processes occur and how the setting affect their outcome. He highlights the 
necessity of a speaker to adapt to, to use Michel Foucault’s terms, a “particular local 
‘regime of truth’” that determines what can be spoken in the social context (Ibid.: 322). 
A securitizing move can be successful in one setting but may fail in another. Importantly, 
Salter (Ibid.: 326) argues, contra Balzacq’s (2011: 9) assertion that securitizing actors 
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aim to convince “as broad an audience as possible,” that securitizing actors can and do 
pursue narrow securitization to specific audiences. The second key contribution by Salter 
(2008: 324) is the notion of “entropy of the public imagination,” which describes how 
some issues can fade form public attention and memory, independently of whether the 
threat is actually still “there” or not. Salter’s conception of the audience meshes well with 
Kingdon’s model, which is of benefit to this thesis. However, Salter does not discuss how 
“settings become settings and, once formed, how [they are] reproduced and transformed” 
(Côté 2016: 554). 
 Côté’s (2016) laudable contribution is the meta-synthesis of nearly three dozen 
articles on the treatment of audiences in ST literature. He highlights that while the 
audience in the CS is nearly non-existent, the intersubjective treatment of the audience 
(e.g. Balzacq 2011, Bourbeau 2011) has not been truly intersubjective either, since “the 
notion of intersubjectivity in these amended theories is manifested only through the need 
for the actor to couch his/her securitizing moves in pre-existing, contextualized rhetoric 
and practices in order that they have a better chance of success” (2016: 550).11 Soliciting 
audience acceptance is rendered a mechanical manifestation of contextual factors. By not 
producing a truly intersubjective conception of the audience, Côté argues, these 
approaches actually perpetuate the marginalization of the audience. To remedy this, he 
proposes an active role for the audience: the audience are entities that can “authorize the 
view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the 
issue through security practice” (Ibid.: 548). His criticism and his novel definition of the 
audience are rooted in the divergence between theoretical abstractions and empirical 
reality in which audiences are found to be fundamental to the construction of “shared 
security values” and to be active participants in securitization processes by “challeng[ing] 
the securitizing actor’s presentation of the issue, forcing the securitizing actor to either 
abandon its attempt at securitization or reengage the audience with a new or modified 
                                                 
11 To phrase this differently, securitizing actors are more successful if they sense the disposition of the 
audience and use language that resonates with them. This is a critical mechanism often utilized by 
politicians — especially populists — in that securitization evokes potential insecurity which carries 
powerful psychological effects on part of the audience. 
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securitizing move or security narrative” (Ibid.: 546, 554). This deliberation is a point 
previously also raised by Stritzel (2007: 363).  
Audiences, thus, have independent capacity for action that has security effects. 
Furthermore, their reactions “can also influence the substance of security speech and 
action, shift and shape future securitizing moves, and influence the perception of shared 
security understandings and accepted policy responses” (Côté 2016: 551–52). This is 
expressed through “multiple iterative, contextually contingent interactions” with the 
securitizing actor (Ibid.: 552). This echoes Salter’s (2008: 327) suggestion that the 
audience determines the form of the securitizing move, especially since the audience is 
hardly ever just the public but also bureaucrats, ministers, officials, etc. Vuori (2008: 72) 
phrases this from the opposite point of view, stating that the audiences “depend on the 
function the securitization act is intended to serve.” Côté’s analysis enhances ST’s 
capacity to explain successful securitization, as well as how the contextual circumstances 
in which securitization occurs are created and altered through “securitization interactions” 
(2016: 554). Finally, Côté’s conception of the audience could enable a better application 
of ST to non-democratic contexts, the absence of which has been raised by Léonard and 
Kaunert (2011). 
  There remain theoretical loose ends, such as Balzacq’s assertion (2008: 76) that 
securitization can produce “social and political consequences without the explicit assent 
of an audience.” Léonard and Kaunert (2011) wonder what audience assent actually 
means, what it looks like in practice, and how to measure it. Another problem relates to 
the interactions between different audiences, something which this thesis topic touches 
on superficially. ST needs to be developed to take into account different audiences, their 
relations with each other, and their impact on the securitization process.  
 
ST scholars have spent considerable efforts on the ontology of the audience. But another, 
non-linguistic dimension of this concept remains relatively vague: to strengthen ST’s 
explanatory capacity and to further bridge the gap between theory and empirical research, 
the cognitive psychology of individuals and collectives must be included in the paradigm. 
More specifically, there is a need to incorporate psychological insights into the 
securitization process to reveal what motivates people and how they respond to 
constructions of threats and of insecurity. 
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 One recent contribution in this domain has been that of Baele et al. (2018) who 
investigate whether the utilization of quantitative rhetoric (i.e. the use of numbers and 
other, scientific-implies-objective-and-authoritative data) facilitates the success of 
securitizing moves. Quantitative rhetoric is common in attempts aimed at convincing 
audiences. Baele et al. recount the research that shows that iconic images, emotional 
displays, and scientific facts all support securitizing moves.  
Another contribution is that of Berling (2011) who essentially argues the same 
point. Crucially, the air of authority12 that scientific arguments add to securitizing moves 
— “scientific objectivation” (2011: 387) — could significantly aid in elevating issues 
from the political to the securitized (e.g. nuclear deterrence during the Cold War). Also 
worthy of note is that a lack of knowledge can be mobilized as “failed science” (Ibid.: 
389) wherein a lack of knowledge legitimizes undemocratic practices for the sake of 
managing risk. 
People process new information either through a central or peripheral route in the 
brain. Not all information is processed the same. Due to various internal and external 
constraints (e.g. personal interest, lack of time), some information can be “fast-tracked” 
with the help of cues (Baele et al. 2018: 462). People tend to process numbers slower, 
such information is fast-tracked with the help of secondary cues such as the character of 
the communicator, with an expert possessing greater persuasive potential than a non-
expert. Given that quantitative information relayed by a non-expert has been found to be 
less persuasive than qualitative information, the implication is that the source of the 
information and the format of the message need to be congruous for the message to be 
persuasive. However, research has also shown (e.g. Kahan et al. 2012) that information 
is treated differently in political argumentation: there is a “strong tendency” for people to 
interpret quantitative information “in a way that only confirms their own pre-existing 
                                                 
12 Berling is one among many security scholars — the Paris School, led by Didier Bigo, Jef Huysmans, 
Trine Villumsen, etc. — who use Bourdieu’s notions of the field and capital in analyzing securitization. 
Berling (2011: 389) argues that science can be understood as a practice and as a type of capital “with 
important weight in specific fields.” As such, science can determine what can and cannot be talked about, 
playing a role in the construction of contexts, which is constituted, in Bourdieu’s terms, by fields and field-
specific capital. However, the mobilization of scientific facts only facilitates securitization, it does not 
cause it. 
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opinion, ideological beliefs, or worldview” — i.e. confirmation bias (Baele et al. 2018: 
464) Hence, numbers are more persuasive when confirming preexisting beliefs but less 
so when they are inconsistent with those beliefs. 
 This speaks to what kind of arguments audiences find more and less persuasive and 
how securitizing actors can gain legitimacy and what types of legitimacy have more 
potential to persuade and in what contexts. Baele et al. showed that “it is in fact very easy 
to convince an audience that something or someone is a security threat” (2019: 471). 
Salter’s (2008: 324) notion of the “entropy of public imagination” also, partly, emanates 
from the psychology of an individual. 
 ST should more often be coupled with psychological studies, in addition to 
empirical recounts of events, to elucidate the dynamics between the relevant actors in the 
securitization process. 
 
1.6 Functional actors 
While the CS includes functional actors as one of the core units of analysis in ST, the CS 
hardly elaborates on the concept. Its definition is nebulous: functional actors are entities 
that “affect the dynamics of a sector” by influencing “decisions in the field of security” 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 36). In the sectoral analysis that the CS conducts, they merely list 
what the potential functional actors in a given sector are, such as the government, the 
armed services, and the private-sector arms industry in the military sector; economic 
actors (such as transnational corporations and chemical industries), governments, 
governmental agencies, and intergovernmental organizations in the environmental sector 
(Ibid.: 56–57, 79). 
 The functional actor has not been accorded the same theoretical attention as other 
units of analysis because it has hitherto been considered of secondary importance to the 
securitization process. However, since a lot of scholarship has focused on the multitude 
of factors that affect this process, the under-development of the functional actor 
constitutes a clear oversight and deprives from the comprehensiveness of the whole ST 
paradigm, in addition to distancing it from empirical reality. 
 Based on the discussion above, one might opt to overcome the problem that the 
under-developed functional actor concept by simply treating it as a context-specific 
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audience, especially if one subscribes to Côté’s (2016) argument about the active role the 
audience plays. However, I would consider this a mistake since the dynamic between the 
securitizing actor and an audience is about persuading and deliberating in an effort to 
legitimate a solution to a security problem. The role of the functional actor, on the other 
hand, is to potentially exert influence on that dynamic. It is this influence, rather than a 
concentrated act of persuasion or an intersubjective response to that act, that serves to 
separate the functional actor from the securitizing actor and the audience.  
This influence can be conceived of in several ways. It could be located in the 
bureaucratic politics side of the process and be expressed in the issues that find their place 
on a policy agenda, what policy alternatives are specialists choose to develop, etc. In this 
regard, there are close ties with Kingdon’s model, which includes entities that he refers 
to as visible and hidden participant clusters (2013: 69). In the former belong people who 
receive a lot of attention and press (e.g. the president and his appointees), in the latter are 
those that do not (e.g. congressional staffers, academics, career bureaucrats, etc.). The 
influence of the functional actor could also be conceived of as an intermediary between 
the securitizing actor and the audience. For example, the media has considerable sway of 
what and how people think about world events (as will be discussed below). Functional 
actors, then, can influence the production, transmission, and reception of securitizing 
moves.  
What makes functional actors not an audience is that they are more likely to be 
self-driven toward whatever their material, ideational, or social ends, and they do not 
respond to securitizing moves in the same way, especially since they rarely are the explicit 
targets of those moves. Indeed, it is entirely plausible that functional actors operate 
irrespective of someone’s securitizing moves, or they operate in ways that drives the 
production of securitizing moves (by influencing those with the authority to speak security 
in a given context) or that influences how the audience reacts to those securitizing acts 
(as will be evidenced by the example of the media).  
Of course, the influence of the functional actor on authorized speakers of security 
could be construed as a micro-level securitizing move in and of itself but that yields an 
ontological incongruity — in this instance, it would be the audience (i.e. an authorized 
speaker of security) who would be expected to follow up on a successful securitizing 
move with a policy or a subsequent securitizing move. This muddies the line between a 
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securitizing actor and an audience but does highlight how, overall, the roles of the 
participants can transform during successive iterations of securitizations (i.e. an audience 
in one setting may become the securitizing actor in another setting). The ontological 
incongruity applies to the abstract categories of securitizing actors, audiences, and 
functional actors, not to the actual changes of their particular constituents in a select 
instance of securitization. On conceptual grounds, it makes sense analytically to treat 
securitizing actors and audiences as separate entities from a functional actor, lest the 
latter concept become too diluted and impractical. 
Moreover, the capacity of the functional actor to be a securitizing actor is 
circumscribed by its inherent lack of authority and legitimacy to speak security to the 
general public. Therefore, functional actors cannot independently produce security 
meanings either, only influence the production thereof between the securitizing actor and 
the audience (cf. Côté 2016: 544). As such, while a functional actor may exhibit context-
specific characteristics of either a securitizing actor or an audience, it should be 
considered a separate entity with its own ontology. 
 One of the two main goals of this thesis is to reconceptualize the functional actor 
by analyzing the behavior of the media and the judiciary under the Trump administration 
and its efforts to securitize immigration. The original conception of the CS more-or-less 
suffices to describe the role of the judiciary in securitization but the conception needs to 
be expanded to better describe the role of the media. It needs to permit self-interest, which 
is implied in the CS but is explicit in the profit-motive driven business model of mass 
media. In the CS, this self-interest was generally either survival or profit. 
Based on these theoretical considerations, I submit the following as the enhanced 
conception of the functional actor: it is an entity that (1) affects decisions in a field of 
security in general and the success of a securitizing move in particular, (2) cannot 
independently produce security meanings13, (3) stands to gain or lose, in material, 
                                                 
13 The securitizing actor and the audience engage in a negotiation as to what a threat is but this does 
necessarily preclude an original articulation of a threat. As is discussed in Dolinec (2010), the primary 
definition hypothesis suggests that people with power and high rank in a society who have access to expert 
information the rest of the population does not have the power of primary definition of phenomena (i.e. the 
articulation of a threat). This is relevant in the case of the media since it is these high-ranking elites from 
35 
 
ideational, social, or other terms, as a result, and (4) can, in its particular function, operate 
as a secondary securitizing actor or as a secondary audience but is not the direct target of 
a securitizing move. I use the term “secondary” here to maintain that even though the 
media, for example, may produce content that constitutes a (de)securitizing act (such as 
an editorial that speaks favorably of Islam), that content is rarely produced ex nihilo but 
very often in response to a (de)securitizing act in another field, particularly a field that is 
of interest to the media.  
One may be tempted to consider this definition tautological if considered in the light 
of the central argument of this thesis: that the judiciary and the media should be 
considered functional actors. That is to say, the essential qualities of the judiciary, for 
example, make it a functional actor because the functional actor has the qualities that the 
judiciary has. Instead, the process of developing this definition was inductive because a 
new theoretical perspective was developed in accordance with empirical observation. In 
classifying the media and the judiciary as functional actors, I am categorizing them 
according to their primary function in the securitization process. For example, the 
judiciary’s function in a liberal-democratic system effectively preordains its role as a 
functional actor, given that its capacity to act as a securitizing actor is delimited by the 
system itself. The general categorization of the media and the judiciary as functional 
actors does not preclude them in general or the individuals they are comprised of in 
particular from assuming other roles in a particular instantiation of securitization (just like 
securitizing actors and audiences). 
I will now turn to why the judiciary and the media qualify as functional actors. 
 
1.6.1 Judiciary 
To fully illuminate the judiciary’s role as a functional actor, its functions and constitution 
need to be expounded. Keeping in mind the case study of this thesis, the following section 
proceeds to describe the judiciary with regard to the US specifically. 
Modern liberal democracies are based on the principle of separation of powers. This 
division produces three branches of government: the executive, the legislature, and the 
                                                 
whom journalists often get their stories. Functional actors, especially in comparison with securitizing 
actors, lack this full-fledged capacity to speak security. 
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judiciary. The US Constitution was the result of a revolution incited by perceived 
mistreatment at the hands of the parliamentary monarchy of the British. To prevent the 
centralization of power — and the abuse of that power that has historically inevitably 
followed — the Founding Fathers devised the first system of government where its 
powers are divided between branches that exercise different functions but that check and 
balance the functions of the other branches. Regarding such a constitution of government, 
the late Supreme Court (SC) Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the Founding Fathers 
purposefully manufactured “gridlock” into the system so as to best protect the liberty of 
the people from injurious legislation (Savage 2011). 
 The powers of the judiciary stem from Article III of the US Constitution which 
guarantees the judges their office for life — their impeachment and conviction excepted 
—, as well as a salary that may not be reduced while the judges are in office. These 
measures protect the judiciary from threats and pressure from the executive and the 
legislature, respectively, as well as “the temporary passions of the public” (The White 
House N/d). Members of the federal judiciary are appointed by the executive and 
confirmed by the legislature. 
 The federal court system of the US consists of three levels: district courts, circuit 
courts (the first level of appeal), and the SC (the final level of appeal) (Office of the 
United States Attorneys N/d). The first two levels and their jurisdictions, unlike the SC, 
were established by Congress. Federal courts, unlike state courts, have limited 
jurisdiction, meaning they hear cases they are authorized to hear by the Constitution or 
federal statutes. In some cases, district courts have original jurisdiction, in other cases 
(e.g. lawsuits between state governments), it belongs to the SC. Congress has also given 
original jurisdiction to some specialized courts, such as the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court. Cases decided in the 94 district courts14 can be appealed to the 13 
circuit courts which operate under mandatory review, meaning they have to hear all cases 
that have been appealed in the lower courts. Cases decided in circuit courts, as well as 
cases decided in state supreme courts that deal with federal law, can be appealed to the 
                                                 
14 In each district, there is a US Attorney, employed by the Department of Justice, who acts as the lawyer 
of the federal government in the district. This means defending the government in civil suits and prosecuting 
federal crimes. 
37 
 
SC. However, the SC has the discretion to choose which cases to hear. If it refuses to hear 
the case, the decision of the lower court is upheld. The SC accepts only a fraction of all 
appeals, usually hearing cases when an “egregious error” has been made or when there 
are conflicting decisions across the country on a particular case (such as on immigration) 
(Ibid.). 
 
The judiciary interprets the law, determines the law’s constitutionality, and applies the 
law to individual cases. This has a direct impact on the effectuation and sustainment of 
policies (or extraordinary measures in the case of securitization). Indeed, the judiciary are 
people that need to be persuaded to charge or to acquit the accused, based on arguments 
from various actors who are generally on both sides of that argument. But this breaks the 
securitizing actor–audience dynamic because it does not involve a back-and-forth 
deliberation with the judiciary in an active role, as prescribed by Côté (2016). It is also 
perfectly possible that a passionate audience accepts the securitizing move which leads to 
the adoption of (extraordinary) measures to counter the threat image but have those 
measures thwarted by the courts, which constitutes an active role but not in the judiciary’s 
capacity as an audience in the ST paradigm. Moreover, the presumption of fairness, i.e. 
the administration of justice according to the law equally, is supposed to surmount any 
kind of persuasion that securitizing moves engage in, either by attacking the judiciary 
outright or trying to apply pressure on them by mobilizing the public.15 
In terms of the definition of the functional actor that I outlined above, the judiciary 
qualifies on all accounts. First, the judiciary does not make policy but evaluates its 
lawfulness. By declaring a law or policy unconstitutional, the judiciary can block them, 
preventing a securitizing move from being completed. Second, the judiciary does not 
independently produce security meanings, which only result from the intersubjective and 
iterative discursive interactions between the securitizing actor and the audience. Third, 
the judiciary stands to lose legitimacy if its rulings are considered to be a misapplication 
                                                 
15 While anyone might attack the judiciary for ruling against his or her personal opinion, populist radical 
right-wing populists have made such attacks an industry, to the extent that excoriating the judiciary as 
another manifestation of a corrupt elite establishment is a definitional feature of current right-wing 
populists. 
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of justice. Furthermore, and more generally, if judges engage in what violates “good 
Behaviour” — such as political bias and favoritism, graft, and abuse of power16 —, as is 
stipulated in the Constitution, the judges may face impeachment. However, due to the 
politically fraught situation in the US presently, the judiciary stands to lose legitimacy no 
matter what decision it makes if the case is politically divisive enough.17 Fourth, insofar 
as the judiciary are indeed people open to persuasion in their particular function as judges, 
they function as a secondary audience. However, this function does not extend to the 
blocking of policy, since the courts are primarily tasked with interpreting and applying 
law, not adjudicating securitizing moves per se. Neither are they direct targets of those 
moves. However, the interesting aspect of this in terms of the case study is that some 
judges have referred to Mr. Trump’s securitizing moves as basis for blocking a policy. 
For example, federal judges have referred to Mr. Trump’s explicit antipathy against 
Muslim immigrants as the reason to block his travel ban against predominantly-Muslim 
countries. 
 
1.6.2 Media 
The previous section started with the division of governmental duties among different 
branches. The media, understood as news outlets that use media technologies to mass 
communicate, are often referred to as the fourth branch of government, or “the fourth 
estate,” which emphasizes the media’s role as another layer of checks and balances, as 
well as its own role as a center of authority (Vultee 2011: 82). The media is essential to 
the securitization process because of its generally-accepted-but-often-challenged status 
as a purveyor of truth and the self-evident effect on public opinion this entails. This self-
                                                 
16 All these examples constitute only a selection of accusations for which federal judges have hitherto been 
impeached in the US. See Federal Judicial Center (N/d). 
17 For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), the SC ruled that restricting 
corporations, unions, and other profitable organizations from independent political spending (as opposed 
to direct contributions to candidates), as well as prohibiting the same from broadcasting political media 
within a certain time frame before elections violated the First Amendment. Effectively, corporations, 
comprised of individuals, are guaranteed the same rights as individuals to engage in political speech. One 
side of the political aisle celebrated the decision as upholding the Constitution, the other side rebuked it for 
facilitating the flow of corrupt “dark money” into politics. See, e.g., Weintraub (2016). 
39 
 
evidence stems from the proliferation of mass media and of the Internet during the past 
century: there is nary a person that does not either read newspapers, watch TV, listen to 
the radio, or do all of these via the Internet. Given the very ubiquity of these media, a 
definite and considerable effect on public discourse and opinion is to be expected — and 
has been demonstrated.  
Securitization scholarship has tended to implicitly and uncritically accept the media 
as a functional actor (e.g. Eroukhmanoff 2018) or as an audience (Léonard and Kaunert 
(2011)18. This constitutes an oversimplification of both concepts. The challenge for ST is 
to incorporate media studies and communication theory to better answer questions such 
as how issues are securitized, how people respond to attempted securitization, how 
contextual elements are formed, and how the deliberation between the securitizing actor 
and the audience is mediated and influenced. In this section, I will classify the media as 
a functional actor and then present an overview of media studies that ST should 
incorporate or has already ventured to incorporate. 
In terms of the new model for a functional actor I outlined above, the media 
likewise qualifies on all accounts. First, the media, as will be demonstrated at greater 
length below, primarily acts as a medium that facilitates the communication between the 
public and the government, politicians, and other officials. The media’s framing of issues 
has a great impact on public perceptions thereof which in turn affects the threat 
negotiation dynamic between the securitizing actor and the audience. The media can act 
as a mouthpiece for the government (as it largely did in the lead-up to the Iraq War) or it 
can condition audience behavior (in issuing cues as to what to talk about and how). Both 
have severe ramifications on the success of securitizing moves. 
                                                 
18 In applying the Kingdon model to the 2003 British government proposal to the EU regarding changes to 
the asylum-processing system, Léonard and Kaunert (2011: 72) note that it is “interesting” how media 
reports, “particular[ly] in the left-liberal press,” reinforced the opposition by some EU Member States to 
proposal. The media highlighted the security dimension of the British proposal and presented it in a more 
politicized way than had been intended by the government — in EU circles, the plan came to be known as 
the “concentration camp plan.” Léonard and Kaunert (Ibid.) ultimately treat the “left-liberal” media as the 
representative of a particular public opinion and, therefore, just another audience. And, indeed, this 
dimension of the media does make it an audience. However, the media is a multidimensional entity and the 
media’s role as an audience is secondary function. 
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Second, it is true that the media has a bigger input vis-à-vis the production of 
securitizing moves in that the media’s transmission of threat images can be construed as 
a securitizing move in and of themselves. However, as I stated in the introduction to this 
section, the media rarely creates topics — and threat images — ex nihilo. Rather, the 
media either reports on a securitizing move of an actor and engages with it (by 
legitimating it as news and by providing supporting or conflicting commentary) or it 
translates virtual preexisting discourses into actual discourses19,20. Both serve to facilitate 
the deliberation between securitizing actors and an audience. Governmental positions 
have “formal authority granted by statute and by the constitution” (Kingdon 2013: 45) 
while the media can only strive for the moral support of its audience. The key dynamic 
here is that, in general, the media “reinforce a bias toward the status quo” by relaying 
information from reliable sources whose essential function is to provide that information 
“reliably” (Vultee 2011: 83). As such, the media’s impact is to either focus or defocus 
threat images, not to produce security meanings independently of the dynamic between a 
securitizing actor and the audience. 
 Third, the media is a for-profit endeavor, which incentivizes the broadcasting of 
dramatic events. Both Salter (2008: 324), in his use of the “entropy of the public 
imagination,” and Kingdon (2013: 58–59) point at the fact that the media cover 
                                                 
19 The terms “virtual” and “actual” in this usage are inspired by the work of Gilles Deleuze (1966). The 
notion relevant here is that there exist a multiplicity of discourses in society which people can draw on. The 
virtual has several potential actualizations, all of them always in flux. The act of writing an opinion editorial 
or broadcasting a newscast that depicts something as threatening or as innocuous translates the virtual 
discourse into an actual discourse. The use of translation here emphasizes that this transformation is 
discursive in nature. Insofar as this translation engages with something that is already out there, this does 
not constitute the original production of security meanings. And while securitizing actors and audiences 
also employ preexisting discourses in the construction of threats, those qualities are closer to their essential 
features, unlike that of the media which primarily serves as a forum for those discourses. Moreover, if an 
investigative journalist, academic, or technocrat attempts to create an original threat image (i.e. by 
introducing a new threat to the public consciousness, such as the carcinogenic impact of tobacco), the fact 
that it is published in and by the media (indicating a securitizing move by the media) does not supersede the 
intended primary use of the media as a vessel to transmit the message of a threat image. 
20 A similar but a simpler argument regarding the media’s function as a securitizing actor is made by 
Dolinec (2010). 
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sensational stories for a brief while and then jump on to the next one, whether or not the 
material facts of the case (such as the actual presence of a threat) change. Attracting public 
attention is a structural imperative of any media in that its very existence depends on its 
business success.21 
 Fourth, and has been strongly implied so far, the media’s capacity to be a 
securitizing actor and an audience is its secondary function. The original conception of 
the audience, as Côté (2016) has argued, was too passive. A cursory analysis of how the 
media operates — how and why it publishes or broadcasts content, stemming from the 
necessity to make a profit — reveals at least an active part, which dovetails with Côté’s 
conception of the audience. In fact, this activeness is not limited to the functions of an 
audience. The media, as I have already suggests and as has been indicated by research, 
may act similarly to that of a securitizing actor or an audience but it must act as a mediator 
between the two. The latter is its essential, ever-present quality since the media is a 
platform through which governments and the people interact, even in totalitarian regimes. 
 
An overview of a selection of relevant media research serves to substantiate the 
aforementioned claims. 
Several authors (e.g. Robinson 1999, Vultee 2011) have touched on the importance 
of media frames. Frames contextualize information. They are the way issues are 
presented, a “professionally structured reconstruction” of events (Vultee 2011: 82). 
Frames selects only certain events and facts which enforces only a certain interpretation 
of a phenomenon (Norris et al. 2003). Neither people nor the media have the time, 
resources, and the cognitive ability to think of “all the potential dimensions of the given 
problem” (Dolinec 2010: 26). Securitization, as Vultee argues (2011: 78–79), should be 
treated as a kind of media frame in its own right, for it “highlights the existential threat 
of an issue” and “diminishes the arguments for handling it as a matter of political routine” 
                                                 
21 Even entities as profligate as legislatures would entertain shutting down public broadcasting companies 
if their utility (i.e. their capacity to draw an audience) is found to be lacking to the extent that they are 
perceived to be a waste of resources. Note, however, how in Kull et al. (2013), the people that consumed 
NPR and PBS, funded in part by the government, were overwhelmingly less prone to misperceptions 
regarding Iraq. 
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(Gitlin 2003: 7). Such frames are constructed jointly between the media and its audiences, 
insofar as media content caters to the public and is informed by them.  
 Page and Shapiro (1983: 175) found a link between public opinion and policy data, 
finding “considerable congruence” between changes in preferences and changes in 
policies. They argue that public opinion can be a proximate cause of policy, affecting 
policy more than vice versa. This suggests that the media’s influence on public opinion 
can have a remarkable effect on the success of securitizing moves. 
 Robinson (1999: 301) discusses “the CNN effect” — the assumption that “real-time 
communications technology” provokes “major responses from domestic audiences and 
political elites to global events.” The reverse of this is the idea of “manufacturing consent” 
(Ibid.: 303) — the assumption that government policy drives media content more than 
vice versa. Kingdon’s (2013) analysis falls on the latter side but he himself, as well as 
other studies, do show a direct, even if modest, impact on policy. 
 Kull et al. (2003) present an illuminating overview of polling data collected by the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and the polling firm Knowledge 
Networks (KN) regarding public misperceptions22 related to the invasion of Iraq. Their 
study affirms the strong influence the media has on the people. The three key 
misperceptions widespread among the American populace were Iraq having WMDs, Iraq 
having close ties to al-Qaeda and thus being linked to 9/11, and that global opinion 
supported the US taking unilateral action against Iraq. The misperceptions strongly 
predict support for going to war in Iraq. Regression analyses indicate that the most 
powerful predictors of misperceptions were the intention to vote for the sitting president23, 
the source of news, the intention to vote for the opposing party in the next presidential 
election, and the level of education (non-college educated were slightly more likely to 
believe some misperceptions). The level of attention paid to news showed no statistical 
correlation24 and neither did age, gender, party identification, and income. The 
                                                 
22 Their use of the phrase “misperception” immediately brings to mind Robert Jervis’ seminal work 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976). 
23 In controlling for support for the president, party differences disappeared. Among Bush supporters, 
Republicans, Democrats, and independents all had similar rates of misperception. 
24 Curiously, viewers of Fox News showed an increase in the frequency of misperceptions as their attention 
to the news grew. This is explained by the fact that Fox News is an openly right-leaning media outlet and 
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implications this research has on ST is startling. Even if the public is opposed to unilateral 
military action (which would constitute an extraordinary measure), the securitizing actor 
seems to have considerable capacities in persuading the public — by instilling false 
beliefs that align with the “value orientations” of the public (Ibid.: 597) — especially if 
this intention is facilitated by the media. O’Reilly (2008) builds on the work of Kull et al. 
(2003) and says that the media was both the victim and the contributor to the hyper-
patriotic national mood that took hold of America after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and led 
to the securitization of Iraq25.  
 Dolinec (2010: 12–14) emphasizes how the media’s reproduction of who and what 
are important in society has an impact on agenda-setting26, which influences security 
discourses which in turn “support particular speech acts and extraordinary measures.” 
People tend to assign importance to issues according to the level of importance that the 
media assigns to them. This is important since, as Altheide and Grimes (2005) argue, 
broadcast television networks shape how the American public understand foreign affairs 
by bringing in some people to speak security and not others (such as from pro-intervention 
think tanks). Prioritizing certain issues over others often serves elite interests, since the 
elites are usually the source of the information for the media. Importantly, given that the 
media are “usually subsidiaries of large corporations” (Ibid.: 14–15), corporate and 
business imperatives apply to the functioning of media entities.27 The media tends to use 
dramatic frames over undramatic ones and showcases negative stories over positive ones 
in an effort to attract a bigger audience. 
                                                 
since support for the president ranked as the biggest predictor of misperceptions, the effect of serving as a 
misleading mouthpiece for the right-leaning government was compounded. Kull et al. (2003: 593–94) 
acknowledge that Fox and CBS, the two outlets “least likely to present critical commentary” of the 
administration, had viewers most prone to misperceptions. 
25 However, as Kull et al. (2003: 597) themselves acknowledge, the post-9/11 environment may have been 
a unique one. 
26 In Kingdon’s (2013: 51) model, the actors that participate in creating a policy agenda are referred to as 
“agenda agents.” 
27 Dolinec brings the example of NBC being owned by General Electric and CBS previously being owned 
by Westinghouse Electric, both of whom have or had ties to arms manufacturing. Moreover, both Disney 
and Warner Bros., owners of ABC and CNN, respectively, produced propaganda for the US government 
during World War II. 
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 Kingdon’s (2013) research indicates that the influence of the media should not be 
overstated. The media’s influence on the government’s policy agenda is “dilute[d]” 
because the media covers stories only briefly (Kingdon 2013: 59). Once people get tired, 
the media moves on and vice versa. I am dubious whether this impact remains muted 
since the advent of the so-called new media, as well as social media. In fact, I would 
venture to say that the liberalization and proliferation of media technologies has increased 
the pressure that could be brought to bear using them.28 
Kingdon’s commentary on public opinion is likewise relevant for ST and for this 
thesis. Public opinion can influence governmental agenda because it makes an issue a 
popular cause for a vote-seeking politician. Then again, Kingdon (2013: 65) also suggests 
that public opinion more often functions to constrain the government, not to direct it to 
do something. He (Ibid.: 67) concludes that in terms of agenda-setting, “governmental 
officials and other activists [likely] affect the agenda in the mass public more than the 
other way around.” 
All these insights expound on how the media influences the “multiple iterative, 
contextually contingent interactions” between the securitizing actor and the audience 
(Côté 2016: 552). They also confirm my argument that serving as an intermediary 
between the securitizing actor and the audience is its essential characteristic, rendering 
the media a functional actor. This, in addition to the media’s incapacity to function fully 
as an independent securitizing actor or audience, as I argued above, should alleviate 
                                                 
28 For example, Matt Drudge, the creator of the right-wing news aggregator Drudge Report, famously broke 
the affair between President Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, a story Newsweek had been sitting on 
(Glass 2013). 
New media and social media have challenged the virtual monopoly the elite media had on the flow 
of information, thereby changing the power dynamics in society. Public pressure campaigns have, for 
example, finally removed many entrenched sexual harassers from office, previously protected by corporate 
silence. Even Ronan Farrow, the NBC News reporter that broke the story on serial harasser and film 
producer Harvey Weinstein, had to go to the New Yorker to get the story published because NBC executives 
were trying to suppress the story by “slow-walk[ing]” it (Ali and Polgreen 2017). Social media, at least in 
such instances, can act like a secondary amplifier of topical issues. 
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concerns over selection bias misguiding the analysis. It is to the great benefit of ST 
incorporate these constellation of factors. 
 
1.7 Securitizing immigration 
This section discusses the securitization of immigration policy and the constitutional 
prerogatives of the federal government which are requisite knowledge for analyzing the 
immigration-policy dynamics under the Trump administration. By incorporating juridical 
elements into ST, the framework could better predict which securitizing moves are likely 
to ultimately be successful. 
The securitization of immigration is about mobilizing political resources by 
depicting immigration in general and a certain group of immigrants in particular (either 
as categories of migrants, such as immigrants, asylum-seekers, or refugees, or as 
categories of race and ethnicity) as an existential threat to national security, economy, 
and/or identity through mechanisms and policies that (may) suggest contravening 
international and domestic law. These technologies are usually those employed by police 
and military forces and includes gathering biometric data, profiling, detention, 
surveillance, etc. Givens (2010: 79) argues that immigration has been an “overlooked yet 
major component of both economic and national security.” 
 The literature on the securitization of immigration in Europe is abundant (e.g. 
Huysmans 2000, Neal 2009) but less so on the US, and even then mostly in the context 
of post-9/11 developments (e.g. d’Appollonia and Reich 2010, d’Appollonia 2015). ST 
has seldom been applied to the US. In both Europe and the US, especially in light of the 
rise of right-wing populism, the security dimension of immigration has risen to the fore.29 
Immigration policy is an instrument with which to protect the state, the society, and the 
internal market. Immigrants are often portrayed as a threat to domestic security, to the 
welfare system, and to cultural homogeneity (Huysmans 2000).  
There are two main types of immigration policies: immigration control (e.g. over 
illegals and refugees, family reunification, and work visas) and immigrant integration 
                                                 
29 This is not to say that these claims are exclusive to right-wing populism. Such criticisms have been levied 
for decades by many groups, even before Huntington’s (1996) notion of the clash of civilizations. 
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(e.g. concerning citizenship, anti-discrimination, and language requirements) (Givens 
2010: 81–82). In the US, debates over immigration policy hinge more on physical borders 
while in Europe, the concern is more over the non-territorial border between us and them. 
The focus on immigration control in the US has been particularly intense after 9/11. 
 
1.7.1 Federal prerogatives 
The vast powers of the federal government to regulate the admission, expulsion, and 
naturalization of non-citizens is rooted in the Constitution, US Code, federal regulations, 
statutes, and SC decisions. Federal and state government attempts to regulate non-citizens 
have often come into conflict. In general, the SC has given relatively free rein to the 
legislature and the executive in this area. 
 The legislature has a “plenary and unqualified” power to regulate immigration, 
naturalization, and matters of foreign policy that arise from the same (National Paralegal 
College 2018). Article 1(8)(4) gives Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization,” which is generally held to be the legislature’s constitutional source of 
power over immigration. However, naturalization does not necessitate full control over 
immigration. 
The judiciary has been extremely deferential to the federal government in matters 
with potential international ramifications. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952), the SC 
held that “any policy toward aliens” is an essential part of conducting foreign relations, 
so much so that such matters are “exclusively entrusted to the political branches of 
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference” (Justia: US 
Supreme Court Center 2018a). Congress is therefore free to set the terms that dictate the 
admission of aliens into the country.  
Furthermore, federal courts have found the detainment of non-citizens and 
immigration quotas in keeping with the Constitution and the UN Charter, and that 
excluded non-citizens do not have a constitutional right to a hearing (Weissbrodt and 
Danielson 2004).  
 
The executive does not possess an inherent power over immigration. Its purpose is to 
enforce congressional legislation without exceeding the authority provided by that 
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legislation. However, legislation often does not provide directions on how to apply the 
law, thus the manner of enforcement becomes an executive prerogative. 
 The departments that conduct executive immigration policy are the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Department of State (DoS), the Department of Justice (DoJ), the 
Department of Labor (DoL), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 
Under the DHS, the Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) reviews petitions for 
immigration, asylum, and refugee applications; the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) seeks to identify and expel illegal aliens from within the US; and the 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seeks to prevent illegal entries in the first place by 
patrolling the borders and other ports of entry.30 
Much of the executive’s prerogatives, as well as the interaction between the federal 
and state governments is governed by the latter chapters of Title 8 of the US Code (USC). 
For example, under 8 USC § 1182, the executive is endowed with the power to suspend 
the entry of “any aliens or any class of aliens” (Cornell Law School: Legal Information 
Institute 2018a). Nonetheless, 8 USC § 1152 also stipulates that no immigrant visa can 
be issued with prejudice towards the person’s “race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or 
place of residence” (Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute 2018b). The 1996 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), prohibits state 
and local governments from restricting or not responding to federal inquiries into the 
immigration status of individuals (Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute 
2018c, Citizenship and Immigration Services 2018a).  
The latter was a response to the emergence of so-called sanctuary cities — 
“localities which, as a result of a state or local act, ordinance, policy, or fiscal constraints, 
limit their assistance to federal immigration authorities seeking to apprehend and remove 
unauthorized aliens” (Kim and Garcia 2008: 1). 
In City of New York v. United States (1997) (Justia: US Constitution Center 2018b), 
a federal court upheld the preemption by two federal statues a New York City ordinance 
that prohibited NYC officials from sharing information about the immigration status of 
aliens with federal authorities and ruled that it did not violate the anti-commandeering 
                                                 
30 For a more comprehensive overview of federal agencies dealing with immigration, see Weissbrodt and 
Danielson (2004) and Davy et al. (2005). 
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doctrine under the Tenth Amendment. This doctrine means that the federal government 
may not require a state legislature to enact particular regulatory standards or require that 
state law enforcement directly participate in enforcing federal law (Kim and Garcia 2008: 
4). 
 
1.7.2 State prerogatives 
State efforts to regulate a field that is simultaneously regulated by congressional intent or 
federal statutes are struck down in federal courts by the doctrine of preemption — i.e. 
when state law conflicts with federal law, the former is invalidated. The main premise 
behind such preemption, the SC has held, in for example, Graham v. Department of 
Public Welfare (1971) (Justia: US Supreme Court Center 2018c), is that divergent state 
laws violate Article 1(8)(4) of the Constitution. Despite Article 1(8)(4), the Constitution 
does not explicitly state that the power to admit or deny admission or to remove non-
citizens rests with the federal government instead of state governments. 
Nonetheless, states are permitted some regulations that affect non-citizens but 
generally only if they comport with existing federal regulations. In Hines v. Davidowitz 
(1941) (Justia: US Supreme Court Center 2018d), the SC held states cannot, 
“inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or 
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulation.” 
Complementary efforts were not necessarily deemed constitutional. But in De Canas v. 
Bica (1976) (Justia: US Supreme Court Center 2018e), the SC upheld a California 
regulation that prohibited knowingly hiring non-citizens without lawful residence, stating 
that not “every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of 
immigration, and thus per se preempted by this constitutional power, whether latent or 
exercised.” This case implied that “states may fill gaps in the federal regulatory scheme 
governing non-citizens,” (Weissbrodt and Danielson 2004, Chacón 2014), but any 
incursions into the federal domain, such as crossing the line between immigration and 
foreign policy, have summarily been struck down in the courts. 
States nevertheless pass hundreds of immigration-related bills annually (Chacón 
2014). And while the SC has affirmed federal supremacy, it has permitted the states to 
regulate the lives of immigrants, such as denying most all forms of benefits to illegal 
residents. 
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This chapter outlined the key elements of ST relevant to this thesis and included 
interdisciplinary insights that should be adopted by ST in explaining securitization 
processes. Media studies, cognitive psychology, and law are all relevant to understanding 
how security is constructed in a society. The following chapter focuses on how the 
enhanced concepts of ST will be applied to the case study. 
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2 Methodology 
The chief aims of this thesis are to develop a more nuanced model for analyzing 
securitization processes and to argue that the media and the judiciary should be treated as 
functional actors in those processes. This requires the combination of those elements that 
the previous chapter suggested ST should incorporate, such as media studies and 
cognitive psychology. This chapter provides an overview of how the empirical case study 
supports the pursuit of these aims. 
This thesis is a disciplined and interpretive single case study because it applies an 
existing theoretical framework to a new event in an effort to show that the framework can 
be extended to account for it. The Trump administration provides a unique perspective 
which can serve to expand ST by specifically highlighting the role the media and the 
judiciary play in securitization. A single-case study also evades the common problem of 
a lack of time and resources. However, while one of the benefits of this thesis is its 
timeliness, it is also its drawback since active policy-making is ongoing at the time of 
writing. For example, the SC is yet to rule on the constitutionality of the travel ban EO. 
Nonetheless, the amount of data already available is sufficient to demonstrate the utility 
of my proposed framework and to argue that the judiciary and the media should be 
considered functional actors. 
 This thesis is built on qualitative analysis. This is justified, since the central premise 
of the thesis is an inductive one. The endeavor is effectively a conceptual once since 
empirical observations feed into the theoretical discussion already presented in the 
previous chapter. The primary subjects of analysis are discourse and immigration policy-
making. The data was gathered from US government websites and from various news 
sites that are generally understood to be in opposite political camps (such as the left-
leaning Washington Post and the right-leaning Washington Examiner). This 
differentiation is necessary to be able to infer that a certain political bent is associated 
with a particular media frame that that outlet uses. 
 To elucidate the context in which immigration policy has been conducted under the 
Trump administration, the thesis provides an overview of recent immigration policy and 
an analysis of public opinion polls. Several different polling companies were used to 
minimize polling bias. Polls are necessary for gauging audience responses to securitizing 
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moves and proposed policies, as well as for identifying the several audiences involved in 
the process. The ability of ST to account for public sentiments and the media’s effect on 
it is further enhanced by the application of Kingdon’s three streams model. Audience 
assent is the prerequisite of successful securitization. 
The subsequent section then proceeds to securitization proper. The Trump 
administration’s securitizing moves have been categorized according to the four specific 
areas of immigration policy they address. These are the following: tightening the southern 
border, issuing a travel ban on predominantly Muslim countries, placing restrictions on 
refugees and asylum-seekers while increasing the number of deportations and 
incarcerations, and defunding sanctuary cities. The ending of the DACA program has 
been excluded due to spatial restraints and because high public support for pathway to 
citizenship for DACA recipients keeps the issue from being securitized. Kingdon’s model 
is applied to each of these categories. The streams provide more specificity by breaking 
securitization up into different stages. The explication of the policy stream is contingent 
on the aspects of bureaucratic politics that have become public knowledge through the 
media which is the only source for such information. Insofar as the media primarily 
reproduces the information of the elites in government and in the bureaucracies anyway, 
whether through leaks or by authorization, this shall not considered a hindrance. 
However, the general lack of information regarding the development of some policies 
does not enable to delineate between the audiences in the problem stream and in the policy 
stream. The latter is important since proposed and adopted policy measures tend to go 
through several iterations before being implemented. The peculiarity of the Trump 
administration is that it confuses the temporally-linear logic of the Kingdon model, owing 
to wing to Mr. Trump’s style of issuing general proclamations and EOs first and 
producing the specifics afterward.  
Separately from the Kingdon model, securitizing and desecuritizing moves will be 
presented, the latter being issued by the political opposition. Because discourse is not the 
central focus of this thesis, the amount of textual examples will be limited. These limited 
examples are treated as particular illustrations of speech acts that have been reiterated 
several times by the administration or the political opposition. 
 The media sources that are used in this thesis are generally online publications, not 
broadcast television. The media frame will be understood generally as the particular angle 
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on a particular piece of news. If the media presents Mr. Trump’s measures in a dramatic 
frame, it is clear there is an attempt to elevate the topic higher on the public agenda. If the 
presentation is sympathetic to the measure then the media will be understood to be 
actively facilitating the securitizing move, if the presentation is antagonistic toward the 
measure then this is regarded as impeding it. If the frames are specific to a particular 
political leaning, then they are construed to be communicating with a partisan audience. 
 The judiciary’s impact will be measured dichotomously according to whether the 
courts have permitted or prevented the implementation of the administration’s policies. 
However, the very nature of securitization is such that it invites legal challenges by going 
beyond politics as normal (e.g. by violating civil rights of certain groups). Discourse is 
relevant in the analysis of the judiciary’s impact because judges issue rulings wherein 
they explain their rationale behind a particular decision. 
 Finally, I will conclude the thesis by analyzing the implications of the empirical 
data and consider whether the role of the media and the judiciary in this case justifies their 
treatment as functional actors in the securitization process. 
 
The following section will attach the units of analysis in ST to the empirical case study. 
 The securitizing actor is the Trump administration collectively and President 
Trump specifically. 
 The securitizing moves are speech acts that depict immigration as a threat to the 
country and lobby for the passage of policies to counteract that threat (e.g. a travel ban). 
These moves are transmitted through news outlets, broadcast television, and social media. 
 The referent objects are those security sectors which the Trump administration has 
depicted as existentially threatened. These will be apparent from speeches and from 
proposed and adopted policy measures. The classification of Mr. Trump as a right-wing 
populist leads to the prediction that there the administration has invoked multiple referent 
objects, namely the national economy and welfare (i.e. economic security), the 
institutional robustness of the state (i.e. national security), and national identity (i.e. 
societal security). 
 The functional actors are presumed to be the judiciary and the media. 
 The audience is the American populace of different political persuasions. Inasmuch 
as possible, distinctions between audiences will be drawn, informed by opinion polls. 
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 The context is the general political environment of the US currently. This can be 
gleaned from how different populations regard different issues. In terms of securitizing 
immigration, terrorist attacks by first- and second-generation immigrants both at home 
and abroad can play a significant role in preconditioning audience response. Other 
variable that predispose audiences against immigrants are economic insecurity31, high 
levels of unemployment within a community, media frames, etc. 
 
The following chapter presents the empirical case study, followed by an analysis of its 
implications and suggestions for future research. 
  
                                                 
31 The literature on populism considers the so-called losers of globalization hypothesis to be a central one 
behind the recent rise of right-wing populists (e.g. Mudde 2007). 
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3 Securitizing Immigration under the Trump 
Administration 
This chapter will first outline the context in which recent immigration policy has been 
conducted. This context will draw on the analysis of opinion polls that will be assumed 
to indicate the general mood of the country. The polls evidence a great degree of political 
polarization in general and largely divergent views on immigration in particular. The 
chapter will then proceed to briefly cover major immigration legislation preceding Mr. 
Trump’s presidency and the immigration platform Mr. Trump campaigned on. The 
chapter will then outline the four main categories of the administration’s immigration 
policy to which the enhanced securitization framework will be applied. The ending of the 
DACA program has largely been excluded due to it being almost identical to the other 
categories of immigration policy in the important aspects (such as Mr. Trump’s 
securitizing moves creating a link between illegal aliens and crime) and because high 
public support for pathway to citizenship for DACA recipients keeps the issue from being 
securitized. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an analysis of the results of the 
empirical research and suggestions for future research. 
 
3.1 Context 
Context determines what kinds of securitizing moves are more or less likely to be 
successful by conditioning the audience to be more or less receptive to certain arguments. 
A particular context determines who has the authority to speak, what can be spoken, and 
what is heard. The rise of left-wing and right-wing populists in Europe, in Latin America, 
and in the United States over the past decade and more, but particularly over the past 
couple of years, bespeaks a kind of affliction affecting at least parts of Western societies. 
For example, the share of manufacturing in Western economies has decreased particularly 
rapidly from the beginning the 21st century (Levinson 2018) and real wages, not taking 
into account decreased working hours and increased compensation through benefits and 
taxes, have remained unchanged since 1972 (Worstall 2016). This has been compounded 
with traditionally-white Western societies becoming more diverse ethnically (Cohn and 
Caumont 2016). 
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Populism scholars, in trying to explain the success of populist parties, have among 
other theories adopted the so-called cultural backlash hypothesis which suggests that 
older generations, especially men, have started reacting against long-term shifts toward 
more “progressive” and “liberal” social values (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 16). Values 
strongly correlate with birth cohort, education, and sex — thus, the cultural backlash 
thesis predicts that older men lacking a college degree will be the most antipathetic toward 
liberal attitudes regarding sexuality, religion, multiculturalism, and immigration 
(Inglehart and Norris 2016: 16). Insecure times are also less conducive to open-
mindedness and an acceptance of diversity (Ibid.: 13–14). Cultural accounts, in 
combination with economic hypotheses — e.g. that automation, outsourcing, 
globalization, the transition to a knowledge economy, etc. are leaving destitute certain 
segments of society — seem to explain populist successes rather convincingly. The 
aforementioned elements create a fraught environment on which populists can capitalize.  
Immigration specifically taps into quintessential radical right-wing populism, 
which is nativist because immigrants are treated as an alien threat to the nation; is 
authoritarian because either immigrants do not fit in and are criminals or because many 
immigrants enter the country illegally and have to be deported; and is populist because it 
blames the poor economic condition of some people on the political elites who have 
decided to let the immigrants in to satisfy their supposedly globalist ideology or their 
corporate overlords who desire cheap labor. 
Many consider Donald Trump’s election to the presidency to have been a 
reactionary response, a largely race-driven “whitelash” against the presidency of Barack 
Obama (Ryan 2016, Beauchamp 2016, Inglehart and Norris 2016: 9). While this is 
questionable statistically (since Trump won white voters by the same margin that 
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney did in 2012), it is a convincing argument 
socio-economically, given the wide gaps in terms of gender and educational attainment 
(Tyson and Maniam 2016).  
 
In the case of the US specifically, it is widely-acknowledged fact that polarization is at 
its zenith, having increased dramatically over the past decades (Berman 2016, Campbell 
2016). Partisan differences have widened considerably in terms of gender, race, 
educational attainment, and age. A majority of women lean Democratic, as do majorities 
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of ethnic minorities, the college-educated, and younger age cohorts (Pew Research Center 
2018). 
In 1994, only 64% of Republicans were more conservative than the median 
Democrat and only 70% of Democrats were more liberal than the median Republican 
(Pew Research Center 2017a: 12). In 2017, 97% of Republicans were more conservative 
than the median Democrat and 95% of Democrats were more liberal than the median 
Republican. Moreover, 71% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats cite harm of the other 
party’s policies as a major reason for identifying with their party (Fingerhut 2018). 
Politicla polarization far outranks polarization across social, economic, urban–rural, or 
generational lines. According to a 2017 Pew survey, 64% of Americans perceive a very 
strong conflict between Democrats and Republicans, compared to 29% between the rich 
and the poor, 27% between blacks and whites, 13% between urban and rural dwellers, 
and 12% between old and young people (Gramlich 2018). 
Partisanship on fundamental political values — immigration, racial discrimination, 
government-run healthcare and welfare — have grown from 15% in 1994 to 36% in 2017 
(Pew Research Center 2017a: 3). Curiously, this is despite the fact that attitudes on many 
issues — particularly on social ones (e.g. drugs, same-sex marriages, divorce, out-of-
wedlock births, etc.) — have shifted in the same, socially-liberal direction. It is simply 
the case that the rate of change has been bigger for Democrats than it has been for 
Republicans. Furthermore, research also indicates that partisans do not always understand 
the other side accurately (Lakoff 1996, Bauerlein 2012). 
Republicans tend to be more anti-immigration than Democrats. Republican-leaning 
views have roughly remained the same in the past decades, with a modest increase to 60% 
of respondents favoring decreasing immigration into the US. Meanwhile, Democrat-
leaning views have dropped by over half to 20% favoring decreasing immigration 
(Newport and Dugan 2017). Nevertheless, 65% of Americans say that immigrants 
“strengthen the country with their hard work and talents,” as opposed to 26% who think 
immigrants burden the country by “tak[ing] jobs, housing, and health care” (Pew 
Research Center 2017a: 38). These views were reversed in 1994 and the increase in 
positive attitudes has largely been driven by Democrats, whereas the share of Republicans 
who regard immigrants positively has never passed the share who regard them as a 
burden. In July 2015, a month after Mr. Trump had announced his candidacy, 53% of 
57 
 
Americans, including 76% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats believed illegal 
immigration “increases the level of serious crime” (Rasmussen Reports 2015a). In August 
2015, most Americans (76%) and just over half of Republicans (56%) supported a 
pathway to legal status for illegals that meet certain criteria (Goo 2015). In 2011, a split 
of 46%–47% supported and a fence that would cover the entire southern border (Pew 
Research Center 2011). 
 These results lead to a few conclusions and some assumptions that greatly 
illuminate the environment in which security is spoken. First, since political 
bipartisanship is greatly hamstrung by political polarization among the electorate, favor 
or disfavor regarding a certain securitizing move or a proposed policy measure is likely 
driven by party allegiance. This creates a situation in which these allegiances truly do 
become tribal, meaning group loyalty supersedes issue-specific reflection (Freeman 
1986). Second, the lack of bipartisanship in Congress, by definition, will shift policies 
toward the political extremes, thereby increasing the likelihood that politicians will seek 
to securitize those issues, which in turn fuels partisanship. A polarized society is more 
susceptible to calls by populists to topple the status quo. Third, the chances of the resulting 
securitizing moves succeeding will, therefore, be decreased since a smaller slice of the 
population will be open to being convinced. Fourth, the level of partisanship is presumed 
to be manifest in the media as well, insofar the media reflect and cater to the preferences 
of their respective audiences, which have grown more and more polarized. Political 
partisanship will be presumed to be expressed by the frames the media adopts, generally 
corresponding to the attitudes that left-leaning and right-leaning audiences have on 
specific issues. Fifth, given that the audience exhibits what could be called knee-jerk 
tribal loyalties, media coverage is largely expected to follow suit. This sort of partisan 
media coverage magnifies the sense of polarization in the country, leading to a vicious 
circle that exacerbates actual polarization and further decreases trust in the media Geiger 
(2016). 
 
3.1.1 Immigration policy 
The current US immigration system is founded on the 1952 Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (INA), which included a quota and a preference system, and the 1965 
Immigration Act, which removed country-specific quotas and instituted rules for special 
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preference. At the heart of these are nuclear and extended family reunification, 
humanitarian admissions, and labor inflows (Rosenblum 2006: 1).  
 Smaller reform packages have subsequently been adopted. The 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) granted a one-time amnesty to certain foreign nationals, 
eventually legalizing 2.7 million illegal aliens, and instituted the employment eligibility 
system. The 1990 Immigration Act established the green card visa lottery system, which 
effectively amounts to a diversity program for underrepresented countries. The 1996 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) imposed heavy 
penalties for immigration violations. In 2001, the Patriot Act made background checks 
tougher and security clearances harder to obtain. The 2005 Real ID Act eased the 
deportation of illegal aliens and asylum-seekers, and imposed federal requirements for 
state driver’s licenses. The 2006 Secure Fence Act authorized 700 miles of additional 
fencing along the southern border and increased funding for various measures of border 
security. 
 Comprehensive immigration reform has eluded American politicians for decades 
but its necessity has been acknowledged by both sides of the political spectrum. Givens 
(2010: 79) suggests that immigration reform in the US is so difficult because “the public 
has difficulty seeing beyond the cultural and ideational issues raised by the flow of people, 
whereas border control is a clear security issue.” Rosenblum (2009: 31) suggests that 
Americans disagree over the basic dimensions immigration reform is supposed to tackle: 
the economy, security, or culture. Many of the measures that were adopted after 9/11 were 
already being developed or implemented. However, the terrorist attacks prevented the 
Bush administration from fulfilling its promise to expand and to liberalize the 
immigration system (Givens 2010: 80). 
Immigration gradually became a key policy issue for President Obama. But losing 
70 seats to the Republicans in the 2010 midterms took comprehensive immigration reform 
off the table once again, given the lack of bipartisan support for a single immigration bill. 
In June 2012, President Obama announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program which halted the deportation of certain illegal immigrants who were 
brought to the US illegally as minors and instead provided those persons an opportunity 
to apply for renewable two-year periods of deferred deportation. By 2017, some 750,000 
out of an estimated 1.7 million eligible illegals — those who had been brought to the US 
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before age 16 and who had lived in the US without authorization for over five years — 
had signed up through the program (Martin 2017, Passel and Lopez 2017). Republicans 
accused President Obama of violating the law by sidestepping Congress (Preston and 
Cushman 2012). DACA recipients were permitted to apply for driver’s licenses but since 
they are issued by states, not by the federal government, some states refused to provide 
the recipients with licenses (Chacón 2014).  
Politicians and commentators were divided over the EO. Some (Rotunda 2015) 
argued that since the Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) had previously held that the 
President lacked “‘policy discretion’” and since President Obama himself had promised 
not to change immigration laws independently of Congress, then claiming “prosecutorial 
discretion” in instituting DACA was underhanded (Wolking 2014, Department of Justice 
2014). Others (Wittes 2014) held that since the 8 USC § 1227 stipulates that “deportable 
aliens” will only be expelled “upon the order” of the Attorney General (Cornell Law 
School: Legal Information Institute 2018d), then a kind of discretion is implied.  
  In November 2014, Mr. Obama announced the Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program, as well as his intention to 
expand DACA. DAPA was intended to give temporary legal status and work permits to 
illegal aliens whose children were citizens or legal permanent residents. However, 26 
states sued and their objections were upheld by the temporary injunction of a district judge 
after the 5th Court of Appeals ruled DAPA “untenable” (Ford 2015) and after the SC 
deadlocked in United States v. Texas (2016) (Justia: US Supreme Court Center 2018f). 
 The Republican responses to DACA and DAPA were hostile. The perception that 
the executive branch was unilaterally handing out residence and work permits raised the 
specter of national and societal security, making immigration a top issue for the 2016 
elections. This momentum was seized by Mr. Trump. 
 
3.1.2 Trump’s campaign 
Donald Trump ran on a platform that promised to largely undo President Obama’s 
domestic and foreign policies, from health care to the Iran nuclear deal. Immigration was 
the signature issue of his campaign, which is par for the course for most populist 
politicians. He has repeatedly called American immigration laws “dumb” (Griffiths 
2018). Much of the controversy that attended his campaign was specifically fueled by his 
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rhetoric and policy proposals regarding immigration. He famously promised to finally 
build a wall on the US–Mexico border and to make Mexico pay for it. He also threatened 
to deport millions of illegal aliens and to limit the number of refugees and visas issued to 
guest workers. Finally, he promised to reverse President Obama’s EOs that had instituted 
DACA and had tried to institute DAPA. 
 Mr. Trump’s views on immigration have evolved over time but have remained 
consistent in certain aspects. Many of the views he expressed were already outlined in his 
2000 public policy book The America We Deserve, written when Mr. Trump was 
considering running for president on the Reform Party’s ticket. In it, he stated that 
America was admitting far too many legal and illegal immigrants and that Americans 
should be put first (Sankin 2015). Mr. Trump’s conception of immigration is zero-sum 
(Matthews 2017).  
 Finally, opinion polls suggest that Mr. Trump’s anti-immigration rhetoric resonates 
with a significant portion of the American public, at least partially substantiating the 
notion that he was “giving voice to the voiceless” (Grabien 2016). This is further affirmed 
by the fact that Trump supporters were 17% more likely to support a border wall and 13% 
more likely to consider immigrants a burden than average Republican voters, and 28% 
and 22% more, respectively, than non-Trump supporting Republican-leaning voters 
(Smith 2016). 
 
3.2 Securitizing moves 
No immigration legislation has yet been passed under President Trump. His efforts have 
hitherto been limited to rhetoric and to several EOs. In general, President Trump has 
attempted two types of securitizing moves: (1) to protect economic, political, and societal 
security from illegal Latin American immigrants and (2) to protect political and societal 
security from radical Islamic terrorism. These sectors are depicted as existentially 
threatened, requiring the administration to adopt specific measures to crack down on 
immigrants. Insofar that EOs circumvent the Congress and often invite political and 
public backlash, they constitute extraordinary measures adopted in the service of an 
agenda. However, they are by their very nature limited and precarious since they can 
either be reversed by a future president or be blocked in courts. Audience support and 
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opposition is roughly split in half, likely contributing to the many legal challenges that 
have met the administration’s EOs. Public attention can often direct the attention of 
politicians but the process works the other way too (Kingdon 2013: 67). 
 
3.2.1 Securing the U.S.–Mexico border 
3.2.1.1 Kingdon’s three streams 
Problem stream: In the problem stream, issues or conditions are transformed into security 
problems. For this to happen, someone with political clout has to articulate that something 
is an existential threat. While immigration has been a high-priority issue in Washington 
for at least since 9/11 (and arguably much longer before that), the issue gained new 
urgency during when President Obama passed DACA and tried to pass DAPA. 
Nonetheless, at the first Republican presidential debate in August 2015, Mr. Trump 
claimed that immigration was not “on anybody’s mind until I brought it up at my 
[presidential campaign] announcement” (Time 2015a), despite indications that 
immigration had already started becoming a hot-button topic again (Greenberg 2015). 
However, Mr. Trump did shift discussion toward the more extreme end of the spectrum 
(Fahrenthold et al. 2015). 
 Mr. Trump has attempted to securitize migration by pointing at the absent border 
wall with Mexico. He has repeatedly stated that violent criminals and drugs are flowing 
in through the porous southern border, painting a picture of an America whose national, 
economic, and societal security are at risk. However, he has tended to play fast and loose 
with specificity (Trump 2015a). Political rhetoric is often misleading, if not dishonest 
outright. Several studies have indicated that illegal immigrants, other than being illegally 
present in the country, commit fewer crimes than natives (Nowrasteh 2015). However, it 
is true that drugs and people are trafficked across the border, and there does appears to be 
a “small but significant” association between illegal immigrants and drug-related arrests 
(Green 2016). 
 
Policy stream: In the policy stream, the details of the policy are formed and alternatives 
are generated. The policies that acquire the requisite feasibility and acceptability have the 
highest likelihood of being accepted. 
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 In January 2017, Mr. Trump issued EO 13767 which called for the construction of 
a border wall and detention facilities adjacent to it, and for the hiring of thousands of 
additional Border Patrol agents (The White House 2017a). In July 2017, the House of 
Representatives approved $1.6 billion for the wall but the Senate has so far not 
reciprocated. Thus, President Trump has repeatedly threatened a government shutdown 
over funding for the wall (Fabian and Bolton 2018). The administration commissioned 
the construction of eight prototypes to have choices regarding the type of border wall that 
is built (Edelman 2017). However, the ultimate construction of a border wall will still 
hinge on securing congressionally-approved funding. 
 In January 2018, in discussions over the continuation of the DACA program, the 
Democrats offered and then withdrew an offer to fund the wall (Cowan and Cornwell 
(2018). In May 2018, at the request of San Diego, the administration announced it would 
begin working on a section of the border wall in California (Reuters 2018). 
 Embedded in Mr. Trump’s calls to build a border wall have been several other 
measures that often deal with other aspects of immigration policy. His call to hire large 
numbers of extra Border Patrol and immigration personnel was deemed “unrealistic” by 
the DHS, given the number of applications that would have to be processed by its already 
“understaffed, poorly trained human resources operation” (Rein 2017). In April 2018, Mr. 
Trump signed a memo that ended the “dangerous practice” of catch-and-release, which 
sees immigration enforcement officials release detained illegal immigrants while they are 
awaiting to be heard by an immigration judge (Beech 2018, The White House 2018). 
 The wall seems to remain a tough sell because it represents an expensive package 
deal that costs more than the $22-billion estimate of the DHS, even if it would represent 
a minuscule portion of the entire federal budget (Brown 2017). This estimate does not 
cover extra border guards and annual maintenance. While the border represents a clear 
security problem, as Givens (2010: 79) stated, the biggest source of illegal immigration 
are visa overstays (Gonella 2017). 
 Therefore, not every policy — a potential one or an EO — is accepted by the policy-
making community in government. It could very well be that the Trump administration’s 
deviation from the temporal linearity presumed by Kingdon’s policy-making model 
hinders the adoption of his proposed policies — not because it deviates from the model 
itself but because it deviates from the typical, business-as-usual bureaucratic politics that 
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the model describes, and thus from those established procedures of negotiating that 
usually increase the viability of policies. As a result, the securitizing move is undermined 
by not commanding the formal support that institutions provide, preventing the adoption 
of extraordinary measures to counter the threat image. In the absence of executive and 
legislative sanction, proposed policies are debated even more hotly in the media, likewise 
preventing the accumulation of enough support for the securitizing move as a whole. 
 
Politics stream: In the politics stream, the policy proposals are presented to the public 
and either adopted or dismissed. Success is largely contingent on public and partisan 
support. 
 The essential part of this stream is public support for an aspect of immigration 
policy, understood as a proxy for support for a particular securitizing move. Mr. Trump’s 
failure to secure funding for the wall is at least partly the result of not convincing the 
population at large either.  
Curiously, support for the wall has been dropping ever since Mr. Trump raised it 
during the presidential campaign. In June 2015, the same month Mr. Trump announced 
his candidacy, the Pew Research Center survey showed 46% support for the border wall 
(Tesler 2016). In March 2016, the Pew figures had dropped to 36%. In August 2015, 
Rasmussen Reports (2015b) recorded 51% in favor of a southern border wall with 92% 
of Republicans and 30% of Democrats in favor. In April 2016, support had dropped to 
42% and by December, down to 37% (Rasmussen 2016a). CBS/New York Times polls 
showed a drop from 45% support in January 2016 to 39% in July 2016 (Tesler 2016). The 
RAND Corp’s PEPS poll, which tracks the same individuals, showed a decrease from 
48% to 38% support in July 2016 and August 2016 (Ibid.).  
In March 2018, a CBS News (2018) poll indicated 38% support and 60% 
opposition, with 77% support among Republicans, 10% among Democrats, and 36% 
among Independents. A 2018 Haas Institute poll found that 66% of Californians rejected 
the southern border wall as a policy priority (Haas Institute 2018). A Quinnipiac poll 
showed a 43%–53% split among Texans in April 2018 (Wallace 2018). Support for the 
border wall is low despite nearly half of Americans considering (illegal) immigration a 
major source of crime and a big drain on taxpayers (Rasmussen Reports 2017b, 
Monmouth University Polling Institute 2017). 
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 The downward trend in support for the wall points at a couple of underlying causes. 
First, the desecuritizing moves by the political opposition, repeated by and emphasized in 
the media, seem to have successfully countered Mr. Trump’s securitizing moves by 
making the construction of a border wall an illegitimate way to protect the country from 
illegal immigration, whether or not the threat itself is accepter or not. Second, it is more 
likely that the elites influence the people more than vice versa.  However, public pressure 
campaigns in the age of social media seem to be much more potent than in times before. 
In the current context, polling may suggest that support for the border wall was low even 
in the absence of media intermediation, thus contributing to the low support for the wall 
among government officials. Therefore, the securitizing actor has not managed to 
persuade enough of any relevant audience that either immigration should be securitized 
or that the response to securitizing immigration should be the construction of a border 
wall. 
 
3.2.1.2 (De)securitizing moves 
Securitizing moves: Mr. Trump has repeatedly attempted to securitize immigration by 
depicting the southern border with Mexico as an existential threat to national, societal, 
and economic security. All these potentially-threatened sectors were invoked in the June 
2015 speech at Trump Tower in New York City, where Mr. Trump announced his 
campaign for the presidency and created a political firestorm to boot. By creating a threat 
image of a conspiratorial outside seeking to take advantage of the US, he constructed the 
pretext for focusing that threat image on immigration. He stated that illegal immigrants 
from Latin America bring crime and drugs, a situation greatly exacerbated by the absence 
of effective border control:  
The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else’s problems. /…/ It’s true, and 
these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their 
best. They’re not sending you. /…/ They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and 
they’re bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing 
crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. But I speak to border guards 
and they tell us what we’re getting. And it only makes common sense. /…/ They’re sending 
us not the right people. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South 
and Latin America, and it’s coming probably — probably — from the Middle East. (Time 
2015b) 
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These sentiments have been echoed time and again in speeches, tweets, and in 
policies. For example, in the January 2017 EO on border security, illegal immigration is 
explicitly treated as a threat to “national security” and “public safety” (The White House 
2017a). Mr. Trump has also said that drug crime, fueled by Mexican cartels, has become 
a “dangerous threat to our societies” and that drug gangs have “literally taken over towns 
and cities of the United States” (Dinan 2017b). 
Finally, Mr. Trump has used the same event to lobby support for securitizing 
immigration on multiple fronts. When the illegal Mexican immigrant, who had been 
deported five times and who had killed Kate Steinle, was acquitted, Mr. Trump stated, 
“The Kate Steinle killer came back and back over the weakly protected Obama border, 
always committing crimes and being violent, and yet this info was not used in court. His 
exoneration is a complete travesty of justice. BUILD THE WALL!” (Trump 2017) 
 
Desecuritizing moves: In January 2018, Democratic Senate Minority leader Chuck 
Schumer (2018) tweeted out a story that said Mr. Trump wanted to cut back on “smart 
border security” to have the means to actually pay for the wall, and added that Democrats 
cannot agree to Mr. Trump’s wall because it is “completely ineffective” and “absurdly 
expensive.”  
In response to Mr. Trump’s 2018 State of the Union speech, Representative Joe 
Kennedy III delivered the official Democratic response in which he stated that President 
Trump’s policies are “not who we are,” and that whatever walls are built, “my generation 
will tear [them] down” (Meyer 2018). 
In February 2018, California Attorney General (AG) Xavier Becerra stated that the 
Trump administration is “ignoring laws it doesn’t like” to build on the southern border a 
“medieval wall” that violates “our values,” implying that the administration’s keenness 
on erecting a wall is both illegal and immoral (Kopan 2018). 
 Politicians and other public officials who have argued against the wall have largely 
refrained from stating outright that it is racist. Rather, they focus on the wall being 
expensive and imply it is a symbol of nativism and xenophobia. Given that securitization 
is aimed at adopting measures to combat an existential threat, it is analytically more useful 
to treat these instances as desecuritizing moves — inasmuch as they depict the referent 
objects as not existentially-threatened or the threat image as not existentially-threatening 
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—, not as counter-securitizing moves aimed at depicting President Trump as an existential 
threat to the same referent objects. The ultimate effect in either case is the 
delegitimization of the securitizing actor and the securitizing move, especially in response 
to such moves being performed first. 
 
3.2.1.3 Media frames 
Media coverage regarding the wall specifically has mostly focused on arguments in favor 
and in opposition to the wall. The consensus among publications of both political leanings 
is that the wall is a wasteful endeavor and that immigration enforcement efforts should 
be directed elsewhere. 
 Conservative outlets like National Review (2017) have stated that that while more 
barriers in “select places” would be welcome, “physical barriers along the southern border 
ought to be just one element of a larger immigration-enforcement agenda,” pointing at 
the dramatic decrease of border apprehensions as a sign that the “fulsome rhetoric” and 
EOs of the president have worked — even better than a physical barrier would.  
Left-leaning outlets like the Washington Post (2017) have concurred, saying that 
“the wall is a foolish and wasteful enterprise, one whose legitimate purposes — stopping 
unauthorized immigration and drug smuggling — could be achieved at far lower cost 
through other means.” However, if the wall was built, they would consider it a 
“monument to the xenophobia Mr. Trump tapped to get elected” (Ibid.). 
Other left-leaning outlets emphasize the latter point more expressly. An article in 
Vulture (Saltz 2018) said that the wall prototypes “call to mind that under Mussolini and 
Hitler, fascist architects appropriated the look, materials, and visual languages of classical 
architecture in order to create new gigantic, intimidating structures.” Commentators in 
other outlets have echoed these sentiments (Gallego 2017). 
Many right-leaning outlets have not so much argued in favor of building a wall but 
against the wall being a monument to racism, stating that calling people “racist” is a 
“discussion-killer,” which precludes people form finding “middle ground” (Campbell 
2018). Nevertheless, some commentators have tried to make the case that the “wall can 
work,” since border apprehensions in places where fencing has been erected have dropped 
precipitously (Sperry 2018). 
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The only media that cover the wall in a positive light consistently are those which 
present the views of anti-immigration hardliners, most of whom occupy a specific niche 
of right-wing politics. For example, early Trump supporter Ann Coulter has repeatedly 
castigated Mr. Trump for slow-walking his immigration policies (Fox News 2017). 
It is safe to assume that by generally representing the wall negatively — as a symbol 
of nativism and as a wasteful effort —, the public would be opposed to it. Given the 
decrease in support for the wall once Mr. Trump made it a campaign promise, one could 
also assume that the media’s transmission of these messages persuaded people against it. 
Thus, the media has impeded Mr. Trump’s securitizing moves aimed at producing a 
southern border wall. 
 
3.2.1.4 Judicial deliberation 
The Trump administration has so far not secured congressional authorization or funding 
for the southern border wall to be built. However, minor portions are in the works, in 
addition to the wall prototypes that have already been completed. 
In response to acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke announcing in September 2017 
that several environmental protections will be waived to build the wall and also in 
response to the 37 regulations that had to be waived to construct wall prototypes in San 
Diego, California, the Trump administration was sued by several environmental groups 
(Garfield 2017). In February 2018, District Judge Gonzalo Curiel, whom Mr. Trump had 
accused of being biased against him in the Trump University case because of his Mexican 
heritage, ruled that the administration has the authority to waive environmental laws and 
other regulations to build the border wall (Kopan 2018). Judge Curiel affirmed that is not 
for the courts to decide whether political decisions are wise. 
While this aspect of immigration policy has not been subjected to many lawsuits, 
the judiciary’s decision to rule against the executive would have impeded it from 
constructing parts of the border wall. In not intervening — but having the potential to do 
so —, the judiciary affirmed its role as a facilitating functional actor. 
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3.2.2 Travel ban 
3.2.2.1 Kingdon’s three streams 
Problem stream: The travel ban is arguably the most controversial policy President 
Trump has sought to implement. This stems from the originally explicit anti-Muslim 
nature of his rhetoric and proposed policies. Mr. Trump has sought to securitize political 
and societal security in the face of Islamist terror attacks in Europe and the US. In 
December 2015, after the Paris and San Bernardino, California terror attacks, he called 
for the suspension of Muslim immigration. He has also taken pride in finally articulating 
the words “radical Islamic terrorism,” effectively speaking a threat image into existence 
(Fox News 2015). In the context of a bevy Islamist terror attacks in Western countries, 
Mr. Trump sought to articulate radical Islam as an existential threat and promised to 
institute policies to keep America safe. 
 
Policy stream: In January 2017, President Trump issued EO 13769 (hereinafter EO-1) 
which purported to prevent terrorist attacks in the US by placing a 90-day moratorium on 
visa issuance to seven predominantly Muslim countries — Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen —, in addition to reducing the number of refugees admitted to 
the US, including an indefinite block on the admission of Syrian refugees (The White 
House 2017c, Shear and Cooper 2017). The moratorium was intended to provide a period 
for immigration agencies to review visa-issuing procedures and to potentially alter them. 
The travel ban went through several iterations after it was first introduced in 
December 2015. The original idea was to institute a blanket ban on foreign Muslims. In 
June 2016, right after the Orlando Pulse nightclub attack, Mr. Trump proposed 
suspending immigration from those countries in the world that have that have been 
“compromised by terrorism” (Detrow 2016, Healy and Martin 2016). In August 2016, 
Mr. Trump proposed to subject prospective immigrants to “extreme vetting” to weed out 
people who do not “share our values and respect our people” (Zezima 2016).  
Unlike in the case of the border wall, the development of the travel ban has engaged 
in more traditional forms of bureaucratic politics. In August 2016, Mr. Trump said he was 
forming a commission to decide from which countries immigration should be suspended 
(Stephenson 2016). He is also alleged to have requested a commission to show him “the 
right way /…/ legally” to design a “Muslim ban” (Wang 2017). The seven countries that 
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were eventually included in the original EO had been declared “countries of concern” by 
the Obama administration (Blaine and Horowitz 2017) and several people from those 
countries have had direct and indirect links to terrorist activities (Lee 2017b). 
 Once EO-1 was blocked, the administration revised it and issued EO 13780 
(hereinafter EO-2) (The White House 2017d) which excluded Iraq from the list of 
countries to which the travel ban applied and which no longer differentiated between 
Syrian refugees and refugees in general. 
 The SC stayed most of the injunctions against EO-2. Once the order elapsed in 
September 2017, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 9645 (hereinafter 
EO-3) which placed several additional countries under travel restrictions. 
 Given that EOs can be enforced immediately — unless or until stymied by legal 
challenges —, they largely circumvent the politics stream. However, EOs are not 
legislation and can be revoked by the subsequent administration. Insofar that they bypass 
Congress in instituting a policy, EOs may best be considered extraordinary measures in 
their own right, both in form and in content, as distinguished from congressional 
legislation that is extraordinary only in content. And as such, the politics of persuasion 
become secondary to legality, because urgent institutional, public, and media backlash 
will inevitably drive lawsuits against the government. The viability of policies is 
increased if it seeks to persuade people inside and outside government. Executive fiat in 
the absence of negotiated institutional support subverts the process of bureaucratic 
politics and also undermines the securitizing move because securitization is negotiated 
between the securitizing actor and the audience. 
 
Politics stream: As was the case with the border wall, the absence of institutional support 
and consistently favorable media coverage are likely to drive considerable opposition to 
the travel ban. In addition, there were public protests all across the country when the EO 
was issued. 
Public opinion polls have yielded contradictory results regarding the ban. In 
response to the proposed Muslim ban in December 2015, Rasmussen (2015c) found 46% 
support for and 40% opposition. But in 2017, Rasmussen (2017) found a split of 57%–
33%, a Reuters–Ipsos poll found a split of 48%–41%, and Gallup found 42%-57% (Bump 
2017). In February 2017, a Quinnipiac poll showed 38% saying the EO makes the nation 
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safer while 39% said it did not (Quinnipiac University 2017). In 2018, a Haas Institute 
poll showed 49% support and 51% opposition among Californians (Haas Institute 2018).  
Furthermore, in June 2017, an AP–NORC poll found that 57% of Americans 
thought the courts had “acted correctly” by blocking the ban while 39% thought the courts 
were “wrongly interfering,” including 82% of Democrats in the former category and 73% 
of Republicans in the latter (Caldwell and Swanson 2017). 
The public is at the very least divided on the issue and the disagreement generally 
follows party lines. Questionable institutional and public support are not optimal 
conditions for securitizing moves to be successful. However, in the case of EOs, the 
deliberation between the securitizing actor and the audiences may take on a judicial 
dimension, in which case the process will be influenced by the judiciary who effectively 
serve as an alternative mediator. This is because the judiciary, while being formally 
independent, are not responsible for submitting lawsuits, only for the adjudication 
thereon. These lawsuits can be brought by the unconvinced audiences in and out of 
government. 
 
3.2.2.2 (De)securitizing moves 
Securitizing moves: In December 2015, Mr. Trump’s campaign website issued a 
statement that called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on” 
(DonaldJTrump.com 2015b). The statement depicted Sharia law as entirely antithetical 
to American values. 
In an August 2016 speech, he specifically addressed radical Islam in a speech. He 
enumerated over a dozen of recent high-profile Islamist attacks on Western countries, 
including the Charlie Hebdo and Nice attacks in France and the airport bombing in 
Brussels. He added that the “hateful ideology of radical Islam” and the “oppression of 
women, gays, children, and nonbelievers” that it entails,” cannot be “allowed to reside or 
spread within our countries” (The Hill 2017).  
 The travel ban EOs reiterated many of these statements, arguing that the existential 
threat of terrorism to national and societal security is one that urgently demands a policy 
response. 
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Desecuritizing moves: Democratic Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer said in 
response to the travel ban, “Tears are running down the cheeks of the Statue of Liberty 
tonight as a grand tradition of America, welcoming immigrants, that has existed since 
America was founded, has been stomped upon.” (Owen et al. 2017) Lena Masri, an 
official at the Council on American-Islamic Relations, said, “There is no evidence that 
refugees — the most thoroughly vetted of all people entering our nation — are a threat to 
national security.” (Ibid.) 
In response to the revised travel ban, Democratic presidential candidate Bernie 
Sanders called the ban “a racist and anti-Islamic attempt to divide us up,” and stated that 
the president does not respect “our traditions of religious freedom (Carney 2017a). Mr. 
Schumer stated the EO was “dangerous,” “makes us less safe, not more, it is mean-
spirited, and un-American,” “must be repealed,” and “is all the proof Americans need to 
know that this has absolutely nothing to do with national security” (Carney 2017b). 
Unlike in the case of the border wall, politicians have been profuse in calling Mr. 
Trump a racist xenophobe and have depicted the travel ban as an illegitimate act fueled 
by animus. Their desecuritizing moves reject the notion that immigrants are a threat and 
that that welcoming immigrants is a fundamental value of America. The notion of 
counter-securitizing moves is stronger for this particular policy measure but I again 
suggest that since these moves are issued in response to a preceding securitizing move and 
with the aim of reversing it, the term desecuritizing move remains the appropriate 
analytical term.  
In addition, it might actually be more fruitful to analyze these particular 
desecuritizing moves through the lens of Austin and Brossard (2017) who discuss the 
simultaneous enactment of securitizing and desecuritizing moves. This link holds because 
the statements of those opposed to the travel ban have sought to reverse the logic of the 
initial securitizing move by President Trump: instead of radical Muslims being an 
existential threat to national and societal security which requires the adoptions of the EO, 
the EO itself is the threat to national and societal security and that Muslims are esteemed 
Americans and immigrants. 
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3.2.2.3 Media frames 
Media coverage of the EO has been much more partisan than for the border wall. Most 
all left-leaning outlets condemned the Muslim element in the order. Some commentators 
used evocative language, such a piece in the Guardian saying that, “Donald Trump is 
now officially gunning for the Muslims.” (Bayoumi 2017). The religious element has 
been highlighted in response to the revised travel ban as well, even though the revision 
tried to downplay the religious elements: “But make no mistake: It is a Muslim ban, no 
matter how much the Trump administration tries to wrap it in better legal reasoning, more 
docile language, and ribbon that screams national security.” (Cardona 2017A journalist 
for Vox said that even though Islam is a religion, the “orientalist” treatment of Islam has 
largely converted it into race as much as it is a religion (Harris 2017). Some left-leaning 
outlets, such as the Huffington Post, provided a platform to Muslim commentators who 
said that while the rollout of the EO was “clumsy,” radical Islam and radical attitudes 
among Muslim immigrants indeed had to be dealt with (Ali 2017). 
 Right-leaning pro-Trump outlets have been more focused on what has at times 
seemed like damage control. An article on Breitbart created a checklist of “facts” about 
the EO to counter the “hysteria” of left-leaning publications, stating inter alia that it is 
not a Muslim ban since the largest Muslim-majority countries “are not named,” that 
presidents have had cause to ban from some countries on the list before, and it is justified 
as a security measure if the government is concerned over its capacity to vet refugees 
(Hayward 2017). Many conservative outlets also provided judicial commentary to argue 
in favor the EO’s legality (McCarthy 2017a). Most of the conservative media has tended 
toward the latter, especially in responding to the judicial blocks issued against the EO, 
arguing that the judges “[got] it wrong” (von Spakovsky 2017) and that injunctions 
amounted to “judicial tyranny” (Shapiro 2017). Several left-leaning outlets, on the other 
hand, said that the Court of Appeals made “the right call” (The Washington Post 2017b). 
 In this case, media frames have been split between frames that effectively facilitate 
the securitizing move and those that are antagonistic to it. Media coverage that is at least 
to a significant degree sympathetic toward the government’s policies is likely to increase 
support for the policy among some of the audience higher than a baseline level of no 
media influence. However, the considerable amount of negative coverage has then 
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likewise done the opposite for the audience generally negatively disposed toward the 
policy. Thus, the media has magnified the split among the audiences. 
 
3.2.2.4 Judicial deliberation 
Once President Trump had issued the EO, acting DoJ Secretary Sally Yates, a holdover 
from the Obama administration who was waiting for the confirmation of eventual AG 
Jeff Sessions, refused to implement the travel ban for which she was promptly fired by 
President Trump (Johnson and Taylor 2017). 
 Numerous lawsuits were filed against the travel ban. Among them was a brief 
asking the courts to block the EO, signed by tech giants like Apple, Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft and by former Secretaries of State John Kerry and Madeleine Albright (Jacobs 
and Smith 2017). 
In early-February 2017, the original EO was blocked by Seattle District Court Judge 
James L. Robart, citing “immediate and irreparably injury” vis-à-vis the States’ “residents 
in areas of employment, education, business, family relations, and freedom to travel,” as 
well as the “operations and missions” of its universities and its tax bases (Robart 2017: 
4–5). Robart’s injunction did not discuss the judicial or constitutional provisions that the 
EO supposedly violated. Arguing against Judge Robart’s injunction, the Trump 
administration stated that judges were not equipped to adjudicate cases involving national 
security since they lacked access to classified information (Francisco et al. 2017). 
On the other hand, Boston District Court Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton, refused to 
block the EO, citing 8 USC § 1182 (Gorton 2017). Those in favor of the injunction 
generally argued that this statute and the broad discretion provided to the executive in 
terms of enforcing immigration law make the EO legal. Those opposed to the injunction 
generally argued that the EO violated the First Amendment and 8 USC § 1152 because it 
discriminated against race, nationality, and religion.  
 The Trump administration proceeded to withdraw the first version of the order and 
resubmitted a revised version in March. That EO was blocked by Hawaii District Court 
Judge Derrick K. Watson, by Maryland District Court Judge Theodore D. Chuang, and 
by Fourth Circuit Judge Roger L. Gregory. These judges went beyond the text of the EO 
to argue that the order was based on anti-Muslim sentiment, and thus a violation of the 
First Amendment (Watson 2017a). Watson cites Mr. Trump’s anti-Islam statements on 
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the campaign trail as “significant and unrebutted evidence of religious animus,” and that 
“facially neutral language” only emerged later on to mask the original sentiment (Ibid.: 
33–35). Moreover, Judge Watson argued that the EO would “irrevocably damag[e]” the 
University of Hawaii, including damage to “the collaborative exchange of ideas among 
people of different religions and national backgrounds” (Ibid.: 17–19). 
In June 2017, the Trump administration appealed their case to the SC who accepted 
it for review. The SC overrode the injunctions and reinstated the travel ban, except for 
people with “bona fide relationships” with persons or entities in the US (Wheeler 2018). 
The SC considerably narrowed the injunctions issued by Judges Watson and Chuang but 
let them stand. 
 In September 2017, as EO-2 expired, President Trump signed EO-3 which extended 
it. Judges Watson and Chuang again implemented temporary injunctions to prevent the 
order from taking effect. Judge Watson argued that EO-3 did not adequately justify the 
link of an individual’s nationality to their propensity to committing terrorist attacks and 
that its appeals to national security did not hold water since many countries fail some of 
the criteria outlined in the proclamation yet are not included in the ban (2017b: 27–30). 
Judge Chuang quoted Mr. Trump’s statements as basis to block EO-3 on statutory and 
constitutional grounds (Peña 2017). 
In December 2017, the SC stayed the injunctions on EO-3 until the SC itself rules 
on the matter (The Supreme Court 2017). The SC first heard oral arguments in April 2018 
and is expected to issue a final ruling before summer recess. 
The judiciary’s role in forbidding the travel ban EOs has prevented the securitizing 
move from being completed. This amounts to the judiciary acting as an impeding 
functional actor. However, the judiciary has specifically referred to the securitizing 
moves of the Mr. Trump as reasons for blocking the EOs. 
 
3.2.3 Restrictions on refugees and immigrants and increases in deportations and 
incarcerations 
3.2.3.1 Kingdon’s three streams 
Problem stream: The impetus that drove Mr. Trump to lobby for a border wall is largely 
the same that has driven his attempts to limit immigration and to increase deportations — 
a perceived threat to national, societal, and economic security. The illegal aliens that cross 
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the border end up in communities where they peddle crime and drugs. A 2012 DHS report 
said there 1.9 million “removable criminal aliens” (Department of Homeland Security 
2012: 61), out of whom an estimated 820,000 are unauthorized immigrants (Rosenblum 
2015: 22) Mr. Trump has repeatedly articulated these perceived threats. 
In July 2015, 32-year-old Kate Steinle was shot and killed in San Francisco by Jose 
Zarate, an illegal immigrant who had been deported five times. In November 2017, a jury 
acquitted Zarate of manslaughter charges (Stevens et al. 2017). President Trump 
repeatedly referenced the killing to argue that criminal illegal immigrants should be 
deported and that sanctuary cities, which San Francisco is, should be denied federal grants 
(Weinberg 2015, Nguyen 2016). In early-November 2017, immediately after the terrorist 
truck attack in New York City, Mr. Trump called for the suspension of the diversity visa 
lottery system because the assailant had entered the US through that very same program 
(Mark 2017).  
These exemplify how external events can drive the (re)articulation of a security 
problem. For example, in August 2017, the administration had formally supported the 
elimination of the visa lottery system (The White House 2017b) but the truck attack in 
New York City provided an opportunity to do so again. 
This aspect of immigration policy also has a distinct economic element to it, 
enabling Mr. Trump to claim economic security as the referent object threatened by 
illegal immigration. However, the idea of deporting illegals en masse would have serious 
ramifications on the labor market. Of the estimated 11 million illegals, about 8 million 
are in the labor force, constituting 5% of the national workforce of 160 million people 
(Martin 2017: 15). Almost a fifth of all agriculture workers in the US are illegals. It is 
also true that many illegals do menial jobs that Americans generally do not want to do. 
Analysts estimate that mass deportations could ultimately reduce the nation’s GDP by up 
to 2.6% (Soergel 2017). 
 
Policy stream: Mr. Trump paid little regard to the policy specifics of his general 
proclamations that illegal aliens should be deported. As with the southern border wall, 
analyses indicated that the material and social costs of mass deportations would be 
prohibitive (Schoen 2017). 
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 To aid the process of deporting illegals, the administration reinstituted the Secure 
Communities program via an EO in January 2017 (The White House 2017f). The EO 
argued that the “interior enforcement” of immigration laws is “critically important to the 
national security and public safety” of the country. The EO also accused sanctuary cities 
of allowing “[t]ens of thousands of removable aliens” back into the “communities across 
the country” (Ibid.). 
 In June 2017, President Trump proposed to ban new immigrants from having access 
to welfare programs for five years. However, such restrictions are already in place 
(Diamond 2017). 
In September 2017, the Trump administration proposed capping refugee admissions 
at 45,000 for 2018, the lowest number since the modern refugee admissions system was 
established in 1980 (Torbati and Rosenberg 2017). 
 Under President Trump, ICE arrests increased by 30% in 2017, largely due to the 
arrests of people without a “criminal background[],” outside being in the country illegally, 
although the high numbers under President Obama also stemmed from removing people 
with no criminal history (Federis 2018). 
Mr. Trump has also called for the ending of chain migration, under which legal 
immigrants are permitted to bring in distant relatives (The White House 2018). However, 
since the approval of every person takes a long time, massive influxes do not actually 
occur (Muñoz 2018). 
In cracking down on illegal immigration, the administration has foregone the “once-
common practice” of administrative closure, i.e. granting reprieves to immigrations 
targeted for deportation (Levinson 2018). This has contributed to an already-immense 
backlog of cases in immigration courts. In January 2018, AG Jeff Sessions announced he 
would seek “legal arguments” as to whether immigration judges should have the authority 
to “close cases” at all (Ibid.), indicating bureaucratic politics. 
In April 2018, President Trump directed the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
DHS to work with state governors to deploy National Guard troops to the southern border 
— with an aim to combat the “unacceptable” flow of drugs, criminal activity, and a 
migrant caravan traveling heading toward the US from Central America —, a move that 
Presidents Bush and Obama and state governors had also made (Davis and Rogers 2018, 
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Shaw 2018). This move led to the apprehension of at least 1,600 additional illegal border 
crossers (Giaritelli 2018). 
Also in April 2018, the Trump administration directed federal agencies to adopt a 
“buy American, hire American” strategy and signaled an intention to end handing out 
H-1B visas through a lottery (O’Brien 2017). H-1B visas are generally reserved for high-
skilled people in specialty occupations. 
Since Mr. Trump took office, ICE prosecutors have appealed administrative 
closures at 10 times the rate they did during the second term of President Obama 
(Levinson 2018). Deportations from the US interior have risen 34% (Sacchetti 2018) and 
deportations in 2018 so far are up 40% compared to 2017, “returning to Obama-era 
levels” (Britzky 2018). Arrests of illegal aliens not convicted of a crime have tripled 
compared to the last two years under President Obama (Gogolak 2018). In 2017, border 
apprehensions were at a 46-year low but the numbers surged in the spring of 2018 (Dinan 
2018a). 
This area of immigration policy concerns the most substantial aspects of 
immigration. By speaking security, Mr. Trump has tried to curry favor for a host of 
policies that are generally understood to be a prerogative of the executive branch — the 
enforcement of immigration laws. DACA established that the government can exercise 
discretion in not enforcing a vaguely-worded statute. The Trump administration has taken 
the opposite approach in targeting the illegal immigrant population at large while 
instituting measures that either reduce or discourage legal and illegal immigration into 
the country. 
 
Politics stream: This area of immigration policy touches on areas that are more deeply 
rooted than more controversial measures such as a border wall or a travel ban. 
In August 2015, Rasmussen (2015b) reported that 94% of those supporting a wall 
and 65% of those opposed to it favored the deportation of illegal immigrants convicted 
of a felony. In September 2016, Rasmussen (2016b) found 48% of respondents opposing 
taking in any additional refugees from the Middle East and Africa. A split of 62%–28% 
thought that admitting more refugees would pose a national security risk. 
In February 2017, a Pew (2017b) survey showed 56% support for and 41% 
opposition to the notion that the US has a responsibility to accept refugees. Also in 
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February 2017, a Quinnipiac (2017) poll found a split of 37%–60% in terms of support 
for and opposition to the suspension of all refugees for 120 days. 
In March 2017, a Gallup (Jones 2017) poll showed 59% of Americans worrying 
about illegal immigration with a 48%–79% split among Democrats and Republicans, 
respectively. 67% of Hispanics, 59% of whites, and 57% blacks worried about illegal 
immigration. Over the past 15 years, the general level of concern has held relatively 
steady, except for a marked uptick in 2006–08. 
In January 2018, a Harvard CAPS–Harris poll found 81% support for reducing legal 
immigration in general and 63% support for reducing legal immigration by at least half 
(NumbersUSA 2018). In March 2018, a Haas Institute survey showed 59% of 
Californians favoring increasing deportations (Haas Institute 2018). In April 2018, a 
Rasmussen (2018b) poll showed 54% opposition to letting the migrant caravan enter and 
37% favor for letting the migrants in temporarily so each of their cases could be reviewed 
individually. 
The public is generally favorably-disposed toward immigrants and refugees but less 
supportive of high numbers of legal and illegal immigration. Republicans tend to be more 
anti-immigrant than Democrats but two-thirds of Americans say that immigrants 
strengthen the country (Newport and Dugan 2017). Neither party holds favorable views 
of illegal immigration. Unlike for the border wall and the travel ban, public opinion tends 
toward the enforcement of immigration laws and the restriction of immigration generally. 
This predisposes the audiences toward accepting the securitization of immigration but 
less so of the securitization of immigrants, since most also favor a pathway to citizenship 
(Goo 2015). Americans support the deportation of criminal aliens but they are 
sympathetic to families not being broken apart by wanton deportations. Overall, stricter 
enforcement of immigration laws already on the books draws a much lesser backlash than 
attempts to institute new policies through EOs which are more likely to be perceived as 
extreme. 
 
3.2.3.2 (De)securitizing moves 
Securitizing moves: Mr. Trump has tried to securitize both immigration and illegal 
immigration. In 2014, at the annual conservative gathering CPAC, he threatened that 
passing immigration reform threatens the economy since immigrants are “taking your 
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jobs” and that it also threatens the Republican Party, which would “not get any of those 
[immigrant] votes” (Blake 2014). This notion echoes a 2012 Pew survey that found that 
illegal Latino immigrants lean Democrat over Republicans by a margin of 54%–19% 
(Patten and Lopez 2013). 
 In November 2015, President Obama stated after the Paris terrorist attacks, “ISIL 
does not represent Islam to the degree that anyone would equate the terrible actions that 
took place in Paris with the views of Islam.” (Fox News 2015) In an interview, Mr. Trump 
accosted President Obama for pussyfooting around the topic of radical Islam, adding that 
Syrian refugees are mostly men with fraudulent identification papers who could “very 
well [turn out to be] the ultimate Trojan horse” (Ibid.). 
 In October 2016, at a presidential debate, Mr. Trump said he would target “bad 
hombres” and “get them out” (Jacobo 2016). 
 During the presidential campaign, Mr. Trump repeatedly flirted with the idea of 
mass deportations, even echoing President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1954 deportation 
initiative known as Operation Wetback (Vlahos 2015).  
 These securitizing moves continue to depict national, economic, and societal 
security as existentially threatened. Comparing refugees to a Trojan horse is a particularly 
potent evocation of a threat image. 
 
Desecuritizing moves: National security experts have argued that refugees are not a threat 
to the US because they already are “among the most highly vetted immigrants” to be 
admitted (Torbati and Rosenberg 2017). Democratic Congressmen John Conyers and Zoe 
Lofgren said that capping refugee admissions at a low number constituted “an abdication 
of our moral authority, and an abandonment of the very values that make America great” 
(Ibid.). 
 In January 2017, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee Tom Perez 
tweeted out a statement which said that banning refugees and visa holders from countries 
in the Middle East and Africa is both “discriminatory and dangerous” and “contrary to 
our core values as Americans” (Perez 2017). 
 In March 2018, Mrs. Nancy Pelosi called the large-scale raid of illegal immigrants 
in California “unjust and cruel,” saying President Trump had “decided to terrorize 
80 
 
innocent immigrant families” and added that “Californians will continue to proudly keep 
our doors open to the immigrants who make America more American.” (Shaw 2018) 
 In May 2018, Mr. Bernie Sanders called President Trump’s views on immigration 
“heartless” (Morin 2018). 
 These statements again raise the question of what it means to be American and try 
to delegitimize the policies of the administration. 
 
3.2.3.3 Media frames 
Media coverage of this area of immigration policy has generally fallen into two categories 
and generally according to partisan leanings. Left-leaning outlets are more likely to 
publish stories that cast a sympathetic light on immigrants that have been in the country 
for decades but are being deported. Right-leaning outlets are more likely to publish stories 
that emphasize the crimes that immigrants commit.  
The first category focuses on the familial ties that are broken, echoing the common 
slogan among immigration activists that deportations often separate families (Pilkington 
2017, Silva 2018). These stories also tend to highlight the uptick in ICE arrests under 
Trump. These outlets also give a platform to immigrants negatively affected by particular 
policies to argue against those policies (Escalante 2017, Kalaw 2017). 
 The other category tends to emphasize the heinous crimes committed by 
immigrants, especially illegals. There is a tendency to give the impression that the 
particular crime being reported on is yet another one in a series recently and that these 
could have been avoided if immigration laws were “being fully enforced” (Bandler 2017). 
These stories also tend to criticize courts of judicial activism when they issue rulings 
favorable to criminal immigrants (Barron 2018). The outlets that tend report more on the 
negative aspects of immigration are usually right-leaning. 
 Left-leaning outlets have also focused on the morality of Mr. Trump’s immigration 
policies. An article in the Nation said that the administration’s policies are “designed to 
maximize suffering” (Hing 2018). Some columnists have written tongue-in-cheek articles 
that combat the “inhumanity of toying with people’s lives” by outlining the metrics in 
which natives to a little or a lot more poorly than immigrants, suggesting in jest that “[s]o-
called real Americans are screwing up America” and that maybe “they should leave” and 
be replaced with “new and better ones” (Stephens 2017). 
81 
 
 Some have focused on the policy-side of the debate. A column in the Washington 
Post argued that mass deportations have “long been ineffective policy” and that the focus 
should be on “stem[ming] the tide of undocumented immigrants” (Young 2017). The Los 
Angeles Times has given a platform to some immigration activists who argue that even 
violent criminals should not be deported since the “chaos” they would saw in Latin 
American countries would only cause more people to “flee those countries” (Castillo 
2017). A New York Times piece argued that by deporting MS-13 gang members, the 
criminals “simply regroup” and “head back” to the US but now with “recruits who know 
how to navigate the United States” (Martínez 2018). 
 Some commentators have argued that immigration policy should not be a tool “to 
divide us,” saying that the political parties “polarize the electorate and extract financial 
contributions from their favored interest groups,” even though America could be “a 
country of immigrants” that chooses to control its borders simultaneously (Cannon 2017).  
Conservative commentators often suggest that “the entire vocabulary of illegal 
immigration has become Orwellian,” accompanied by assumptions that illegal 
immigration is “a gift” to the US, even though some 1.2 million cases of identity-theft by 
illegals would amount to “career-ending felony” for US citizens, not to mention the 
brazenness of resident aliens in interfering in the politics of and declaring hostility toward 
the host country (Hanson 2018). Others emphasize that lawful residency and citizenship 
are “legal status issue[s],” not a matter of property or human rights (Ellis 2018). 
 Even though most Americans see eye-to-eye in opposing illegal immigration and 
favoring immigrants, the partisan differences that remain are sure to be magnified by 
media coverage. For example, if many outlets should consistently suggest that 
questioning the right of the US to restrict immigration amounts to intolerance, then this 
is unlikely to persuade the opposite side but to galvanize their antipathy even more. On 
the other hand, if other outlets suggest that immigration enforcement should be heavy-
handed and less concerned with the impact indiscriminate enforcement has on 
immigrants, the opposite will feel justified employing accusations of intolerance. By 
magnifying polarization in this manner, the media facilitates securitization of 
immigration for one audience and impedes it for another. 
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3.2.3.4 Judicial deliberation 
The courts have adjudicated on a couple of immigration cases tangentially related to the 
specific policies of the current administration. In February 2018, the SC ruled that 
immigration officials can hold immigrants “indefinitely without receiving [periodic] bond 
hearings” even if they have permanent legal status or are asylum-seekers, holding that the 
government has the right to detain immigrants while determining whether they should be 
allowed in the country (Bowden 2018). In April 2018, the SC struck down a deportation 
law that left the term “aggravated felony” too vague to be applied consistently in 
deporting immigrants (Liptak 2018). 
 Overall, in this particular aspect of immigration policy, the judiciary has played a 
different role than in other aspects. Since the majority of the administration’s policies in 
this field have concerned enforcement, the judiciary has instead been deployed to handle 
the backlog of cases in immigration courts. However, the very fact that immigration 
policy is thus rendered through the judiciary — i.e. the potential of the executive to 
enforce immigration laws is constrained by the capacity of the courts to handle individual 
applications of those laws —, the judiciary impacts the securitization process. And in this 
particular case, the judiciary acts as an impeding functional actor but one that has the 
potential to facilitate the process. 
 
3.2.4 Defunding sanctuary cities 
3.2.4.1 Kingdon’s three streams 
Problem stream: President Trump’s policies regarding sanctuary cities are also rooted in 
his antipathy toward (illegal) immigration. He has often stated that sanctuary cities 
perpetuate the crime and drug-smuggling that he associates with illegal aliens because 
sanctuary policies frustrate federal efforts to deport criminal aliens. 
 
Policy stream: In January 2017, Mr. Trump issued EO 13768 that stripped federal grant 
money from sanctuary cities on the basis of 8 USC § 1373 (The White House 2017e). It 
also ordered the resumption of the Secure Communities program and directed the 
Secretary of the DHS to hire 10,000 more immigration officers and to start issuing a 
weekly list of crimes committed by illegal aliens. 
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The Secure Communities program unites local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies in using integrated databases to identify criminal aliens (Department of 
Homeland Security 2009). The program was effected in 2009 and then canceled in 2014, 
after deportations had reached an all-time high under President Obama. The Obama 
administration replaced the program with one that focused on detainees charged with 
violent crimes. Statistics indicate that the program had not increased the number of 
criminal illegal aliens being deported specifically but the number of deportations 
generally (Groetzinger 2017).  
In August 2015, Mr. Trump used the Kate Steinle murder to argue for deporting 
illegal immigrants accused of murder and to withhold federal grants from sanctuary cities 
(Weinberg 2015). The murder inspired two proposed bills, Kate’s Law, which would have 
created mandatory minimum sentences for people who reenter the country illegally, and 
the No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, which would allow ICE officials to pick up criminal 
aliens from local jails and to withhold certain federal grants from sanctuary cities (Leslie 
2016, GovTrack 2017). 
The January 2017 EO said that sanctuary jurisdictions “willfully violate Federal 
law” and have caused “immeasurable harm to the American people and to the very fabric 
of our Republic” (The White House 2017f). 
In January 2018, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen suggested that she would ask the 
DoJ to look into prosecuting officials in sanctuary cities (Shapiro 2018). 
 
Politics stream: In 2015, Rasmussen Reports (2015d) recorded 62% of respondents 
approving of taking action against sanctuary cities while 26% opposed. In 2017, a 
Harvard CAPS–Harris poll found 80% opposing sanctuary cities while polls by 
McClatchy–Marist and Fox News found a 50%–41% and a 41%–53% split, respectively, 
in support for and opposition to stripping sanctuary cities of federal funds (Lee 2017a). 
A March 2018 CBS News (2018) poll yielded 48%–47% support for and opposition to 
sanctuary cities being given free rein to deal with immigrants. Among Republicans, 74% 
said sanctuary cities should comply with federal efforts while 70% of Democrats said 
sanctuary cities should be able to deal with immigrants as they see fit. 
 Based on public attitudes, it seems that the administration’s efforts to crack down 
on sanctuary cities has had a galvanizing effect. If sanctuary cities are depicted as an 
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extension of illegal immigration and thus a threat to national and societal security, the 
audience seems agree with the securitizing move. However, if sanctuary cities are 
depicted as havens for non-violent immigrants who are being threatened by deportation, 
the audience favors letting those immigrants be. These attitudes have become distinctly 
partisan, impeding the administration from compelling an end to sanctuary policies. 
 
3.2.4.2 (De)securitizing moves 
Securitizing moves: In July 2017, Mr. Trump stated that Kate’s Law and the No 
Sancctuary for Criminals Act would “make our communities safer” and “save American 
lives” (Abrams 2017). AG Jeff Sessions said that Kate Steinle’s murder would have been 
“preventable” if not for “San Francisco’s decision to protect criminal aliens” (Stevens et 
al. 2017). 
 EO 13768 itself argued that sanctuary policies threaten “national security and public 
safety” and have caused “immeasurable harm to the American people and to the very 
fabric of our Republic” through the release of “[t]ens of thousands” of criminal illegals 
back into the communities (The White House 2017e). 
 In an effort to convince law enforcement officers to direct their efforts at sanctuary 
cities, AG Jeff Sessions told them that the DoJ and the administration would “fight these 
unjust, unfair and unconstitutional policies that have been imposed on you” (CNBC 
2018). 
In May 2018, President Trump hosted a roundtable with California mayors and 
sheriffs who are opposed to the state’s sanctuary policies. During the session, Mr. Trump 
commended their resistance to “California’s deadly and unconstitutional sanctuary state 
laws” that provide “safe harbor to some of the most vicious and violent offenders on earth 
(Jones 2018). When a Sheriff had said that she is not allowed to inform ICE about 
criminals, such as a potential “MS-13 member” because of the sanctuary policies, Mr. 
Trump responded that the administration is “stopping a lot of them” and that, You 
wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t people. These are animals.” 
(Pavlich 2018) 
The administration has painted a clear picture of sanctuary policies as conduits for 
violent crime and drugs, threatening national and societal security. 
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Desecuritizing moves: California AG Xavier Becerra stated that California “abide[s] by 
federal law” and “respect[s] the Constitution,” whereas the Trump administration does 
not and is trying “bully local jurisdictions to do what they want” (Gerstein 2017). San 
Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera echoed these sentiments, stating that 
immigration enforcement was the “federal government’s job” and that nobody was 
“stopping them” from doing that (Ibid.). Mr. Becerra later stated, in response to the Trump 
administration suing California over its sanctuary policies, that the state is “in the business 
of public safety, not deportation” (Daniels 2018). These constitute desecuritizing moves 
because they assert the legitimacy of the state’s practices while asserting the illegitimacy 
of Trump’s policy. Their proposed way to achieve desecuritization is to block the EO that 
withheld federal grants from sanctuary localities. 
In January 2017, California Representative Nancy Pelosi said that “in our sanctuary 
cities, our people are not disobeying the law,” adding that they are protecting “law-
abiding citizens” (Schwartz 2017). In May 2017, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel stated 
that illegal immigrants and their children work “incredibly hard” and are “welcome” in 
Chicago because they are “part of the Chicago family” (Key 2017). 
 
3.2.4.3 Media frames 
Once more, there is a partisan divide regarding the outlets and the types of stories on 
sanctuary cities they are likely to publish. Left-leaning outlets usually depict sanctuary 
laws as necessary to protect non-violent illegal aliens from deportation, right-leaning 
outlets usually depict them as violations of federal immigration law intended to harbor. 
 An article in the Nation applauded the federal courts for striking down the sanctuary 
city EO, because it evidenced “the strength of our system’s response when confronted by 
a president dismissive of civil rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law” (Cole 2017). An 
opinion column on NBC News said that California is “the last, best hope against Trump” 
because California knows “how to bead down racism (Arellano 2018). 
 Left-leaning outlets have also tended to magnify the negative interpretatoins of Mr. 
Trump’s statements. When Mr. Trump tweeted, “There is a Revolution going on in 
California. Soooo many Sanctuary areas want OUT of this ridiculous, crime infested & 
breeding concept,” an editor on CNN wrote a piece trying to get to the bottom of the term 
and stated that the fear of immigrations “‘breeding’ has been a staple of nativist thought 
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for hundreds of years” and that it has “an animalistic connotation” (Wolf 2018). Left-
leaning outlets have also given a platform to people critical of sanctuary laws. Former 
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg appeared on MSNBC and rejected the idea that 
everybody can “be deciding which laws they obey” because “[t]he law is the law” (O’Neil 
2017).  
Conservative outlets have gone much further. A piece on Conservative Review said, 
“When it comes to nullifying federal immigration statutes /…/ liberals suddenly develop 
an affinity for localism,” and that “liberals have the Constitution exactly backwards” 
(Horowitz 2016). An editorial on National Review said that President Trump was right to 
push in the opposite direction of President Obama, saying, “localities that specifically 
forbid their officials to provide information to federal immigration authorities are 
violating the black-and-white letter of the law” (National Review 2017c). And a column 
on the Hoover Institution website said that “sanctuary city” does not really imply anything 
“other than a place where advocates of illegal immigration ignore and override federal 
law to allow illegal aliens to reside, often in violation of the local, state, and federal law,” 
adding that “a more honest description” would be “secessionist cities” or “amnesty cities” 
because they are “defiant state-rights enclaves /…/ in Confederate fashion” (Hanson 
2017). And as was the case with the previous aspects of immigration policy, many 
conservative commentators have criticized the injunctions place on the EOs of the 
administration (McCarthy 2017b). 
Competing sympathetic and antagonistic frames are likely to magnify divisions 
among the populace, impeding the crackdown on sanctuary cities. 
 
3.2.4.4 Judicial deliberation 
Several counties and California promptly sued the Trump administration over the EO on 
sanctuary cities, arguing that the administration did not have the congressional authority 
to add new conditions to federal grants and that that denying grants to localities that did 
not provide immigration authorities extensive access and information violated the 
Constitution (Becerra et al. 2017: 21–25). In April 2017, District Court Judge William H. 
Orrick issued a nationwide injunction on the order (Orrick 2017). In July 2017, Judge 
Orrick declined to stay the injunction despite the DoJ issuing a request to reconsider the 
block in light of a memo that narrowed the scope of the original EO (Lima 2017). 
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In November 2017, Judge Orrick made the injunction permanent, stating that the 
plaintiffs have demonstrated that the EO violates the separation of powers and deprives 
them of their Fifth and Tenth Amendment rights (Visser 2017). In April 2018, the 7th 
Circuit Court upheld the nationwide injunction, stating that a “check against tyranny 
[must not be] forsaken” (Dinan 2018b). 
 In March 2018, the DoJ sued California over its sanctuary laws that prevent police 
from inquiring the immigration status of detainees and that prevent local and state law 
enforcement from sharing with federal immigration officials information regarding the 
release of illegals from custody (CNBC 2018). 
 The injunction against the EO that stripped sanctuary cities of their federal grants 
is a demonstration of how the judiciary can impede the execution of the administration’s 
proposed policies, thereby impeding successful securitization. 
 
3.3 Analysis 
This thesis sought to develop a model for ST which takes into account policy-making 
procedures, different audiences, the deliberation between the securitizing actor and those 
audiences, and the influence of the media and the judiciary as functional actors. Based 
on the results of the empirical analysis, the treatment of the media and the judiciary as 
functional actors is justified. Their distinct influence on the securitization process has 
been demonstrated in all categories of immigration policy. 
 The media influences the way the securitizing moves and EOs are perceived and 
received. In all the cases except for the border wall, media coverage was eminently 
partisan. As was predicted by the theoretical and contextual considerations outlined in 
Chapter 1, the media was expected to magnify polarization among different audiences. 
This thesis did not seek to translate this impact into numerical terms, i.e. to measure 
precisely the impact the media had on public opinion, insofar that impact can accurately 
be measured at all. There seems to be an inverse relationship between the amount of 
media coverage a policy receives and the success of implementing that policy. Many 
aspects of immigration policy that pertain to enforcement, which are more widely 
understood to be the prerogative of the executive branch, have been performed with less 
backlash. 
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 The judiciary influences whether securitizing moves can be completed by adopting 
a policy. In the case of the southern border wall, the district court held that the federal 
government can waive environmental laws to build the wall. The travel ban and sanctuary 
city EOs were blocked. Regarding restrictions on refugees and the increase in 
deportations, it is the incapacity of the judiciary to handle the sudden increase in 
immigration cases that is impeding the enforcement of immigration laws. 
 The enhanced model of ST that this thesis has developed provides a more 
comprehensive overview of how securitization processes actually unfold in real life. The 
Kingdon model captures the initial articulation of a security problem and the resulting 
policy-making and deliberation with the audiences. The case study showed that the 
deliberation between the securitizing actor and the audiences need not be direct. For 
example, widespread antagonism to a policy is more likely to yield legal challenges which 
may be upheld in court. 
 The Trump administration case study has revealed other unique insights as well. By 
relying almost exclusively on EOs, President Trump has challenged the temporal linearity 
of the Kingdon model. The policy and politics stream were largely combined by first 
issuing the EO and then revising it once about half of the audience had objected, usually 
also resulting in a federal injunction. Indeed, the reiterative deliberative interaction 
between securitizing actors and audiences does not permit for linear securitizations — 
unless audience assent is sufficient in the very first iteration. All these developments, 
including debates over threat images and the contents of the EOs, took place in the public 
eye.  
The empirical case study also seems to indicate that securitizing actors tend to 
speak security to large audiences simultaneously, exerting influence on the public and 
policy-makers alike. The Kingdon model presumes a gradual expansion of the audience 
from select decision-makers to technocrats to the public at large. By articulating a threat 
publicly, the president influences policy-making processes in all three streams 
simultaneously. However, it may very well be that these theoretical concerns vis-à-vis the 
Kingdon model are specific to the Trump administration. Accounts of bureaucratic 
politics regarding previous administrations, for example, have demonstrated that tracing 
policy-making is applicable in the case of the US more generally. It may also be that if 
the Trump administration were to follow the established patterns of bureaucratic politics 
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— that which the Kingdon model was intended to theorize —, the feasibility and viability 
of the EOs would greatly increase. To the extent that the mercurial Trump administration 
turned the process on its head, the utility of the Kingdon model is nonetheless lessened. 
Besides, given that securitization aims to elevate political issues into security issues, the 
“normal” process of policy-making should not be expected to hold. 
By including in the paradigm the judicial precedents outlined in Chapter 1 Section 
7, we have cause to assume that the several blocks by federal courts are likely to be 
overturned by the SC. 
This thesis suggests that despite some theoretical concerns, the enhanced model for 
ST that incorporates Kingdon’s policy-making model, the explication of (de)securitizing 
moves, media frames, and judicial proceedings significantly improves the explanatory 
potential of the paradigm by providing a more accurate representation of reality. 
Securitization should be investigated across levels of analysis.  
 
3.4 Suggestions for future research 
Future securitization scholarship could follow several avenues. This thesis aimed to 
highlight the utility of an interdisciplinary approach to ST by putting different insights 
from different fields to the test in the empirical case study. Future research would do well 
to incorporate research in domains such as cognitive psychology and media studies to 
further enhance our capacity to understand security. For example, a lot of research 
remains to be done with regard to what arguments in what form audiences find most 
persuasive. Psychological insights are necessary to reveal how they respond to 
constructions of threats and insecurity. In other words, ST needs to take into account the 
essential features of the essential units that it investigates. Including interdisciplinary 
elements would help bridge the gap between theory and empirical research. 
 In relation to this thesis specifically, the revised functional actor concept could be 
applied to different empirical case studies, especially to test the roles of the media and the 
judiciary. A more comprehensive study would include a considerably larger percentage 
of TV broadcasts in the analysis to better understand the impact of media frames. 
Furthermore, future research could focus on the frames in news stories more than in 
opinion pieces. 
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 An auspicious path would be to investigate the dynamics between different 
functional actors and the resulting influence on the success of securitization. 
 Finally, to restate what other ST scholars (e.g. Léonard and Kauner 2011), audience 
assent still requires operationalization. How to measure audience acquiescence and how 
to precisely define critical mass? 
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Conclusion 
ST focuses on how certain entities are depicted as existentially threatened and how this 
can result in the elevation of political issues into security issues through the reiterative 
intersubjective deliberations between securitizing actors and audiences. This 
mutually-constitutive construction of security is influenced by contingencies such as 
functional actors and context that influence the success of securitization moves. 
Securitization makes it possible to adopt policies that go beyond the established norms in 
the political sphere. However, the original conception of the ST by the CS is marked by 
the sever under-theorization of sever key concepts. Second-generation ST scholars have 
not fully ameliorated these concerns. The Trump administration case study served to 
inductively tackle the theoretical concerns still present in the ST paradigm. 
This thesis had two overarching goals. First, it sought to develop a more 
interdisciplinary model of ST that accounts for policy-making procedures, different 
audiences, the deliberations between the securitizing actor and those audiences, and the 
influence of the media and the judiciary as functional actors. This endeavor necessitated 
intricate theoretical discussions regarding several key elements involved in securitization. 
Fields such as cognitive psychology and media studies were argued to be essential 
because of their intimate ties to the core units of analysis. 
Second, with the particular case study feeding directly into the theoretical 
considerations, to produce a more nuanced and practicable conception the functional 
actor, which is an entity that (1) affects decisions in a field of security in general and the 
success of a securitizing move in particular, (2) cannot independently produce security 
meanings, (3) stands to gain or lose, in material, ideational, social, or other terms, as a 
result, and (4) can, in its particular function, operate as a secondary securitizing actor or 
as a secondary audience but is not the direct target of a securitizing move. Specifically, 
this thesis argued that the media and the judiciary should be treated as functional actors 
by ST paradigm, based on the increased potential of the enhanced conception to describe 
reality. 
After providing a theoretical overview of the key units of analysis, including 
discussions on the functions of the media and the judiciary, the thesis constructed a model 
for analyzing securitization processes. To understand the dynamics between the 
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securitizing actor, the multiple audiences, and the media and the judiciary as functional 
actors, it is important to consider the context in which intersubjective interactions occur. 
The best way to do so is to delimit a policy area (such as immigration) and to discuss the 
events (such as terrorist attacks by immigrants) and attitudes (such as views on visa 
policies) germane to it. This thesis used public opinion polls to analyze public sentiments 
regarding several different aspects of immigration policy. 
The context in which immigration policy has been conducted under the Trump 
administration was followed by the delineation of different categories of immigration 
policy. John Kingdon’s three streams model, designed to describe the policy-making from 
the initial articulation of a problem till the final adoption of a policy, was applied to these 
categories, supplemented by securitizing and desecuritizing moves on part of the 
administration and its political opposition, by media frames that either facilitated or 
impeded the securitizing moves, and by the judicial proceedings that likewise have either 
facilitated or impeded the securitizing moves. 
The results of the empirical study indicated that the treatment of the media and 
judiciary as functional actors is justified because their distinct influence on the success 
of securitization process is clearly demonstrable. By magnifying polarization among the 
populace, the media impedes successful securitization by limiting potential support for 
particular measures. The judiciary can prevent securitizing moves from being completed 
by blocking policies. In the case of the US–Mexico border wall, the courts allowed the 
government to waive environmental laws to build the wall. The travel ban and sanctuary 
city EOs were blocked multiple times. The incapacity of the judiciary to handle the 
increased backlog of immigration cases impedes the effective enforcement of 
immigration law by the executive branch. 
The results of the study also indicate that an enhanced, interdisciplinary model of 
ST is a welcome addition because it increases the theory’s explanatory potential by 
offering a more accurate representation of the entities involved in the process. 
While the securitization framework has been considerably improved since its 
introduction two years ago, several unresolved theoretical obstacles remain. This thesis 
sought to take a step in resolving those obstacles and to offer novel avenues for future ST 
scholarship to embark upon, such as a more complete intertwining of the interdisciplinary 
elements with ST and the application of the enhanced analytical model to different cases.  
93 
 
Bibliography 
Theoretical background 
Altheide, David L. and Jennifer N. Grimes. (2005). War Programming: The Propaganda 
Project and the Iraq War. Sociological Quarterly, 46:4; 617–43. 
Austin, Jonathan L. and Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard. (2017). “(De)securitisation 
dilemmas: Theorising the simultaneous enaction of securitisation and 
desecuritization. Review of International Studies. 
Baele, Stephanie, Travis Coan, and Olivier Sterck. (2018). Security through numbers? 
Experimentally assessing the impact of numerical arguments in security 
communication. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20:2, 
459–76. 
Balzacq, Thierry. (2005). The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience 
and Context. European Journal of International Relations, 11:2, 171–201. 
Balzacq, Thierry. (2008). The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU 
Foreign and Interior Policies. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46:1, 75–100. 
Balzacq, Thierry. (2011). A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and 
variants. In Thierry Balzacq (ed.). Securitization Theory: How Security Problems 
Emerge and Dissolve, 1–30. New York: Routledge. 
Berling, Trine V. (2011). Science and securitization: Objectivation, the authority of the 
speaker and mobilization of scientific facts. Security Dialogue, 42:4–5, 385–97. 
Bigo, Didier and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds). (2008). Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: 
Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11. New York: Routledge. 
Bigo, Didier. (2002). Security and Immigration, toward a Critique of the Governmentality 
of Unease. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27:1, 63–92. 
Bourbeau, Philippe. (2011). The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and 
Order. New York: Routledge. 
Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen. (2009). The Evolution of International Security Studies. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 212–17. 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. (1998). Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
94 
 
Cavelty, Myriam D. (2008). Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the 
Information Age. London: Routledge. 
Côté, Adam. (2016). Agents without agency: assessing the role of the audience in 
securitization theory. Security Dialogue, 47:6, 541–58. 
d’Appollonia, Ariane C. (2015). Migrant Mobilization and Securitization in the US and 
Europe: How Does It Feel to Be a Threat? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
d’Appollonia, Ariane C. and Simon Reich (eds). (2008). Immigration, Integration and 
Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective. Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press. 
d’Appollonia, Ariane C. and Simon Reich (eds). (2010). Managing Ethnic Diversity after 
9/11: Integration, Security, and Civil Liberties in Transatlantic Perspective. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles. (1991 [1966]). Bergsonism. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam. New York: Zone Books. 
Dolinec, Vladimír. (2010). The Role of Mass Media in the Securitization Process of 
International Terrorism. Politické vedy, 13:2, 8–32. 
Durant, Robert F. and Paul F. Diehl. (1989). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy: 
Lessons from the U.S. Foreign Policy Arena. Journal of Public Policy, 9:2, 179–
205. 
Eriksson, Johan. (1999). Agendas, threats, and politics: Securitization in Sweden. 
Presentation at the joint session of the European Consortium for Political 
Research. Mannheim, Germany, 26–31 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/df1bf200-8995-4ae6-ab10-
50f442f0bc7d.pdf. 
Eroukhmanoff, Clara. (2018). ‘It’s not a Muslim ban!’ Indirect speech acts and the 
securitisation of Islam in the United States post-9/11, Global Discourse, 8:1, 5–
25. 
Freeman, Jo. (1986). The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties. 
Political Science Quarterly, 101:3, 327–56. 
Gitlin, Todd. (2003). The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and 
Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
95 
 
Givens, Terri E. (2010). Immigration and National Security: Comparing the U.S. and 
Europe. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 11:1, 79–
88. 
Hansen, Lene. (2012). Reconstructing desecuritisation. Review of International Studies, 
38:3, 525–46. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Huysmans, Jef. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 38:5, 751–77. 
Huysmans, Jef. (2006). The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. 
London: Routledge. 
Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: 
Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. Harvard Kennedy School. Accessed 
10 May 2008, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818659. 
Kahan Dan M., Donald Braman, Gregory N. Mandel, Lisa L. Ouellette, Ellen Peters, Paul 
Slovic, and Maggie Wittlin. (2012). The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy 
and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks. Nature Climate Change, 2, 
732–35. 
Kingdon, John W. (2013 [1984]). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2nd ed.). 
Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. 
Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis. (2003). Media, Misperceptions, and the Iraq 
War. Political Science Quarterly, 118:4, 569–98. 
Léonard, Sarah and Christian Kaunert. (2011). Reconceptualizing the audience in 
securitization theory. In Thierry Balzacq (ed.). Securitization Theory: How 
Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, 57–76. New York: Routledge. 
Lind, Dara and Matthew Yglesias. (2016). Donald Trump and immigration, explained. 
Vox, 22 August. Accessed 31 March 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/2016/8/22/12552082/donald-trump-immigration. 
Martin, Philip L. (2017). Trump and U.S. immigration policy. California Agriculture, 
71:1, 15–17. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://doi.org/10.3733/ca.2017a0006.  
McDonald, Matt. (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. European 
Journal of International Relations, 14:4, 563–87. 
96 
 
McSweeney, Bill. (1996). Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. 
Review of International Studies, 22:1, 81–93. 
Mudde, Cas. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mudde, Cas. (2016). The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth 
Wave. C-Rex: Center for Research on Extremism, Working Paper Series No. 1. 
Neal, Andrew W. (2009). Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of 
FRONTEX. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47:2, 333–56. 
Neumann, Vanessa. (2006). The Incoherence of U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in 
Colombia: Exploring the Breaches in the Policy Cycle. European Journal of 
Development Research, 18:3, 412–34. 
Norris, Pippa, Montague Kern, and Marion Just. (2003.) Framing Terrorism: The News 
Media, the Government, and the Public. New York: Routledge. 
O’Reilly, Ciaran. (2008). Primetime Patriotism: News Media and the Securitization of 
Iraq. Journal of Politics and Law, 1:3, 66–72. 
Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro. (1983). Effects Public Opinion on Policy. 
American Political Science Review, 77:1, 175–90. 
Rawat, Pragati and John Charles Morris. (2016). Kingdon’s “Streams” Model at Thirty: 
Still Relevant in the 21st Century? Politics & Policy, 44:4, 608–38. 
Robinson, Piers. (1999). The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy? 
Review of International Studies, 25, 301–09. 
Rosenblum, Marc R. (2006). US Immigration Reform: Can the System Be Repaired? The 
Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper 132. 
Rosenblum, Marc R. (2009). Immigration and U.S. National Interests: Historical Cases 
and the Contemporary Debate. In Givens, Terri E., Gary P. Freeman, and David 
L. Leal. Immigration Policy and Security: U.S., European, and Commonwealth 
Perspectives. New York: Routledge. 
Rydgren, Jens. (2017). Radical Right-Wing Parties in Europe: What’s Populism Got to 
Do with It? Journal of Language and Politics, 1–12. 
Salter, Mark. B. (2008). Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of 
the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. Journal of International Relations 
and Development, 11, 321–49. 
97 
 
Searle, John R. (1979). Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stritzel, Holger. (2007). Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond. 
European Journal of International Relations, 13:3, 357–83. 
Vultee, Fred. (2011). Securitization as a media frame: What happens when the media 
‘speak security.’ In Thierry Balzacq (ed.). Securitization Theory: How Security 
Problems Emerge and Dissolve, 77–93. New York: Routledge. 
Vuori, Juha A. (2008) Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitisation – Applying the 
Theory of Securitisation to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders. 
European Journal of International Relations, 14:1, 65–99. 
Wæver, Ole. (2004). Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New ‘Schools’ in Security Theory 
and their Origins between Core and Periphery. Presentation at the annual meeting 
of the International Studies Association. Montreal, Canada, 17–20 March. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/6/pag
es74461/p74461-1.php. 
 
Case law and judicial precedents 
Chacón, Jennifer. (2014). Who is Responsible for U.S. immigration policy? Insights on 
Law & Society, 14:3. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/14/sprin
g-2014/who-is-responsible-for-u-s--immigration-policy-.html. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2018a). Pub. L. 104-208: Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ocomm/ilink/0-0-0-10948.html#0-0-0-
1429.  
Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2018b). INA: Act 242 — Judicial Review of 
Orders of Removal. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-
6965.html. 
98 
 
Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute. (2018a). 8 U.S. Code § 1182 – 
Inadmissible aliens. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1182#f. 
Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute. (2018b). 8 U.S. Code § 1152 – 
Numerical limitations on individual foreign states. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1152#a. 
Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute. (2018c). 8 U.S. Code § 1373 – 
Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1373. 
Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute. (2018d). 8 U.S. Code § 1227 - 
Deportable aliens. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1227. 
Davy, Megan, Deborah W. Meyers and Jeanne Batalova. (2005). Who Does What in U.S. 
Immigration. Migration Policy Institute, 1 December. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/who-does-what-us-immigration. 
Department of Justice. (2014). The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to 
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and 
to Defer Removal of Others. 19 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/
2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf. 
Federal Judicial Center. (N/d). Impeachments of Federal Judges. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges. 
Justia: US Supreme Court Center. (2018a). Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 
(1952). Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/342/580/case.html. 
Justia: US Supreme Court Center. (2018b). City of New York v. United States, 971 F. 
Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/971/789/1872861. 
Justia: US Supreme Court Center. (2018c). Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 
U.S. 365 (1971). Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/365/case.html. 
99 
 
Justia: US Supreme Court Center. (2018d). Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/312/52/case.html. 
Justia: US Supreme Court Center. (2018e). De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/351/case.html. 
Justia: US Supreme Court Center. (2018f). United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. (2016). 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/579/15-674. 
Kim, Yule and Michael J. Garicia. (2009). ‘Sanctuary Cities’: Legal Issues. 
Congressional Research Service Report. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2009,1026-crs.pdf. 
National Paralegal College. (2018). Historical Overview of Immigration Law. Accessed 
10 May 2018, 
https://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/courseware_asp_files/DomRelI
mmig/IntroToImmig/HistoricalOverview.asp. 
Office of the United States Attorneys. (N/d). Introduction to the Federal Court System. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts. 
Our Documents. (2017). Transcript of Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the Relocation 
of Japanese (1942). Accessed 1 March 2018, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=74&page=transcript. 
Rotunda, Ronald D. (2015). The President’s Power to Waive the Immigration Laws. 
Justia: Verdict, 12 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/01/12/presidents-power-waive-immigration-laws. 
Savage, David G. (2011). Justice Scalia: Americans ‘should learn to love gridlock’. The 
Los Angeles Times, 5 October. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-20111005. 
The White House. (N/d). Our Government: The Judicial Branch. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-judicial-branch. 
United States Constitution. (2018). Constitutionus.com. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://constitutionus.com. 
100 
 
Weintraub, Ellen L. (2016). Taking On Citizens United. The New York Times, 30 March. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/opinion/taking-n-
citizens-united.html. 
Weissbrodt, David S. and Laura Danielson. (2004). Immigration Law and Procedure in 
a Nutshell (draft version). Minnesota and Saint Paul: The University of 
Minnesota’s Human Rights Library. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/immigrationlaw.  
Wittes, Benjamin. (2014). Executive Power and Immigration Reform. Lawfare Blog, 17 
November. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/executive-
power-and-immigration-reform. 
 
Policy measures and judicial proceedings 
Becerra, Xavier, Angela Sierra, Michael Newman, et al. (2017). State of California v. 
Jefferson B. Sessions, Case No. 17-CV-4701. United States District Court, 
Northern District of California, 14 August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015d-e367-d6a8-ad7f-efff31190001. 
Beech, Eric. (2018). Trump signs memo ending ‘catch and release’ immigration policy. 
Reuters, 7 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-trump-memo/trump-signs-memo-ending-catch-and-release-
immigration-policy-idUSKCN1HD31Q. 
Bowden, John. (2017). Supreme Court rules immigrants can be detained indefinitely. The 
Hill, 27 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://thehill.com/regulation/court-
battles/375791-supreme-court-rules-immigrants-can-be-detained-indefinitely. 
Chung, Jane and Tom Westbrook. (2018). Asia fears trade war after Trump plans hefty 
steel, aluminum tariffs. Reuters, 2 March. Accessed 31 March 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade/asia-fears-trade-war-after-trump-
plans-hefty-steel-aluminum-tariffs-idUSKCN1GE0AN. 
CNBC. (2018). US Justice Department sues California over its ‘sanctuary’ laws. 7 March. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/07/us-justice-
department-sues-california-over-its-sanctuary-policies.html. 
101 
 
Cowan, Richard and Susan Cornwell. (2018). Democrats withdraw offer to fund Trump’s 
border wall. Reuters, 23 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration/democrats-withdraw-offer-
to-fund-trumps-border-wall-idUSKBN1FC236. 
Davis, Julie H. and Katie Rogers. (2018). Trump Will Work with Governors to Deploy 
National Guard to the Border. The New York Times, 4 April. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/trump-governors-
national-guard-border-mexico.html.  
Department of Homeland Security. (2009). Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan 
to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens. 21 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategi
cplan09.pdf. 
Department of Homeland Security. (2012). U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Years 2011 – 2013. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-congressional-budget-
justification-fy2013.pdf. 
Diamond, Jeremy. (2017). Trump’s proposed 5-year welfare ban for immigrants is 
already law. CNN, 25 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/22/politics/trump-immigrants-welfare-5-
years/index.html. 
Dinan, Stephen. (2017a). Illegal immigration plummets after Trump inauguration. The 
Washington Times, 4 April. Accessed 31 March 2018, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/4/illegal-immigration-down-
67-percent-under-trump. 
Dinan, Stephen. (2018b). Judges warn of Trump ‘tyranny’ in defending sanctuary cities. 
The Washington Times, 19 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/apr/19/trump-loses-appeal-
punish-sanctuary-cities. 
DonaldJTrump.com. (2015a). Immigration Reform that Will Make America Great Again. 
DonaldJTrump.com, 6 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150929153557/https://www.donaldjTrump.com/p
ositions/immigration-reform. 
102 
 
DonaldJTrump.com. (2015b). Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim 
Immigration. 7 December. Accessed 4 June 2017, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170301013409/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/pr
ess-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration. 
Edelman, Adam. Trump’s Border Wall Prototypes Are Complete. Now What? NBC 
News, 28 October. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-s-border-wall-prototypes-
are-complete-now-what-n815106. 
Fabian, Jordan and Alexander Bolton. (2018). Trump threatens to veto omnibus over lack 
of wall funding, DACA fix. The Hill, 23 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/379902-trump-says-he-may-veto-
omnibus-over-daca-border-wall. 
Federis, Marnette. (2018). How immigration raids have — and haven’t — changed under 
the Trump administration. Public Radio International, 16 March. Accessed 10 
May 2018, https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-03-16/how-immigration-raids-have-
and-havent-changed-under-trump-administration. 
Ford, Matt. (2015). A Ruling against the Obama Administration on Immigration. The 
Atlantic, 10 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/fifth-circuit-obama-
immigration/415077. 
Francisco, Noel J., Chad A. Reader, August E. Flentje, et al. (2017). State of Washington 
v. Donald Trump. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 4 February 
2017. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/02/04/17-
35105%20motion.pdf. 
Giaritelli, Anna. (2018). Border deployment leads to arrest of 1,600 more illegal 
immigrants. Washington Examiner, 9 May. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/border-deployment-leads-to-arrest-
of-1-600-more-illegal-immigrants. 
GovTrack. (2017). H.R. 3003: No Sanctuary for Criminals Act. 29 June. Accessed 10 
May 2018, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr3003/summary. 
103 
 
Groton, Nathaniel M. (2017). Arghavan Louhghalam v. Donald J. Trump, Civil Action 
No. 17–10154–NMG. United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, 3 
February 2017. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2017/02/Gorton-order.pdf. 
Jacobo, Julia. (2016). Donald Trump Says He Will Get ‘Bad Hombres’ Out of US. ABC 
News, 19 October. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-bad-hombres-
us/story?id=42926041. 
Leslie, Katie. (2016). Cruz’s ‘Kate’s Law,’ named for San Francisco woman killed by 
illegal immigrant, stalls in Senate. Dallas News, 6 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2016/07/06/cruz-renews-push-kates-
law-named-san-francisco-woman-killed-illegal-immigrant. 
Levinson, Reade. (2018). Under Trump, prosecutors fight reprieves for people facing 
deportation. Reuters, 29 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-court-exclusive/exclusive-
under-trump-prosecutors-fight-reprieves-for-people-facing-deportation-
idUSKBN1H5187. 
Lima, Cristiano. (2017). Judge declines to remove block on Trump sanctuary cities order. 
Politico, 20 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/20/judge-declines-to-remove-trump-
block-sanctuary-cities-240780. 
Liptak, Adam. (2018). Justice Gorsuch Joins Supreme Court’s Liberals to Strike Down 
Deportation Law. The New York Times, 17 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/us/politics/supreme-court-deportations-
trump.html. 
Mark, Michelle. (2017). Trump is assailing the diversity visa lottery after the NYC terror 
attack — here’s what it is. Business Insider, 1 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-diversity-visa-lottery-trump-eliminate-
nyc-terror-attack-2017-11. 
Muñoz, Cecilia. (2018). The Myth of Chain Migration. Politico, 26 January. Accessed 10 
May 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/26/myth-chain-
migration-trump-family-immigration-216536. 
104 
 
O’Brien, Sara A. (2017). Trump takes first step toward H-1B reform. CNN, 18 April. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/18/technology/h1b-
reform/index.html. 
Orrick, William H. (2017). County of Santa Clara and City and County of San Francisco 
v. Donald J. Trump, Case Nos. 17-CV-000574-WHO and 17-CV-00485-WHO. 
United States District Court, Northern District of California, 25 April. Accessed 
10 May 2018, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3677977/32c4feb6-
e11c-4457-8c7d-faae1670117a.pdf. 
Peña, Richard P. (2017). 2nd Federal Judge Strikes Down Trump’s New Travel Ban. The 
New York Times, 18 October. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/us/travel-ban-blocked.html. 
Rein, Lisa. (2017). Trump plan to hire 15,000 border and immigration personnel isn’t 
justified, federal watchdog says. The Washington Post, 2 August. Accessed 10 
May 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-plan-to-hire-15000-
border-and-immigration-personnel-isnt-justified-federal-watchdog-
says/2017/08/02/c9345136-77a1-11e7-8839-ec48ec4cae25_story.html. 
Reuters. (2018). Trump says will go forward with border wall plans in California. Reuters, 
9 May. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-sandiego/trump-says-san-diego-wants-to-go-forward-with-its-
section-of-border-wall-idUSKBN1IA2NT. 
Robart, James L. (2017). State of Washington v. Donald J. Trump, Case No. C17-
0141JLR. United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, 
3 February 2017. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/02/03/17-
141_TRO_order.pdf. 
Rosenblum, Marc R. (2015). Understanding the Potential Impact of Executive Action on 
Immigration Enforcement. Migration Policy Institute, July. Accessed 10 May 
2018, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ExecAction-
Removals-SCOMM.pdf. 
Sacchetti, Maria. (2017). Immigration arrests soar under Trump; sharpest spike seen for 
noncriminals. The Washington Post, 17 May. Accessed 31 March 2018, 
105 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-arrests-up-during-
trump/2017/05/17/74399a04-3b12-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html. 
Sacchetti, Maria. (2018). ICE raids meatpacking plant in rural Tennessee; 97 immigrants 
arrested. The Washington Post, 6 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/ice-raids-meatpacking-
plant-in-rural-tennessee-more-than-95-immigrants-
arrested/2018/04/06/4955a79a-39a6-11e8-8fd2-49fe3c675a89_story.html. 
Shaw, Adam. (2018). Trump signs proclamation sending National Guard to Mexico 
border immediately. Fox News, 4 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/04/04/trump-to-sign-proclamation-
sending-national-guard-to-border-immediately.amp.html. 
Shear, Michael D. and Helene Cooper. (2017). Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 
Muslim Countries. The New York Times, 27 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html. 
Soergel, Andrew. (2017). The Hidden Cost of Deportations. U.S. News & World Report, 
10 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/the-
report/articles/2017-03-10/mass-deportations-could-hurt-the-economy. 
The Supreme Court. (2017). Trump, President of U.S., et al. v. Hawaii, et al. 4 December. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/120417zr_4gd5.pdf. 
The White House. (2017a). Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements. 25 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-border-
security-immigration-enforcement-improvements. 
The White House. (2017b). President Donald J. Trump Backs RAISE Act. 2 August. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trump-backs-raise-act. 
The White House. (2017c). Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States. 27 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-
nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states. 
106 
 
The White House. (2017d). Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States. 6 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-
nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-2.  
The White House. (2017e). Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of 
the United States. 25 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-enhancing-
public-safety-interior-united-states. 
The White House. (2017f). Executive Order: Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of 
the United States. 25 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-enhancing-
public-safety-interior-united-states/. 
The White House. (2018). President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address. 30 
January. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address. 
Time. (2015a). Transcript: Read the Full Text of the Primetime Republican Debate. 7 
August. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://time.com/3988276/republican-debate-
primetime-transcript-full-text. 
Time. (2015b). Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech. 16 June. 
Accessed 5 May 2017, http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-
speech. 
Torbati, Yeganeh and Mica Rosenberg. (2017). Trump administration proposes to cut 
refugee cap to 45,000. Reuters, 27 September. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-refugees/trump-admin-
proposes-to-further-cut-refugee-cap-in-report-to-congress-
idUSKCN1C22RN?il=0. 
United States Senate. (2007). Roll Call Vote 110th Congress – 1st Session: On the 
Amendment (Dorgan Amdt. No. 1316). 6 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?co
ngress=110&session=1&vote=00201. 
Visser, Nick. (2017). Judge Permanently Blocks Trump’s Executive Order on Sanctuary 
Cities. The Huffington Post, 21 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
107 
 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/sanctuary-cities-executive-order-
blocked_us_5a139666e4b0aa32975d6b3f. 
Watson, Derrick K. (2017a). State of Hawai’i and Ismail Elshikh vs. Donald J. Trump, 
CV. NO. 17-00050 DKW-KSC. The United States District Court for the District 
of Hawai’i, 15 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170317033303/http://www.hid.uscourts.gov/files/
announcement142/CV17-50%20219%20doc.pdf. 
Watson, Derrick K. (2017b). State of Hawaii, Ismail Elhiskh, John Does 1 & 2, and 
Muslim Association of Hawaii, Inc. vs. Donald J. Trump, Civil No. 17-00050 
DKW-KSC. The United Stated District Court for the District of Hawai’i, 17 
October. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/10/17/watson.pdf. 
Wheeler, Lydia. (2017). Second judge halts Trump’s travel ban. The Hill, 18 October. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/355979-
second-judge-halts-trumps-travel-ban. 
 
Media coverage and opinion polls 
Abrams, Abigail. (2017). House Passes ‘Kate’s Law’ and Bill Cracking Down on 
Sanctuary Cities. Time, 29 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://time.com/4840666/immigration-house-kates-law-sanctuary-cities-trump. 
Ali, Ayaan H. (2017). Trump’s Immigration Ban Was Clumsy but He’s Right about 
Radical Islam. The Huffington Post, 2 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-immigration-
ban_us_58933c0de4b070cf8b80d970. 
Ali, Yashar and Lydia Polgreen. (2017). How Top NBC Executives Quashed the 
Bombshell Harvey Weinstein Story. The Huffington Post, 13 October. Accessed 
10 May 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nbc-harvey-
weinstein_us_59de5688e4b0eb18af059685. 
Arellano, Gustavo. (2018). What California’s racist history can teach us in the battle to 
save immigrants from Trump. NBC News, 13 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
108 
 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/what-california-s-racist-history-can-
teach-us-battle-save-ncna856131. 
Bandler, Aaron. (2017). ANOTHER Illegal Immigrant Arrested For Sexually Assaulting 
An Underage Girl. The Daily Wire, 18 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.dailywire.com/news/15478/another-illegal-immigrant-arrested-
sexually-aaron-bandler. 
Barron, Seth. (2018). Find Better Martyrs. City Journal, 30 January. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.city-journal.org/html/find-better-martyrs-15697.html. 
Bauerlein, Mark. (2012). Liberals, Conservatives, and the Haidt Results. The Chronicle 
of Higher Education, 23 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/liberals-conservatives-and-the-
haidt-results/46113. 
Bayoumi, Moustafa. (2017). Donald Trump’s executive order means he is now officially 
gunning for Muslims. The Guardian, 28 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/27/trumps-executive-
order-officially-gunning-for-muslims. 
Beauchamp, Zack. (2016). Donald Trump’s victory is part of a global white backlash. 
Vox, 9 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/9/13572174/president-elect-donald-trump-
2016-victory-racism-xenophobia. 
Berman, Russell. (2016). What’s the Answer to Political Polarization in the U.S.? The 
Atlantic, 8 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/whats-the-answer-to-
political-polarization/470163. 
Blaine, Kyle and Julia Horowitz. (2017). How the Trump administration chose the 7 
countries in the immigration executive order. CNN, 30 January. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/how-the-trump-administration-
chose-the-7-countries/index.html. 
Blake, Aaron. (2014). Trump warns GOP on immigration: ‘They’re taking your jobs.’ 
The Washington Post, 6 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/03/06/trump-
warns-gop-on-immigration-theyre-taking-your-jobs.  
109 
 
Britzky, Haley. (2018). U.S. deportations are returning to Obama-era levels. Axios, 9 
May. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.axios.com/us-deportations-have-
returned-to-obama-era-levels-immigration-a1fb1d9d-8bef-4b83-8297-
6efe64412c85.html. 
Brown, Vanda F. (2017). The Wall: The real costs of a barrier between the United States 
and Mexico. Brookings Institution, August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-wall-the-real-costs-of-a-barrier-between-
the-united-states-and-mexico. 
Bump, Philip. (2017). Do Americans support Trump’s immigration action? Depends on 
who’s asking, and how. The Washington Post, 2 February. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/02/02/do-
americans-support-trumps-immigration-action-depends-on-whos-asking-and-
how. 
Caldwell, Alicia A. and Emily Swanson. (2017). Most Support Blocking Travel Ban, Poll 
Finds. U.S. News & World Report, 20 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-06-20/poll-courts-are-right-
in-blocking-trumps-travel-ban. 
Campbell, James E. (2016). The source of America’s political polarization? It’s us. The 
Los Angeles Times, 30 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-campbell-political-polarization-
20160627-snap-story.html. 
Campbell, Tom. (2018). Support building a border wall? It doesn’t make you racist. The 
Orange Country Register, 20 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.ocregister.com/2018/02/19/support-building-a-border-wall-it-
doesnt-make-you-racist. 
Cannon, Carl M. (2017). Immigrants are who we are, not a tool for political parties to 
divide us. USA Today, 28 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/07/28/why-america-should-still-
welcome-immigrants-carl-cannon-column/505081001. 
Cardona, Maria. (2017). Trump’s ‘Muslim Ban 2.0’ is still the same flawed, un-American 
mess. The Hill, 6 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
110 
 
blog/immigration/322543-trumps-muslim-ban-20-is-still-the-same-flawed-un-
american-mess. 
Carney, Jordain. (2017a). Sanders: Trump’s revised travel ban ‘racist and anti-Islamic.’ 
The Hill, 6 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/senate/322521-sanders-trumps-revised-ban-racist-and-anti-islamic. 
Carney, Jordain. (2017b). Schumer: Trump’s revised ban will have ‘same uphill climb’ 
in court. The Hill, 6 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-
action/senate/322495-schumer-trumps-revised-ban-will-have-same-uphill-climb-
in-court. 
Castillo, Andrea. (2017). Here’s why some immigrant activists say not even criminals 
should be deported. The Los Angeles Times, 6 May 2017. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-activists-deportation-20170406-
story.html. 
CBS News. (2018). Americans continue to oppose U.S.-Mexico border wall: CBS News 
poll. 12 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-continue-to-oppose-u-s-mexico-
border-wall-cbs-news-poll. 
Cohn, D’Vera and Andrea Caumont. (2016). 10 demographic trends that are shaping the 
U.S. and the world. Pew Research Center, 31 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/31/10-demographic-trends-that-
are-shaping-the-u-s-and-the-world. 
Cole, David. (2017). The Most Important Story of Trump’s First 100 Days. The Nation, 
4 May. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/the-courts-are-
fighting-back-against-trump. 
Detrow, Scott. (2016). Trump Calls to Ban Immigration from Countries with ‘Proven 
History of Terrorism.’ NPR, 13 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/2016/06/13/481910989/trump-expands-immigration-ban-
to-countries-with-proven-history-of-terrorism. 
Diamond, Jeremy. (2017). Trump’s proposed 5-year welfare ban for immigrants is 
already law. CNN, 25 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/22/politics/trump-immigrants-welfare-5-
years/index.html. 
111 
 
Dinan, Stephen. (2017b). Trump says border wall will stop drug cartels that have ‘literally 
taken over towns and cities.’ The Washington Times, 18 May. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/18/trump-demands-
border-wall-drug-fighting-efforts. 
Dinan, Stephen. (2018a). Illegal immigration surges 230 percent in April on southwest 
border. The Washington Times, 3 May. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/may/3/illegal-immigration-233-
pct-april-southwest-border. 
Ellis, Jenna. (2018). Democrats have a perverse legal logic on illegal immigration. 
Washington Examiner, 28 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/democrats-have-a-perverse-
legal-logic-on-illegal-immigration. 
Escalante, Juan. (2017). DREAMers like me have flourished under DACA. Trump might 
take it all away. Vox, 31 August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/first-person/2017/8/29/16220680/daca-trump-dreamers-
undocumented-immigrants. 
Fahrenthold, David A., Jenna Johnson, and Max Ehrenfreund. Trump driving migrant 
debate among GOP field. The Washington Post, 17 August. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-trumps-rise-hard-line-
immigration-ideas-take-hold-in-gop/2015/08/17/85dbbf3e-4506-11e5-846d-
02792f854297_story.html. 
Fingerhut, Hannah. (2018). Why do people belong to a party? Negative views of the 
opposing party are a major factor. Pew Research Center, 29 March. Accessed 10 
May 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/29/why-do-people-
belong-to-a-party-negative-views-of-the-opposing-party-are-a-major-factor. 
Fox News. (2015). Trump: Syria refugees could be the ‘ultimate Trojan horse.’ 18 
November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2015/11/18/trump-syria-refugees-could-be-
ultimate-trojan-horse.html. 
Fox News. (2017). Ann Coulter Unleashes on Trump for ‘Zero’ Progress on Border Wall. 
June 16. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://insider.foxnews.com/2017/06/16/ann-
112 
 
coulter-twitter-storm-trump-lack-border-wall-illegal-immigration-refugee-
policy. 
Gallego, Ruben. (2017). Why we should not build Trump’s border wall. AZ Central, 21 
September. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-
ed/2017/09/21/do-not-build-trump-border-wall-gallego/683522001. 
Garfield, Leanna. (2017). An endangered butterfly, toad, and Mexican shrub may stand 
in the way of Trump’s border wall in 2018. Business Insider, 20 December. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-border-wall-
lawsuit-environmental-concerns-2017-12. 
Geiger, Abigail. (2016). From universities to churches, Republicans and Democrats differ 
in views of major institutions. Pew Research Center, 26 September. Accessed 10 
May 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/26/from-universities-
to-churches-republicans-and-democrats-differ-in-views-of-major-institutions. 
Gerstein, Josh. (2017). California files suit over Trump sanctuary city policy. Politico, 14 
August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/14/california-trump-sanctuary-city-
grant-lawsuit-241623. 
Glass, Andrew. (2013). Drudge says Newsweek sitting on Lewinsky story, Jan. 17, 1998. 
Politico, 17 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/this-day-in-politics-086305. 
Gogolak, Emily. (2018). How Trump moved the Mexican border north. Politico, 15 April. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/how-us-president-donald-
trump-moved-the-mexican-border-north. 
Gonella, Catalina. (2017). Visa Overstays Outnumber Illegal Border Crossings, Trend 
Expected to Continue. NBC News, 7 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/visa-overstays-outnumber-illegal-border-
crossings-trend-expected-continue-n730216. 
Goo, Sara K. What Americans want to do about illegal immigration. Pew Research 
Center, 24 August 2015. Accessed 1 March 2018, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/08/24/what-americans-want-to-do-
about-illegal-immigration. 
113 
 
Grabien. (2016). Trump: Our Campaign Is About Giving Voice to the Voiceless. 12 
September. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://grabien.com/story.php?id=64409. 
Gramlich, John. (2017). Far more Americans say there are strong conflicts between 
partisans than between other groups in society. Pew Research Center, 19 
December. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/12/19/far-more-americans-say-there-are-strong-conflicts-between-
partisans-than-between-other-groups-in-society. 
Green, David. (2016). The Trump Hypothesis: Testing Immigrant Populations as a 
Determinant of Violent and Drug‐Related Crime in the United States. Social 
Science Quarterly, 31 May. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ssqu.12300. 
Greenberg, Jon. (2015). Trump: Illegal immigration wasn’t on anyone’s mind before he 
entered the race. PolitiFact, 7 August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/aug/07/donald-
trump/trump-illegal-immigration-wasnt-anyones-mind-he-en. 
Griffiths, Brent D. (2018). Trump complains about ‘dumb’ immigration laws. Politico, 1 
April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/01/trump-slams-immigration-mexico-
493075. 
Groetzinger, Kate. (2017). Trump’s temporary immigration ban was cover for his order 
to defund sanctuary cities. Quartz, 2 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://qz.com/899563/trump-executive-order-reinstates-bushs-secure-
communities-policy-which-may-have-serious-impact-on-immigrants-in-
sanctuary-cities. 
Haas Institute. (2018). California Survey on Othering and Belonging. 18 April. Accessed 
10 May 2018, https://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/california-survey-othering-and-
belonging. 
Hanson, Victor D. (2017). California, the Rhetoric of Illegal Immigration, and the Perils 
of Ignoring Thucydides’s Warning. Hoover Institution, 7 November. Accessed 10 
May 2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/california-rhetoric-illegal-
immigration-and-perils-ignoring-thucydidess-warning. 
114 
 
Hanson, Victor D. (2018). The Ideology of Illegal Immigration. National Review, 10 
April. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/illegal-
immigration-ideology-orwellian-virtue-signaling. 
Harris, Jenée D. (2017). Islam isn’t a race. But it still makes sense to think of 
Islamophobia as racism. Vox, 2 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/2/2/14452388/muslim-ban-
immigration-order-islamophobia-racism-muslims-hate. 
Hayward, John. (2017). Seven Inconvenient Facts about Trump’s Refugee Actions. 
Breitbart, 29 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2017/01/29/trumps-immigration-pause-sober-defenses-vs-
hysterical-criticism. 
Healy, Patrick and Jonathan Martin. (2016). His Tone Dark, Donald Trump Takes G.O.P. 
Mantle. The New York Times, 21 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-rnc-speech.html. 
Hing, Julianne. (2018). For Trump, Cruelty Is the Point. The Nation, 15 March. Accessed 
10 May 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/for-trump-cruelty-is-the-point. 
Horowitz, Daniel. (2016). Why liberals are dead wrong about sanctuary cities. 
Conservative Review, 2 December. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.conservativereview.com/news/federalism-when-it-works-for-them-
why-liberals-are-wrong-about-sanctuary-cities. 
Jacobs, Ben and David Smith. (2017). Trump tries to salvage travel ban amid numerous 
legal briefs to block it. The Guardian, 6 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/06/amicus-brief-trump-travel-
ban. 
James, Brendan. (2015). Donald Trump Slams Fellow GOPers For ‘Attacking Social 
Security’ (VIDEO). Talking Points Memo, 20 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/trump-gop-candidates-social-security. 
Johnson, Carrie and Jessica Taylor. (2017). Trump Fires Acting Attorney General for 
Refusing to Defend Immigration Order. NPR, 30 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/2017/01/30/512534805/justice-department-wont-defend-
trumps-immigration-order. 
115 
 
Jones, J. Harry. (2018). Trump rails against sanctuary city policies; Abed, Gaspar weigh 
in. The San Diego Union-Tribune, 16 May. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/communities/north-county/sd-no-trump-
meeting-20180516-story,amp.html. 
Jones, Jeffrey M. (2016). Record-High 77% of Americans Perceive Nation as Divided. 
Gallup, 21 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/197828/record-high-americans-perceive-nation-
divided.aspx. 
Jones, Jeffrey M. (2017). In U.S., Worry about Illegal Immigration Steady. Gallup, 20 
March. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://news.gallup.com/poll/206681/worry-
illegal-immigration-steady.aspx. 
Kalaw, Martine. (2017). America Should Think Hard Before Deporting Undocumented 
Immigrants Like Me. The Huffington Post, 18 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/martine-kalaw/the-obscurity-of-
deportat_b_9010332.html. 
Key, Pam. (2017). Rahm Emanuel: Dreamers Are ‘Part of the Chicago Family’ — Illegal 
Immigrants Are ‘Welcome Here.’ Breitbart, 28 May. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.breitbart.com/video/2017/05/28/rahm-emanuel-dreamers-part-
chicago-family-illegal-immigrants-welcome. 
King, Llewellyn. (2017). Trump’s policy on immigration is brainless, cruel and, 
ultimately, banal. The Denver Post, 24 February. Accessed 4 June 2017, 
http://www.denverpost.com/2017/02/24/trumps-policy-on-immigration-is-
brainless-cruel-and-ultimately-banal. 
Kopan, Tal. (2018). Judge Curiel, once attacked by Trump, rules border wall can proceed. 
CNN, 28 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/27/politics/border-wall-ruling-curiel/index.html. 
Lakoff, George. (1996). Chapter Two: The Worldview Problem for American Politics. In 
Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/467716.html. 
Lee, Michelle Y. H. (2017a). Do 80 percent of Americans oppose sanctuary cities? The 
Washington Post, 28 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
116 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/03/28/do-80-
percent-of-americans-oppose-sanctuary-cities.  
Lee, Michelle Y. H. (2017b). Stephen Miller’s claim that 72 from banned countries were 
implicated in ‘terroristic activity.’ The Washington Post, 13 February. Accessed 
10 May 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2017/02/13/stephen-millers-claim-that-72-from-banned-countries-
were-implicated-in-terroristic-activity. 
Levinson, Marc. (2018). U.S. Manufacturing in International Perspective. Congressional 
Research Service, 21 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42135.pdf. 
Martínez, Óscar. (2018). Trump Is Making MS-13 Stronger. The New York Times, 17 
February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/opinion/sunday/trump-ms-13-
gang.html?rref=collection/sectioncollection/opinion. 
Matthews, Dylan. (2017). Zero-sum Trump. Vox, 19 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/a/donald-trump-books. 
McCarthy, Andrew C. (2017a). Trump’s Exclusion of Aliens from Specific Countries 
Is Legal. National Review, 28 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/01/donald-trump-executive-order-ban-
entry-seven-muslim-majority-countries-legal. 
McCarthy, Andrew C. (2017b). A Ruling about Nothing. National Review, 26 April. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/trump-
administration-sanctuary-city-executive-order-activist-liberal-judge-william-h-
orrick. 
Meyer, Ken. (2018). Joe Kennedy Rebukes Trump in SOTU Response: ‘Build a Wall and 
My Generation Will Tear It Down.’ Mediaite, 30 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.mediaite.com/tv/joe-kennedy-rebukes-trump-in-sotu-response-
build-a-wall-and-my-generation-will-tear-it-down. 
Monmouth University Polling Institute. (2017). Public Takes Softer Stance on Illegal 
Immigration. 21 September. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-
institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_092117/. 
117 
 
Morin, Rebecca. (2018). Bernie Sanders: Trump administration ‘heartless’ toward 
immigrants. Politico, 13 May. Accessed 13 May 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/13/sanders-trump-immigration-
heartless-584240. 
National Review. (2017). Don’t Obsess Over the Wall. 26 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/04/donald-trump-border-wall-least-
important-immigration-enforcement-measure. 
National Review. (2017c). Reining in Sanctuary Cities. 29 March. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/jeff-sessions-doj-sanctuary-
cities-grant-policy-lawful. 
Newport, Frank and Andrew Dugan. (2017). Partisan Differences Growing on a Number 
of Issues. Gallup, 3 August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/215210/partisan-differences-
growing-number-issues.aspx. 
Newport, Frank. (2016). Democrats, Republicans Agree on Four Top Issues for 
Campaign. Gallup, 1 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/188918/democrats-republicans-agree-four-top-
issues-campaign.aspx. 
Nguyen, Chris. (2016). Kate Steinle’s family speaks after mention by Donald Trump at 
RNC. ABC 7, 22 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://abc7news.com/news/exclusive-kate-steinles-family-speaks-after-mention-
by-trump-at-rnc/1439363. 
Nowrasteh, Alex. (2015). Immigration and Crime – What the Research Says. Cato 
Institute, 14 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.cato.org/blog/immigration-crime-what-research-says. 
NumbersUSA. (2018). Harvard Poll: 81 Percent of All Voters Support Reducing 
Immigration Levels. 22 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.numbersusa.com/news/harvard-poll-81-percent-all-voters-support-
reducing-immigration-levels. 
O’Neil, Tyler. (2017). Michael Bloomberg on Sanctuary Cities: The Law Is the Law.’ PJ 
Media, 25 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
118 
 
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/04/25/michael-bloomberg-on-sanctuary-
cities-the-law-is-the-law.  
Owen, Paul, Sabrina Siddiqui, and Heather Stewart. (2017). US refugee ban: Trump 
decried for ‘stomping on’ American values. The Guardian, 28 January. Accessed 
10 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/27/trump-
immigration-plan-refugees-vetting-reaction. 
Passel, Jeffrey S. and Mark H. Lopez. (2012). Up to 1.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrant 
Youth May Benefit from New Deportation Rules. Pew Research Center, 14 
August. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/08/14/up-to-
1-7-million-unauthorized-immigrant-youth-may-benefit-from-new-deportation-
rules. 
Patten, Eileen and Mark H. Lopez. (2013). Pew Research Center, 22 July. Accessed 10 
May 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/22/are-unauthorized-
immigrants-overwhelmingly-democrats. 
Pavlich, Katie. (2018). Fake News: Media and Democrats Lie Repeatedly About 
President Trump Calling Illegal Immigrants ‘Animals.’ Townhall, 17 May. 
Accessed 17 May 2018, 
https://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2018/05/17/wrong-again-media-and-
chuck-schumer-claim-president-trump-called-all-illegal-immigrants-animals-
n2481698. 
Perez, Tom. (2017). Twitter post, 25 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://twitter.com/TomPerez/status/824458461111087105. 
Pew Research Center. (2011). The Generation Gap and the 2012 Election — Section 8: 
Domestic and Foreign Policy Views. 3 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.people-press.org/2011/11/03/the-generation-gap-and-the-2012-
election-3. 
Pew Research Center. (2015). A Deep Dive into Party Affiliation. 7 April. Accessed 31 
March 2018, http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-party-
affiliation. 
Pew Research Center. (2016). 4. Top voting issues in 2016 election. 7 July. Accessed 10 
May 2018, http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-
2016-election. 
119 
 
Pew Research Center. (2017a). The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even 
Wider. 5 October. Accessed 10 May 2017, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/05162647/10-05-2017-Political-landscape-
release.pdf. 
Pew Research Center. (2017b). Views of Trump’s executive order on travel restrictions. 
16 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://www.people-press.org/2017/02/16/2-
views-of-trumps-executive-order-on-travel-restrictions. 
Pew Research Center. (2018). Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ 
Party Identification. 20 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, http://www.people-
press.org/2018/03/20/wide-gender-gap-growing-educational-divide-in-voters-
party-identification. 
Pilkington, Ed. (2017). Torn apart: the American families hit by Trump’s immigration 
crackdown. The Guardian, 21 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/21/immigration-families-
deportation-crackdown-donald-trump. 
Preston, Julia and John H. Cushman. (2012). Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain 
in U.S. The New York Times, 15 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-
immigrants.html. 
Quinnipiac University. (2017). American Voters Oppose Trump Immigration Ban, 
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Big Gender Gap as Voters Disapprove 
of Trump. 7 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2427. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2015a). Most Agree with Trump that Illegal Immigration Increases 
Crime. 8 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/july_2015/most_agree_with_trump_that_illegal_immigration_increases_c
rime. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2015b). Voters Want to Build a Wall, Deport Felon Illegal 
Immigrants. 19 August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
120 
 
ration/august_2015/voters_want_to_build_a_wall_deport_felon_illegal_immigra
nts. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2015c). Voters Like Trump’s Proposed Muslim Ban. 10 December. 
Accessed 10 May 2018 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/december_2015/voters_like_trump_s_proposed_muslim_ban. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2015d). Voters Want to Punish Sanctuary Cities. 10 July. Accessed 
10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/july_2015/voters_want_to_punish_sanctuary_cities. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2016a). Most GOP Voters Want a Border Wall in Trump’s First 
Year. 6 December. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/december_2016/most_gop_voters_want_a_border_wall_in_trump_s_first
_year. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2016b). Voters Reject Obama’s New Middle East Refugee Plan. 20 
September. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/september_2016/voters_reject_obama_s_new_middle_east_refugee_plan. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2017a). Most Support Temporary Ban on Newcomers from 
Terrorist Havens. 30 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/january_2017/most_support_temporary_ban_on_newcomers_from_terrori
st_havens. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2017b). Voters Measure Illegal Immigration in Major Crime, More 
Tax Dollars. 29 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/march_2017/voters_measure_illegal_immigration_in_major_crime_more
_tax_dollars. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2018a). Most Want to Keep Out Central Americans Now at Mexico 
Border. 30 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
121 
 
ration/april_2018/most_want_to_keep_out_central_americans_now_at_mexico_
border. 
Rasmussen Reports. (2018b). Most Want Citizenship for Dreamers – and a Wall. 5 
February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immig
ration/february_2018/most_want_citizenship_for_dreamers_and_a_wall. 
Ryah, Josiah. (2016). ‘This was a whitelash’: Van Jones’ take on the election results. 
CNN, 9 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/van-jones-results-disappointment-
cnntv/index.html. 
Salts, Jerry. (2018). Trump’s Border-Wall Prototypes: A Kind of National Monument to 
American Nativism. Vulture, 17 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.vulture.com/2018/01/the-border-wall-is-a-national-monument-to-
trumps-nativism.html. 
Sankin, Aaron. (2015). Donald Trump’s 15-year-old book on public policy reveals what 
kind of president he’d be. The Daily Dot, 23 August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/donald-trump-the-america-we-deserve. 
Schoen, John W. (2017). Trump’s deportation plan could cost taxpayers half a trillion 
dollars. CNBC, 24 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/trumps-deportation-plan-could-cost-half-a-
trillion-dollars.html. 
Schumer, Chuck. (2018). Twitter post. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://twitter.com/SenSchumer/status/950753501633708032. 
Schwartz, Ian. (2017). Mother of Son Killed by Illegal to Pelosi: Which One of Your 
Children Is Expendable for an Illegal Life? RealClearPolitics, 31 January. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/01/31/mother_of_son_killed_by_i
llegal_to_pelosi_which_one_of_your_children_is_expendable_for_an_illegal_lif
e.html.  
Shapiro, Ben. (2017). JUDICIAL TYRANNY: 5 Biggest Legal Stupidities in the Ninth 
Circuit’s Decision to Stop Trump’s Executive Order. The Daily Wire, 9 February. 
122 
 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.dailywire.com/news/13353/judicial-
tyranny-5-biggest-legal-stupidities-ninth-ben-shapiro. 
Shapiro, Ben. (2018). Trump Administration to Investigate Prosecuting Sanctuary City 
Government Officials. The Daily Wire, 16 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.dailywire.com/news/25956/breaking-trump-administration-
investigate-ben-shapiro. 
Sharma, Ruchir. (2017). To Be Great Again, America Needs Immigrants. The New York 
Times, 6 May. Accessed 4 June 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/opinion/sunday/to-be-great-again-
america-needs-immigrants.html. 
Shaw, Adam. (2018). Pelosi slams California ICE raid as ‘unjust and cruel,’ amid outcry 
over mayor’s tipoff to immigrants. Fox News, 7 March. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/03/07/pelosi-slams-california-ice-raid-
as-unjust-and-cruel-amid-outcry-over-mayors-tipoff-to-immigrants.html. 
Shifflett, Shane. (2016). A Divided America. The Wall Street Journal, 10 November. 
Accessed 31 March 2018, http://www.wsj.com/graphics/elections/2016/divided-
america. 
Silva, Daniella. (2018). Michigan father deported to Mexico after living in U.S. for three 
decades. NBC News, 17 January. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michigan-father-deported-mexico-
after-living-u-s-three-decades-n838211. 
Smith, Samantha. (2016). Trump supporters differ from other GOP voters on foreign 
policy, immigration issues. Pew Research Center, 11 May. Accessed 10 May 
2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/11/trump-supporters-
differ-from-other-gop-voters-on-foreign-policy-immigration-issues. 
Sperry, Paul. This town is proof that Trump’s wall can work. New York Post, 13 January. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, https://nypost.com/2018/01/13/we-already-have-a-
border-wall-and-it-works. 
Stephens, Bret. (2017). Only Mass Deportation Can Save America. The New York Times, 
16 June. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/opinion/only-mass-deportation-can-save-
america.html. 
123 
 
Stephenson, Emily. (2016). Trump returns to hardline position on illegal immigration. 
Yahoo!, 1 September. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://in.news.yahoo.com/mexico-
contradicts-trump-paying-border-wall-clouding-visit-000803773.html. 
Stevens, Matt, Thomas Fuller, and Caitlin Dickerson. (2017). Trump Tweets ‘Build the 
Wall’ After Immigrant Is Acquitted in Kathryn Steinle Case. The New York Times, 
30 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/kate-steinle-murder-trial.html. 
Tesler, Michael. (2016). Donald Trump is making the border wall less popular. The 
Washington Post, 16 August. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/16/donald-
trump-is-making-the-border-wall-less-popular. 
The Washington Post. (2017). Congress must make a deal to avoid a shutdown. So, about 
that wall… 22 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-must-make-a-deal-to-
avoid-a-shutdown-so-about-that-wall/2017/04/22/fde2b4b6-26a9-11e7-b503-
9d616bd5a305_story.html. 
The Washington Post. (2017). The 9th Circuit makes the right call on Trump’s travel ban. 
10 February. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-9th-circuit-makes-the-right-call-
on-trumps-travel-ban/2017/02/10/22ca40e4-efbb-11e6-9662-
6eedf1627882_story.html. 
Trump, Donald J. (2018). Twitter post, 5 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/981859214380462081. 
Trump, Donald. J. (2017). Twitter post, 1 December. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/936551346299338752. 
Tyson, Alec and Shiva Maniam. (2016). Behind Trump’s victory: Divisions by race, 
gender, education. Pew Research Center, 9 November 2016. Accessed 10 May 
2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-
divisions-by-race-gender-education. 
Vlahos, Kelley B. (2015). Messy legal process could challenge Trump’s mass deportation 
plan. Fox News, 27 November. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
124 
 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/11/27/messy-legal-process-could-
challenge-trumps-mass-deportation-plan.html. 
von Spakovsky, Hans A. (2017). The Ninth Circuit gets it wrong. Fox News, 9 February. 
Accessed 10 May 2018, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/02/09/ninth-
circuit-gets-it-wrong.html. 
Wallace, Jeremy. (2018). Poll: Most Texas voters oppose border wall. The Houston 
Chronicle, 19 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Poll-Texas-voters-oppose-
border-walll-12847966.php. 
Wang, Amy B. (2017). Trump asked for a ‘Muslim ban,’ Giuliani says — and ordered a 
commission to do it ‘legally.’ The Washington Post, 29 January. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-
asked-for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-
legally. 
Weinberg, Ali. (2015). Kate Steinle Lawsuit Has Political Reverberations in Washington 
over Illegal Immigration. ABC News, 1 September. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/kate-steinle-lawsuit-political-reverberations-
washington-illegal-immigration/story?id=33461835. 
Wolf, Z. Byron. (2018). Trump blasts ‘breeding’ in sanctuary cities. That’s a racist term. 
CNN, 25 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/18/politics/donald-trump-immigrants-
california/index.html. 
Wolking, Matt. (2014). 22 Times President Obama Said He Couldn’t Ignore or Create 
His Own Immigration Law. Speaker of the House of Representatives, 19 
November. Accessed 10 May 2018, https://www.speaker.gov/general/22-times-
president-obama-said-he-couldn-t-ignore-or-create-his-own-immigration-law. 
Worstall, Tim. (2016). It’s True but Irrelevant That Real Wages Haven’t Grown Since 
1972. Forbes, 26 April. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/04/26/its-true-but-irrelevant-that-
real-wages-havent-grown-since-1972. 
Young, Julia G. (2017). Mass deportation isn’t just inhumane. It’s ineffective. The 
Washington Post, 18 July. Accessed 10 May 2018, 
125 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/07/18/mass-
deportation-isnt-just-inhumane-its-ineffective. 
Zezima, Katie. (2016). Donald Trump calls for ‘extreme vetting’ of people looking to 
come to the United States. The Washington Post, 15 August. Accessed 10 May 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/08/15/donald-trump-calls-for-extreme-vetting-of-people-
looking-to-come-to-the-united-states. 
